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Abstract

ABSTRACT:
The central theme of my thesis concerns the case of McGimpsey v. Ireland [1990] I.R.
110 and its wider significance. All discussion in the thesis can be traced back to this
seminal case. On a wider level, the thesis discusses Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution,
tracing their history from their ideologically irredentist origins through to their
amendment following the Good Friday Agreement, with its pluralist, inclusive redefinition of nationality. In essence, the thesis attempts to analyse the relationship
between the two jurisdictions in Ireland, and how it evolved over time. I have
endeavoured to explain how the 1937 Constitution re-defined these relationships, creating
problems for the 26 County State and its courts.
The thesis discusses how the State reconciled the existence of a legal claim over
Northern Ireland with the reality provided by a partitioned island. I argue that the State
has adopted an essentially pragmatic position in its attempts to reconcile Articles 2 and 3
with the de facto political reality on the ground. I discuss how this fundamentally
pragmatic position has co-existed alongside rigid Republican dogma and ideology. In
charting the political journey of Articles 2 and 3, I discuss how pragmatic considerations
have tended to weigh more heavily than idealistic rhetoric. While acknowledging the
radical re-definition of Irish nationality prescribed by the Good Friday Agreement, I
argue that conciliation and accommodation has always characterised the Irish State’s
relationship with Northern Ireland. It was through such pragmatism that the State was
able to reconcile the existence of the legal claim with the reality of partition. The
McGimpsey case forms the foundation of my argument, serving to illustrate the plethora
of problems created by the former Articles 2 and 3. My interview with Chris McGimpsey
(a plaintiff in McGimpsey v. Ireland) permits a deeper analysis of the subject, revealing
his personal perspective on the wider constitutional issue. The case demonstrates how,
(on a political level) the main traditions on this island were able to find a way to
compromise, enabling the realisation of a workable accommodation. I explain my belief
that the amendment of Articles 2 and 3 contributed in a small, but significant way to the
delivery of this new dispensation. The essential theme of my thesis, however, is that such
spirit of accommodation has always been inherent in Irish political thought.
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Articles 2 and 3

IRELAND

AND

THE

IRISH

1

CONSTITUTION:

PRAGMATISM OR PRINCIPLE?-THE MCGIMPSEY CASE

CHAPTER

1:

PREFACE-HISTORICAL

PERSPECTIVE

ON

ARTICLES 2 AND 3 AND THE POSITION RELATING TO
NORTHERN IRELAND

INTRODUCTION:
Article 2: “The national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its islands and its territorial seas.

Article 3: Pending the re-integration of the national territory, and without prejudice to the right of the
Parliament and Government established by this Constitution to exercise jurisdiction over the whole of that
territory, the laws enacted by that Parliament shall have the like area and extent of application as the laws
of Saorstát Éireann and the like extra-territorial effect.”1
“Ireland cannot shift her frontiers. The Almighty traced them beyond the cunning of man to modify”
(Arthur Griffith).2

Both the original text of the old Articles and the views expressed by the founder of Sinn
Féin, reflect the manner in which Irish nationalism traditionally interpreted the national
territory. The nation was defined almost entirely in terms of geography and territory,
comprising the island, its islands and territorial seas. The definition is problematic, being
at once exclusive and restrictive. The clear emphasis is to apply the concept of the Irish
nation exclusively to those inhabiting the island and its locality, with little scope being
given for a wider, more inclusive form of Irishness. For example, in the founding fathers‟
limited definition of the Irish nation there appears to be little room for those of Irish
1

Bunreacht na hÉireann (1937): The original Articles, prior to Nineteenth Amendment. For the purposes
of simplicity, all references to “Articles 2 and 3” in this thesis are acknowledging the former Articles 2 and
3, unless otherwise stated.
2
Quoted from a speech delivered by Dr C.D. McGimpsey to the Philosophical Society, University College,
Cork: 15 December 1990, p.1.
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origin living abroad. It should be remembered that the State was created at a time when
the island had experienced extensive emigration due to the economic hardship
experienced in the latter half of the 19th and early 20th centuries. The traditionally
nationalist conceit of the Irish nation is derived from the idea that the island was
bequeathed to the people by God, that the territory is held by divine benefaction. Griffith
is referencing this political theory in his definition of the nation. As the Preamble
testifies:
“In the Name of the Most Holy Trinity, from Whom is all authority and to Whom, as our final end, all
actions both of men and states must be referred”.3

In reading the 1937 Constitution it is clear that a theological and territorial definition of
nationality is very much reflected. Whilst the clear intention of the nationalist thinkers
who expounded this ideology was to define the extent of the nation and promote their
territorial interpretation of Irishness, it can be argued that a purely geographical
interpretation of the Irish nation creates problems for those Irishmen of unionist
background who would seek to define the nation in broader terms.4 The Constitution was
written at a time when such geographical notions of nationality were prevalent. The great
nation-states of the world had arisen from the political theories which had dominated
western thought since the late 18th century.5 Nationality (as an idea) was defined in terms
of territory. Linked to this concept was the idea that the nation possessed its own rights,
one of which was the right to self-determination and unity.6

Hence the 1937 Constitution is characteristic of a territorial interpretation of nationality.
Doyle has highlighted, however, that the document is rather vague and unclear in its use
of the term “nation”.7 He argues that, in reading the document, it is advisable to approach
the description of the nation with caution. He cites Desmond Clarke as reasoning:

3

Bunreacht na hÉireann: The Preamble. See McGimpsey (1990): p. 2.
Ibid: p.1.
5
See McGimpsey (1990): pp.2-4.
6
See later discussion: McGimpsey v .Ireland [1990] I.R. 110. See below.
7
Oran Doyle: Constitutional Law: Texts, Cases and Materials (Dublin, 2008) p.3.
4
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“The concept of a nation (or nationality) should be used with due caution in constitutional discussions”. 8

Thus the Constitution is “inconsistent” in its use of the term nation, although keen to
distinguish the concept from that of the State.9 Despite the problem of definition, it is
clear that the nation is defined in broadly geographical terms.

In assessing the constitutional position of the State in relation to Northern Ireland, it is
necessary to consider the effect that this idea of territoriality had on relationships within
the island. It is clear that the Constitution created in 1937 created considerable tension for
relationships both within the island, and with the United Kingdom. It is my contention
that one of the over-riding concerns of the State and its courts post-1937 was the
resolution of this tension.10 If the 1937 document can be characterised as an explicitly
Republican charter, and Articles 2 and 3 as a political vehicle for re-unification, it follows
that the interpretation of that document was destined to have implications for the State‟s
interaction with the United Kingdom. More importantly, the 1937 Constitution provoked
a negative reaction from the unionist population in Northern Ireland. In highlighting the
way in which the State has defined its concept of the nation, it is beneficial to understand
the political and social conditions which led to the adoption of the legal claim over
Northern Ireland. In order to assess the State‟s attitude to Northern Ireland, we must first
analyse the political background to the constitutional position. Before considering
contemporary attitudes to these issues, it is expedient to return to the formation of the
State in order to grasp the background to the 1937 Constitution.

8

Desmond Clarke: “Nation, State and Nationality in the Irish Constitution”; Irish Law Times (1998) p.258,
as cited in Doyle (2008): p.3.
9
Doyle (2008): p.3.
10
See below: the reconciling of the de facto political reality with the legal claim over Northern Ireland was
a key feature of both the jurisprudence of the courts and the policy of the State post- 1937.
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THE ANGLO IRISH TREATY, 1922 CONSTITUTION AND
SAORSTÁT ÉIREANN
“The only policy for abolishing partition that I can see is for us, in this part of Ireland, to use such freedom
as we can secure to get for the people in this part of Ireland such conditions as will make the people in the
other part of Ireland wish to belong to this part”.11

In these terms the newly installed leader of Irish nationalism expressed the imperative of
securing unionist consent for political unification following Fianna Fáil‟s election
triumph in February 1932. In examining the State‟s attitude to Northern Ireland, it is
worth acknowledging that such pragmatic acceptance of political reality characterised the
State‟s position every bit as much as the more idealistic and romantic nationalist
doctrines.12 De Valera‟s overture to unionism reflects the manner in which the Irish
State13 was compelled to consider the practical quandaries posed by the desire to re-unify
the national territory. Following the Rising of 1916, support for the disparate elements of
Republicanism united around the organisation of Sinn Féin.14 The rise of the party has
been attributed to several factors. It is clear, however, that the public humiliation and
execution of the rebel leaders did much to garner public opinion in their favour.15

More importantly, the organisational and structural aptitude of Sinn Féin as a political
party did much to consolidate their success.16 As the party was organised along quasi“military” lines, political organisation came naturally.17 When considered alongside the
cataclysmic effects of the conscription crisis of 1918, it is easy to understand the
“electoral landslide of December” that year.”18 The emphatic nature of that victory was to
11

Eamon De Valera: 1 March,1933. As cited in McGimpsey (1990): p.3.
The State‟s policy was always a mixture of pragmatism and nationalist ideology. The same pragmatism
has been reflected in the courts‟ acknowledgement of Northern Ireland. See below.
13
For the purposes of consistency all references to the State should be read as the 26 counties unless
otherwise stated.
14
Tom Garvin: The Evolution of Irish Nationalist Politics (Most Recent ed., Dublin, 2005): pp.126-133.
15
F. Ryan: Constitutional Law (1st ed., Dublin, 2001): p.1.
16
Garvin (2005): pp.126-133.
17
Ibid.
18
Ibid.
12

R.W. McGimpsey

Historical Perspective on
Articles 2 and 3

5

re-define Irish politics in a fundamental way. The subsequent creation of Dáil Éireann
(and re-affirmation of Republic) in January 1919 was a key moment, precipitating the
War of Independence which marred the succeeding years. 19 The election outcome, in one
fell swoop, both galvanised the more radical elements within nationalism and made
partition more likely. 20
“The 1918 election result swept away the parliamentary nationalists……The Sinn Féin victory effectively
destroyed the Home rulers‟ project for mitigating partition, whilst creating a context…which helped propel
even pro-direct rule Unionists towards support for a northern parliament.” 21

The integration of Sinn Féin into the political mainstream, therefore, did much to enhance
the probability of partition. The problem created by the need to define the relationship
with Northern Ireland is a consequence of the imperfect compromise reached between the
Collins faction and the British administration of Lloyd George following the War of
Independence (1919-1921). The negotiations had been dominated by a determination to
satisfy the demands of all sides; in particular the need to reconcile the nationalist demand
for independence with the reality that the unionists (of what became Northern Ireland)
would be absolved from these arrangements. When the cessation of hostilities
materialised on 11 July 1921, the Northern Ireland State was “already legislated for” (by
virtue of the Government of Ireland Act 1920), and the only substantive matters to be
resolved concerned the type of independence that Ireland would be afforded22 The
compromise reached by the negotiators reflects the way in which Republicans were able
to ally pragmatism to their more idealistic tendencies. It also demonstrates that orthodox
nationalist thinking had moved some way from the inflexible, territorial definition
advanced by Griffith.23 De Valera had remained in Dublin for the duration of the
negotiations. The distant approach was a clever tactic by the Republican leader. By
19

See Garvin (2005): pp. 135-147.
Paul Bew, Peter Gibbon and Henry Patterson: Northern Ireland- Political Forces and Social Classes (2nd
ed., London, 1996): p. 11.
21
Bew (1996): p.11.
22
Garvin (2005): p.143. See also Bew (1996): pp.11-13, FitzPatrick (1998): p.107.
23
Coogan (1990): Griffith was one of the more pragmatic negotiators in 1921 and was very keen to do the
deal. This flexibility also reflected the massive pressure exerted on Republicans to compromise by Lloyd
George and his colleagues: See Tom Garvin: 1922 The Birth of Irish Democracy (1st ed., Dublin, 1996),
Tim Pat Coogan: Michael Collins; a Biography (London, 1990); pp. 240-280.
20
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remaining aloof from the talks, he could assess the Republican mood and the likelihood
of him being able to sell the deal. Moreover his whereabouts made it much easier for him
to absolve himself from the terms of any agreement if expedient to do so. 24 The impetus
for a deal, however, was compelling and Collins‟ team reached the historic compromise,
having received assurances on several key issues.25 The bravery exhibited by Collins in
securing the deal is emphasised by Coogan. He quotes British negotiator Lord
Birkenhead commenting after the conclusion of the talks:
“I may have signed my political death warrant” The younger man (Collins) replied “I may have signed my
actual death warrant.”26

The Treaty (signed on 6 December 1921) granted Ireland “dominion status”, thus falling
some way short of full independence. The settlement “went well beyond the earlier Home
Rule Bills, with the granting of fiscal autonomy and provision for the creation of a
defence force.”27 As Garvin observes, the Treaty can be characterised as “an uneasy
synthesis of post-British and republican themes”28 , and the retention of British symbols
was to haunt the new regime. The most contentious provision related to the oath of
allegiance which had been retained in the protocol of the Free State.29 Despite the
propaganda of anti-Treaty elements, the oath was never as controvertible as alleged. In
fact it never contained an explicit oath of allegiance to the British monarch. All the oath
required deputies to swear was `fidelity` to the king and `allegiance` to the Constitution.30
The distinction may be semantic, however. It was the effect of the oath rather than its
wording that proved so unpalatable. The Treaty was accompanied by the provision for

24

See Garvin (2005): p.143.
Coogan (1990): The deal was secured following concessions on several issues, such as the timeframe
within which unionists would have to decide whether or not to join the Free State, the oath of allegiance
and the extent of independence: See Coogan (1990): pp. 260-280.
26
Coogan (1990): p.276.
27
Fitzpatrick (1998): p. 107.
28
Garvin (2005): p.143.
29
Garvin (2005): p.143. The oath was to prove one of the most notorious aspects of the Free State
Constitution and was constantly referred to by anti-Treaty elements; thus gradually eroding the authority of
the Cumann na nGaedhal administration.
30
Garvin (1996): p52. The status of the oath was a key requirement of the Collins delegation in the Treaty
negotiations.
25

R.W. McGimpsey

Historical Perspective on
Articles 2 and 3

7

the six county jurisdiction of Northern Ireland which had been established by the
Government of Ireland Act 1920. The Act can be summarised thus:
“It provided for two Irish parliaments, one for Northern Ireland-i.e. the parliamentary counties of Antrim,
Armagh, Down, Fermanagh, Londonderry and Tyrone…….Each was to have power to „make laws for the
peace, order and good government‟ of the area within its jurisdiction…..the overriding authority of
Westminster was again specifically affirmed in section 75.”31

The legislation, according to FitzPatrick, had envisioned a bicameral legislature, with
authority derived from the monarch as represented by the lord lieutenant.32 The 1920 Act
effectively prescribed “Home Rule for both jurisdictions”33 and, as such, was an
extension of the earlier Home Rule Bills.34 The rebuttal of this model by nationalists was
as much to do with unionist rejection of an all Ireland solution as their Republican
ideals.35 Partition became a reality in 1921 when “Sir James Craig (Lord Craigavon)”
became the “first Prime Minister” of Northern Ireland.36

The agreement of 1921 embodies a workable accommodation, whereby the aspirations
of both unionists and nationalists were catered for. Although imperfect, the Treaty
enabled both political philosophies to save face by accomplishing most of their
objectives. Garvin has argued that the Treaty allowed majorities in both jurisdictions to
realise their aims. Northern unionists had secured their own parliament within the U.K.,
while southern nationalists had achieved independence from British authority, exceeding
earlier Home Rule proposals.37 Hence the success of the Treaty: it realised the majority‟s
expectations.38 The only losers in this analysis were “the nationalists of Northern
Ireland.”39 Another interpretation of the Treaty exists, however. The outcome had fallen

31

James Casey: Constitutional Law in Ireland (3rd ed., Dublin, 2000): p.5.
David FitzPatrick: The Two Irelands 1912-1939 (Oxford, 1998): p.100.
33
FitzPatrick (1998): pp.100-102.
34
FitzPatrick (1998): pp. 100-102. See also Casey (2000); p.p. 6-8.
35
See FitzPatrick (1998): pp. 100-107. The reality of partition inspired Republicans to reject Home Rule
and push for more meaningful independence.
36
Fitzpatrick (1998): p. 102. Craig succeeded Edward Carson as Unionist leader in February of that year.
37
Garvin (1996): pp.50-52, see also Garvin (2005): pp.143-47.
38
Ibid.
39
Ibid.
32
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substantially short of what the rebels had proclaimed in 1916 and, from a Republican
perspective, partition remained unpalatable. Fitzpatrick interprets the Treaty thus:
“…Like most political `settlements`, partition re-directed but failed to resolve the antagonisms that
engendered it. The terms of the settlement left almost all parties more or less dissatisfied, while
encouraging dissident groups to challenge the legitimacy of Irish rather than British authorities.”40

It is fair to say, however, that the Treaty did indeed represent the most realistic
compromise available to all sides. The intractable and militant nature of unionism circa
1922 made the Republican demands of 1916 virtually impossible to attain. Moreover the
fait accompli provided for by the 1920 Act (once endorsed by unionists) made partition
inevitable.41 In this context the only expedient route open to nationalism was to ensure
that they achieved the most extensive form of independence available to them within a
partitioned island. The more flexible elements of Republicanism (as personified by
Collins) recognised this reality.
More importantly, the Treaty is indicative of the new State‟s approach to northern
unionism which existed at the time, (i.e.) that the pro-Treaty elements were prepared to
recognise the existence of Northern Ireland in return for the independence they had
secured. (This acceptance, it should be noted, was accompanied by the aspiration that
political unity would eventually be realised). The pro-Treaty position was also a
realisation that the de facto existence of Northern Ireland made the desire for political reunification of the national territory difficult to implement, at least in the short term. The
dominance of pro-Treaty ideas is evidenced by the definitive nature of their effective
victory in the ensuing Civil War (1922-23).42 The months following the Treaty led to a
clear breakdown in the Republican unity which had been so apparent in 1918.43 The bitter
divisions which were to characterise the succeeding years became increasingly evident.
The Dáil endorsed the Treaty by a majority vote (January 1922), but the position within

40

Fitzpatrick (1998): p.117.
Garvin (2005): pp.143-47.
42
Ibid.
43
Ibid.
41
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militant Republicanism was much more fragmented.44 For example, as Garvin observes,
the leadership of the I.R.A. voted for the Treaty but a majority of rank and file members
voted against its implementation.45 The internal divisions within Sinn Féin were
symptomatic of a wider malaise within Republicanism, where constituencies, families,
communities and activists remained divided over whether or not to back the Treaty.46
Gradually the anti-Treaty forces pervaded Sinn Féin, culminating in the I.R.A‟s rejection
of the Treaty (March 1922).47 The Civil War, however, was a much more muted and
constrained conflict than initially feared.48 The success of the Pro-Treaty faction in
winning hearts and minds is evidenced by the emphatic nature of the victory. It was clear
that a majority within the State were prepared to accept the Treaty as a practical, interim
solution. Those prepared to tolerate partition, at least in the short term, had won the day.
As Garvin contends:
“…The Civil War that followed the Free State‟s attack on the Four Courts at the end of July 1922 was
short. By early 1923 the republican cause had been decisively defeated by the forces of the Free State, but
the true defeat of the republicans was the acceptance of the Treaty, in both 1922 and 1923, by the
electorate.”49

The Free State Constitution (1922) must be viewed, therefore, as a means of giving legal
and political effect to the arrangements provided by the Treaty. A more concise document
than its 1937 equivalent, “it consisted of a Preamble, three sections and two schedules
(the first schedule comprising the text of the Constitution and the second, the Treaty).”50
Article 12 of the Treaty provided that Northern Ireland could opt out of the Free State.51
It is evident, therefore, that the constitutional position relating to Northern Ireland in
1922 was a full recognition of the existence of that jurisdiction. This position reflects the
reality provided by the Treaty and the approach taken by the Free State that unity, as an
44

Garvin (2005): p.144.
Ibid: pp. 145-46.
46
Garvin (2005): The fragmentation within the I.R.A post-1922 was inspired by more than just the political
differences. The “Free State Army and Police” proved popular for disillusioned young men. See Garvin
(2005): pp. 145-46.
47
Ibid.
48
Ibid.
49
Garvin (2005): p.146.
50
Casey (2000): p.15. See also Ryan (2001): p.2.
51
Casey (2000): p.15.
45
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aspiration, could only be achieved through political cooperation. The policy of the
Cosgrave administration, therefore, was very much one of conciliation. The Treaty
required the two governments to give full legal definition to the new entities they had
created, and clarify how they would inter-relate with one another. Consequently the
Boundary Commission was established with a specific remit to define the extent of the
geographical borders. It was the perceived failure of this commission52 which led to the
unique Amending Agreement (known also as the Tripartite Agreement), signed on 3rd
December 1925.53 The Agreement, which was intended to definitively resolve the
boundary question, was negotiated between the three governments involved and
registered as an international treaty with the League of Nations by the Irish Free State.54
The provisions were confirmed by statute in the “Schedule to the Treaty (Confirmation of
Amending Agreement) Act, 1925 (No. 40 of 1925).”55 The Agreement (and the resultant
Act) conveys a desire to achieve mutual recognition of borders through a spirit of
harmony and accommodation. This cooperative approach is evident in the Act. It reads:
“Whereas the progress of the events and the improved relations now subsisting between the British
Government, the Government of the Irish Free State and the Government of Northern Ireland and their
respective peoples make it desirable to amend and supplement the said Articles of Agreement, so as to
avoid any causes of friction which might mar or retard the further growth of friendly relations between the
said governments and peoples……
And whereas the British Government and the Government of the Irish Free State being united in amity in
this undertaking with the Government of Northern Ireland , and being resolved mutually to aid one another
in a spirit of neighbourly comradeship, hereby agree as follows:“1-The powers conferred by the proviso to Article 12 of the said Articles of Agreement on the Commission
therein mentioned are hereby revoked, and the extent of Northern Ireland for the purposes of the
Government of Ireland Act, 1920, and of the said Articles of Agreement, shall be such as was fixed by subsection (2) of section one of that Act.”56

52

The two governments failed to agree on the changes suggested by the Commission. Their suggestions
included increasing Northern Ireland‟s territory.
53
T John O‟Dowd: Irish Law Archives-Irish Legal News: Irish Law- Ireland and Northern Ireland
(Dublin, 1994); P.5. See http://www.irishlaw.org/IrishLawArchives.
54
McGimpsey (1990): p.3. See also Casey (2000): pp.15-16, O‟Dowd (1994): p.6.
55
O‟Dowd (1994): p.6.
56
O‟Dowd (1994): p.6. See also Casey (2000): pp.15-16, McGimpsey (1990): p.3, Ryan (2001): p.2.
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The Agreement is indicative of the approach adopted by the Free State at the time, with
its mention of being “united in amity” and “neighbourly comradeship”.57 Indeed the
explicit acknowledgement of both the Northern Ireland Parliament and its “people”,
foreshadows the de facto recognition of the limitations of the State‟s jurisdiction
enshrined in Article 3 of the 1937 Constitution.58 In assessing the constitutional position,
it is clear that despite the desire to claim sovereignty over Northern Ireland, the political
reality provided by the 1921 treaty (and the Government of Ireland Act) was always fully
recognised by the State. As Bew observes, the Boundary Commission and Amending
Agreement, had fully secured Northern Ireland‟s position within the U.K.59 He quotes Sir
Wilfrid Spender, in recalling a meeting between the protagonists, where:
“Mr Cosgrave burst into tears and said that Lord Craigavon had won all down the line and begged and
entreated him not to make things more difficult for him.” 60

This demonstrates how comprehensively the State had accepted the framework of
partition. There is little doubt that the approach of the Free State was to resolve the
competing territorial claims through political and friendly methods. Moreover the State
evidently had little difficulty in recognising Northern Ireland. Although reflecting the
conciliatory attitude of the Cosgrave government it is also possible that, as Bew argues,
the position was determined by economic necessity.61 He stresses the importance of
signing the Amending Agreement, as it “released the Irish government from significant
financial liabilities.”62

Still, the approach of the Free State undoubtedly involved the full recognition of
Northern Ireland and its borders. Such explicit recognition is the logical consequence of
signing the Treaty. The arrangements agreed in the previous years provided for two
jurisdictions with their own governments which would co-exist with one another.
Ideologically, this didn‟t make the Free State any less nationalist in ethos (or Republican
57
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for that matter), but merely served as a reflection of its pragmatic approach to the
political conditions arising in 1920s Ireland. It may have been an uneasy relationship, but
the Cosgrave administration had little choice but to fully recognise and cooperate with
Northern Ireland. The Free State Constitution and the Treaty obviously provided for
Northern Ireland to be incorporated into the political arrangements. Therefore, the policy
and objective of that State remained political unity. That re-unification failed to occur
can hardly be laid at the door of the Free State alone. The State‟s desire to improve interjurisdictional relations, as reflected in the 1925 Agreement, constitute a worthy attempt to
recognise the political realities and forge a practical relationship with their neighbours.
The nationalist elite had come a long way from the purely geographical interpretation of
the national territory. It was the alleged failure of the State to implement a Republican
programme, however, and the existence of royalist symbols in its Constitution, which
were to prove its undoing.

BUNREACHT NA hÉIREANN (1937) & THE RISE OF FIANNA FÁIL
The spirit of harmony and accommodation that had characterised political discourse in
1925 was shattered at the beginning of the following decade. Good relations with
Northern Ireland, along with the very existence of the Free State, were irrevocably
threatened when Fianna Fáil swept to power in 1932. When the party emerged victorious
in the general election of February that year, its clear intention was to strip away the
despised symbols of monarchy.63 This approach is illustrative of the Republican ideology
espoused by De Valera and his colleagues. The accommodation of 1921 had been a bitter
pill for them to swallow and they had spent the years following the Civil War frantically
trying to re-establish their position. The victory in 1932 is testament to their success in
building their infrastructure, party organisation and consolidating their strength post1923.64 The iconoclastic policy of the new regime is demonstrated by the legislation they
instigated following their electoral success. One of the first Bills proposed by the new
63
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government was the Constitution (Removal of Oath) Bill which sought to definitively
settle the question of the contentious oath of allegiance.65 The oath had been regarded as
the most overt and controversial symbol of monarchy and De Valera was emphasising his
Republican credentials in his resolve to dispense with it. Following some debate
(including several amendments) the Constitution (Removal of Oath) Act came into
existence on 3rd May 1933.66 The alteration was rapidly succeeded by the removal of the
right to appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council.

67

Both these measures

prove that Fianna Fáil was not interested in mere cosmetic changes, but was determined
to tear down the edifice of the Free State and its Constitution. De Valera himself reaffirmed his Republican project in 1935 when he announced his intent to construct a new
Constitution to replace the 1922 document.68 Such institutional change was inevitably
going to have profound implications in terms of the State‟s relationship with Northern
Ireland.
The unashamedly Republican character of the State‟s new policy threatened to destroy
the harmonious and amicable relationship which had hitherto existed between the two
governments in Ireland. While the prevailing mood among the government was favouring
the formulation of a Republican constitution, it took some time for Fianna Fáil to create
the political conditions necessary to facilitate such a change. It was events beyond the
new elite‟s control, however, that were to provide the momentum for constitutional
change. The abdication of British monarch Edward VIII (1936) provided the perfect
opportunity for the State to compose a new constitution, more in keeping with the
ideology and values of Fianna Fáil.69 De Valera successfully used the abdication crisis to
remove the majority of royalist symbols from the State. He accomplished this though a
two fold legislative process. Firstly, he instituted the Constitution (Amendment No.27)
Act which provided for the removal of the British king “from the Constitution.”70 The
Act also abolished the position of Governor General. The action was to have obvious
65
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importance for the Republican agenda: the permanent removal of British symbolism
paved the way for the new Constitution. Secondly, the Oireachtas passed the Executive
Authority (External Relations) Act 1936, which effectively replaced the king as head of
the Executive in Ireland with an “Executive Council.” 71 The effect of this alteration was
not only the elimination of the controversial trappings of monarchy, but the dismantling
of all remaining practical functions of high office, which passed to the Dáil.72 Thus the
conditions had been created for the establishment of a new Constitution and a shift in the
dynamics of the relationship with Northern Ireland.

The adoption of Bunreacht na hÉireann in 1937 marked a return to the irredentist,
geographical interpretation of nationality described earlier. The codification of the new
Constitution signified a new chapter in the legal and constitutional relationships between
the two jurisdictions. The explicitly Republican character of the document created
problems for defining the constitutional status of Northern Ireland. The Constitution can
also be said to have an emphatically “Catholic” character.73 The integration of both
Republican and Catholic values into the fundamental law of the State was naturally
viewed suspiciously by those with a unionist identity who didn‟t share those beliefs. The
determination to pursue an exclusively theocratic agenda was revealed by government
minister Sean McEntee who described a “Catholic constitution for a Catholic State.”74 As
Bew observes, this statement, in turn, evoked Craigavon‟s famous declaration of a
“Protestant parliament for a Protestant people”75 in 1934.

The Constitution should be viewed, therefore, as the definitive legal expression of the
Catholic, Republican values held by the drafters.

71
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Nevertheless the document of 1937
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shares many characteristics with its “1922 counterpart.”77 Whilst the Republican window
dressing is apparent, there is a strain of “continuity” between the two Irish
Constitutions.78 For example, as Casey notes, the provisions relating to the courts, the
legislature, and system of proportional representation used in elections all bear
remarkable similarity with the Free State Constitution.79 In some areas the language used
is virtually “identical”; while other parts of the Constitution derive clear inspiration from
their 1922 predecessor.80 This policy was practically very sensible. It would have been
unwise of the drafters to start from scratch when so many of the logistical and
governmental aspects of State apparatus had already been established. As so many of
these institutions were evidently working well, it would have been inexpedient to throw
the baby out with the bath water. The 1937 Constitution was a more “substantial”
document than its predecessor, and its provisions more comprehensive.81 Moreover it can
be viewed as more radical in tone. In fact Casey has argued that Article 29 and the
provisions relating to the family represent quite “novel” innovations.82

The new

Constitution is best interpreted, therefore, as a successor rather than a replacement of the
Free State Constitution.

As so much of the substance of the two documents is similar, it can be argued that too
much emphasis is attached to the perceived radical character of the document. If the 1937
Constitution is merely an extension of its Free State equivalent, then surely its impact has
been somewhat exaggerated? In terms of the relationship with Northern Ireland, however,
it is the differences rather than the similarities that are important. Firstly, the adoption of
an explicitly Catholic Constitution enshrined in Irish law a set of religious doctrines
which would have alarmed the Protestant majority in Northern Ireland. The distinctly
Catholic emphasis is best illustrated in the Preamble:
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“…We, the people of Éire humbly acknowledging all our obligations to our Divine Lord, Jesus Christ, Who
sustained our fathers through centuries of trial. Gratefully remembering their heroic and unremitting
struggle to regain the rightful independence of our Nation….And seeking to promote the common good,
with due observance of Prudence, Justice and Charity, so that the dignity and freedom of the individual
may be assured, true social order attained, the unity of our country restored and concord established with
other nations.”83

Both the nationalist and Catholic philosophy of the Republican drafters is discernible
from the Preamble, the text conveying an exclusively narrow set of values and
theology.84 Such a religious emphasis had no precedent in the 1922 document.85 From a
unionist perspective, however, the constitutional favouring of one denomination and its
values made the prospect of a united Ireland tangentially unappealing. 86 The overtly
Catholic nature of the Constitution obviously had implications for a unionist population
who inhabited a political hegemony, exercising power virtually unopposed in their own
parliament, where they could protect whatever ideals they wished. Already opposed to
the idea of political re-unification, the adoption of an explicitly Catholic Constitution
made unionists feel completely alienated from the southern State. Although the intention
of De Valera and his party in drafting a new Constitution was to enhance the prospects of
political re-unification, the reality of unionist resistance produced a very different
response. This theological opposition to the values drafted in the Constitution would have
been enough in itself to encourage unionist antagonism with the State. The inclusion of
the territorial, political claim to govern Northern Ireland ensured outright hostility to the
Fianna Fáil project. The policy of the Cosgrave government had been determined by a
pragmatic realism, which recognised unionist opposition to re-unification and respected
the legal boundaries provided by the Anglo-Irish Treaty. The objective of political unity
was retained, but co-existed alongside a desire to maintain amicable relations with
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Northern Ireland.87 The installation of the controversial Articles marked irrefutable
evidence that this policy was being permanently discarded.
The dynamic of North-South relations had thus altered drastically from the spirit of the
Tripartite Agreement. In line with the Republican ideals cherished by DeValera, the State
had now reverted to an irredentist policy in relation to Northern Ireland. A political claim
over Northern Ireland had come into existence: the State was asserting in emphatic terms
a right to govern that territory. As such, the policy regarding Northern Ireland at this time
was now clear. The State had reverted to the territorial, geographical definition of the
nation outlined by Griffith. Although the precise nature of the claim had yet to be given
full legal definition, there is no doubt that a political claim to govern Northern Ireland
had been established. The traditional interpretation of the claim was it represented a
political aspiration, a desire to re-unify the national territory as defined in the
Constitution. The identification of the Articles as a substantive legal claim to govern
Northern Ireland had yet to be definitively proven.88 Nevertheless the nature of the
relationship between the two jurisdictions had irrevocably altered. Their definitions of
sovereignty (as existed at the time) had been exposed as being incompatible. Whilst an
explicit de jure claim to govern Northern Ireland remained, reconciliation between the
two traditions on the island would prove difficult. In assessing the State‟s constitutional
position relating to Northern Ireland in 1937, Garvin argues:
“…The 1937 Constitution eliminated the remaining symbols of the imperial link and also withdrew full
recognition of the State of Northern Ireland…..and was intended to complete the legitimisation of the State.
It also echoed in its phraseology a draft constitution of the Republic of Ireland produced by the rump Sinn
Féin party between 1929 and 1933. The Sinn Féin document was heavily Catholic in tone and also heavily
Gaelic, anti-British and anti-Free Stater. De Valera‟s 1937 Constitution was, by comparison, a liberal
document, but the similarities in phraseology indicate who, or what tradition, it was that De Valera was
trying to pacify.”89
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De Valera, therefore, succeeded in re-establishing his Republican credentials and
dismantling the constitutional framework agreed in 1921. Although many of the practical
structures of government remained intact, the symbolism so despised by Republicans had
been destroyed. The Free State‟s determination to achieve political unity by cooperation
had been replaced by a contentious and divisive claim to govern Northern Ireland. In the
minds of Republicans the State had moved a step closer to securing re-unification. The
reality of this policy, however, was that unionists now felt even more disenfranchised
from the State. In this sense the repercussions flowing from the inclusion of Articles 2
and 3 in the Constitution were colossal, impeding good relations between the
jurisdictions, and hampering attempts to achieve a political settlement in the years that
followed. De Valera had emphatically succeeded in asserting that the policy of the State
involved the re-integration of Northern Ireland, a policy which had now been afforded
constitutional protection.

REVIEW OF THE CONSTITUTION (1967)
Post-1937 one of the primary objectives of the State was the reconciliation of the de jure
claim with the de facto reality of Northern Ireland. Successive governments (as well as
the courts) wrestled venerably with the dilemma posed by the 1937 Constitution. At this
point, it is worth noting that Articles 2 and 3 were never intended to be viewed in
isolation, but form part of an overall, harmonious interpretation of the document. The
intention of the drafters was that Articles 2 and 3 would be interpreted in tandem with the
other Articles of the Constitution and the Preamble. The need to interpret Articles 2 and 3
in a harmonious manner has been accentuated regularly by the jurisprudence of the
courts.90 In particular, due to the obvious connection between the State‟s foreign policy
and the manner in which it interacts with other nations, Articles 2 and 3 need to be read
alongside Article 29 of the Constitution. This article provides a legal basis for the need to
cooperate peacefully with other nations and membership of supra-national/international
bodies. It reads:
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“1. Ireland affirms its devotion to the ideal of peace and friendly cooperation amongst nations founded on
international justice and morality.

2. Ireland affirms its adherence to the principle of the pacific settlement of international disputes by
international arbitration or judicial determination.

3. Ireland accepts the generally recognised principles of international law as its rule of conduct with other
States.”91

The Article requires the State to resolve international disputes in a peaceful and amicable
manner (this principle forming the cornerstone of the State‟s policy of neutrality92). As
such, the Article evokes the spirit of cooperation legislated in the Tripartite Agreement.
The orthodox interpretation of Article 29 is that it places an obligation on the State to
resolve international conflict through political means. The clarification of this
requirement is important when considered alongside the political claim over Northern
Ireland, and the desire to re-unify the national territory. It seems that Article 29 compels
the State to work alongside other nations in a friendly manner, specifically in relation to
the resolution of conflicts. In the context of Northern Ireland, the logical conclusion of
Article 29 is that it demands that the State work with the U.K. government to resolve the
conflict peacefully. After all, it is inconsistent to advocate that the State is legally
required to resolve disputes amicably and in accordance with international law, but not
extend this provision to Northern Ireland.

When interpreting Articles 2 and 3, therefore, it is not desirable but essential to read
Article 29.93 In fact, it can be argued, that Article 29 has always placed a restriction on
the scope of Articles 2 and 3 by its insistence on complying with international law and
cooperating to resolve conflict. The old Articles (specifically Article 3) inherently
recognised the de facto existence of Northern Ireland by their acceptance that “the laws
enacted by that Parliament shall have the like area and extent of application as the laws of
91
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Saorstát Éireann and the like extra-territorial effect”. Including Article 29, the
constitutional arrangements provided in 1937, arguably, have always constrained the
State from pursuing re-unification militarily, and compel it to work peacefully with the
U.K. to settle the Northern Ireland question. Certainly the cooperative, multilateral
language of Article 29 appears to place an onus on the State to resolve the competing
territorial claims through accommodation. The obligation to comply with international
law presented a further problem for the State in relation to Articles 2 and 3. International
law prohibits states from making claims on other territories.94 It was always the
contention of unionists, therefore, that Articles 2 and 3 constituted a breach of
international law.95 The provision of Article 29 to recognise the principles of
international law in the State‟s dealings with other governments can be said to further
limit the scope of Articles 2 and 3. Nevertheless it remains evident that the policy of the
State post-1937 remained the re-unification of the national territory. As such, the State‟s
attitude to Northern Ireland reflected a territorial interpretation of nationality. In the
assessment of the constitutional position, however, it is always wise to consider the effect
of Article 29.

Although the policy of the State remained wedded to the principles of 1937, there was
always an acknowledgement that the position could be improved. From an Irish
perspective, the first venerable attempt at modernising the Articles, and producing a more
universally acceptable form of words, came with the comprehensive review of the
Constitution (1967). As part of a wider debate on constitutional change, an all party
group reviewed the wording of Articles 2 and 3. This consultation led to the
recommendation that “Article 3 should be amended. (The committee did not propose to
alter Article 2).”96 The proposed change read:
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“1. The Irish nation hereby proclaims its firm will that its territory be re-united in harmony and brotherly
affection between all Irishmen.

2. The laws enacted by the Parliament established by this Constitution shall, until the achievement of the
nation‟s unity shall otherwise require, have the like area and extent of application as the laws of the
Parliament which existed prior to the adoption of this Constitution. Provision may be made by law to give
extra-territorial effect to such laws”.97

The debate indicates flexibility in State policy and reflects the real politik which existed
alongside strict adherence to Republican ideology. The intervention is significant,
implying that the original construction of the Articles was controversial. This suggests
that there had been recognition by elements within the State that the Articles, in their
current guise, were unacceptable to unionism.

The comprehensive nature of the exercise signifies that a firm opinion had developed
that the Articles required amendment. The fact that amendment was even being discussed
shows that the State had moved from the inflexible position of 1937. Furthermore the
substance of the proposals would provide inspiration for future attempts to solve the
constitutional problem.98 It was already becoming apparent that changes to Articles 2 and
3 would form part of any negotiated political agreement. Although such amendment was
merely theoretical at this stage, it was evident that the outline for any changes was
crystallising. The template for change had been established: the explicit claim would be
replaced by a less contentious, more aspirational form of words. Finding the required
political formula for agreement (and implementation of) such changes was to prove more
problematic. Even the possibility of substantive negotiations appeared elusive at this
point. Nonetheless the work of the 1967 commission is evidence that the State was
beginning to appreciate the need to amend the Articles. This, in turn, would make the
Constitution more amenable to unionists and help facilitate an eventual settlement. The
State was prepared, therefore, to consider amending the Constitution in the context of a
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comprehensive agreement.99 These alterations were not adopted by the government. They
remain important, however, as providing the framework for constitutional change and as
a starting point for future negotiations. It is likely that the State wished to hold back
amendment to the Articles and save it as a bargaining chip in such talks.

SUNNINGDALE (1973)
The State‟s preparedness to consider changes to Articles 2 and 3 (in the context of an
agreed political settlement) was given expression in the Sunningdale Agreement (1973).
The attempt at political reform within Northern Ireland was inspired by a desire to end
the violence which had characterised the preceding years. Since the suspension of the
Stormont Parliament (24 March 1972), Northern Ireland had been engulfed by
unprecedented levels of violence, perpetrated by the Provisional I.R.A. The intergovernmental Agreement (signed at Sunningdale Park, Berkshire on 9 December 1973)
came at one of the most violent interludes in the State‟s history.100 It should be noted that
the Sunningdale “Agreement” was never an international agreement as such. The
document is better characterised as a communiqué between the two governments.101 The
crisis had commenced with the refusal of unionist prime minister, Brian Faulkner to
permit Westminster to assume control of the security functions enjoyed by the
Parliament.102 The control of security was considered vital in the ongoing battle with
militant Republicanism. The suspension of the Parliament was a controversial decision,
eroding unionist confidence in the British government, and opening a vacuum within
which violence could flourish As Bew has observed:
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“…This process coincided with the administrative centralisation of almost all the hotly disputed functions
of local government in Northern Ireland. Taken together, these events signified the end of the Northern
Ireland state.”103

Certainly suspension had created a political crisis which urgently needed to be solved.
The inspiration of the British government to attempt political conciliation was two fold,
motivated by a determination to end both the political vacuum caused by suspension and
violence on the streets. It was hoped that an agreed political settlement would remove any
lingering justification for violence. The political process commenced with the publishing
of a “white paper by the British government” (3 May 1973), proposing a crosscommunity assembly to be elected by “proportional representation.”104 Institutionally, the
arrangements would involve three strands: the Assembly (replacing the old Northern
Ireland Parliament), a Council of Ireland (which proposed to give the southern State an
unprecedented voice in Northern affairs), and an Executive formed by coalition,
constituted on the basis of power sharing.105 The Northern Ireland Assembly Bill,
resulting from the white paper, paved the way for Assembly elections, which occurred on
28 June 1973.106 This political movement generated genuine hope; with the Ulster
Unionists, S.D.L.P, and cross-community Alliance Party all actively participating in the
elections.107 As such, the Agreement represented the first occasion that an authentic,
multi-party effort had been made to resolve the political stalemate. Perhaps terminally,
however, a substantial proportion of the broad unionist constituency remained
instinctively opposed to the power sharing element of the Agreement, whilst militant
Republicanism stayed outside the arrangements and “boycotted the elections.”108
Although pro-agreement parties triumphed in the election by a clear majority, there
remained a substantial enough minority opposed to the new administration to cause it
difficulty.109
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Electoral success for the pro-agreement parties was just the first step, however. The more
tangible difficulty concerned finding enough of a consensus between the parties to
facilitate the formation of an Executive. To that end, negotiations commenced as soon as
the election results were announced, with the objective of “securing agreement for the
basis of an Executive” as soon as practicable.110 All moderate parties were in favour of
the new political arrangements (although Faulkner had important internal critics), but the
resolution of the outstanding disputes between them remained a formidable challenge.
Discord emerged in relation to the modalities of the Executive, for example how the
parties would conduct business with each other and how the government would
function.111 Displaying remarkable political maturity, the parties reached an
accommodation and the method of voluntary coalition was rubberstamped on 21
November 1973.112 As a powerful symbol of the new inclusiveness, former unionist
Prime Minister Brian Faulkner was appointed as Chief Executive of the new government
with S.D.L.P. leader Gerry Fitt as his Deputy.113 The whole concept of power-sharing
was problematic for the unionist leader. The Unionist party had enjoyed virtual
dominance of the political system since Northern Ireland‟s inception, with only the
ineffectual Nationalist party providing token opposition. The Civil Rights movement had
changed the dynamic of Northern Irish politics permanently, however; creating a more
radical nationalism which was no longer prepared to meekly accept inequality.114 This
created a new set of realities with which unionists were forced to contend.

Moreover, the emergence of the Provisional I.R.A. as an uncompromising agent for reunification through violence, put the existence of the Northern Ireland State and, (for
perhaps the first time since 1922) Northern Ireland‟s status within the U.K, in danger. In
the context of continuing Republican violence, British commitment to maintaining the
Union, according to Bew, could no longer be guaranteed.115 Faulkner, therefore, was
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taking a massive political gamble in his advocacy of power sharing. It was, however, a
calculated risk. The unionist leader was seeking to balance the obvious dissatisfaction
within his party with the reality that a British withdrawal from Northern Ireland could not
be ruled out.116 Indeed, it is possible that had a political settlement not been attempted at
this time, the British would have actively sought disengagement.117 By committing to the
Executive, Faulkner was making a strategic compromise. He had assessed that unionist
interests were better served in the Executive, and that by showing his preparedness to
accommodate, he was making the prospect of British withdrawal much more remote. The
key to the success of his strategy, however, was his ability to persuade enough moderates
to support his vision, thus sidelining the hardliners. The long term stability of the
Executive could only be guaranteed by Faulkner demonstrating to a sceptical
constituency, that the Executive provided the best mechanism for maintaining the Union,
rather than being a sell out to nationalism. It was the failure to allay these concerns that
sounded the death knell for the Executive.

Unionist opposition to the arrangements were to focus not on the principle of power
sharing (as one might have expected), but on the third strand of the institutional
framework. The Agreement provided for a Council of Ireland, giving the State an
unprecedented role in the internal government of Northern Ireland. The idea was nothing
new (it had actually been provided for in the Government of Ireland Act), but the very
idea of the South having an executive function in Northern Ireland was anathema to
unionists.118 There had been, however, discussion among the parties about how best to
formalise relations between the two jurisdictions and what role the South would play in
the new arrangements. Nationalists (for obvious reasons) were keen to maximise NorthSouth cooperation. To help realise this objective, negotiations occurred between the
British government and the administration of Liam Cosgrave; from 6 to 9 December.119
They agreed to resurrect the Council of Ireland idea; the Agreement providing for a
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Council of Ministers, comprising “seven members from both governments.”120 The
Council was to have an “`executive` and `consultative`” role.121 In addition, Sunningdale
provided for a consultative Assembly; composed of thirty members from the Dáil and
thirty from the Northern Assembly.122 It was the vehement nature of unionist opposition
to this idea that proved fatal for the Agreement. The honeymoon period didn‟t last long:
the day after the Agreement was signed the Ulster Workers Council was formed, a shady
collection of loyalist paramilitaries opposed to the Agreement. 123 The move highlighted
the extent of unionist concern over the Agreement and marked a turn towards extremism
within unionism. The insistence of the S.D.L.P. on pushing the Council of Ireland idea
played into the hands of these sinister elements; presenting the sceptics with a
propaganda victory. Already sceptical over the very idea of Southern involvement in
internal Northern Irish affairs, the anti-Agreement faction portrayed the Council as a
“Trojan horse” which would precipitate the advent of a united Ireland. 124 The calamitous
effect of the Council is described by Bew:
“All hope for accommodationist unionism evaporated when to the cross of power sharing was added the
new affliction of a vaguely defined Council of Ireland which the S.D.L.P., to the exultant choruses of the
unionist right, depicted as a crucial mechanism for easing the transition to a united Ireland.”125

Unionism in the 1970s was able to contemplate power sharing with nationalists, but a
Council of Ireland which was increasingly viewed as a vehicle for destroying the Union,
was too hard a sell. The Council was a bridge too far for unionists at this time. Resistance
to the Agreement was becoming ever more militant, with the controversial Vanguard
movement joining the main Loyalist paramilitary groups and Ian Paisley‟s D.U.P in
opposition to the Executive.126 It was the internal machinations of the Ulster Unionists,
however, that determined the downfall of the Executive. A meeting of the Ulster Unionist
120
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Council in January 1974 had made Faulkner‟s position untenable, prompting his
resignation, to be replaced by Harry West.127

With Faulkner in situ, the Executive stood a real chance of success. Convincing the broad
unionist constituency of the merits of an all- island agreement was never going to be an
easy task, but the success the project depended entirely on Faulkner‟s survival. With his
demise, the failure of the Agreement became inevitable.128 This is proven by the rout of
pro-agreement candidates in the General Election of February 1974; anti-agreement
candidates winning a remarkable eleven of the twelve Northern Ireland Westminster
seats.129 The result was emphatic, enabling recalcitrant unionists to portray the election as
a democratic rejection of the Agreement. On analysis of the evidence, it is difficult to
reject this position. It is fair to surmise that the Agreement constituted the best attempt to
resolve the constitutional position of Northern Ireland since the formation of the State. It
also refutes the myth that unionists are essentially unyielding, the Agreement
representing a triumph of pragmatism and compromise. It will be remembered
historically as one of the great missed opportunities, with hope extinguished by a mixture
of genuine concern over the Council of Ireland, and the dark shadow of Loyalist
extremism. The decisive blow came with the announcement that the Unionist party were
discontinuing their support for Sunningdale (March 1974); calling for the Southern State
to amend Articles 2 and 3 in the process.130

The involvement of the Irish government in Sunningdale raises some important
constitutional questions. By conceding the reality of British government authority in
Northern Ireland, it can be argued that the State was acting contrary to its own
Constitution. Through signing the Agreement, the State was recognising the legitimacy of
the British governing that jurisdiction.131 Certainly the involvement in negotiations
reflects a pragmatic realisation that, on a de facto level, Northern Ireland was part of the
U.K. Despite the constitutional rhetoric there was always a practical recognition of the
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political realities provided by partition. This sensible approach is reflected in every intergovernmental area of cross border cooperation; from security to agriculture and
commerce. The preparedness to recognise the de facto reality of Northern Ireland‟s
existence has always characterised Irish government policy. Statutes, official bodies,
ministers and agencies of government have all recognised the existence of Northern
Ireland.132 Cooperation further reflects a constitutional reality: the old Articles 2 and 3
always provided for this recognition. The reality of Northern Ireland‟s existence is
inherent in the old Article 3. In a sense this reflects the sensibilities of those who framed
the Constitution. De Valera wished to emphasise his Republican credentials, but also
account for the practical considerations of government (particularly the State‟s relations
with its nearest neighbour).

The Articles, therefore, performed two principal functions: the claim over the national
territory and the recognition that, pending the re-integration of that territory, the State
could only exercise jurisdiction within Treaty boundaries. This is provided by Article 3.
Indeed the old Article 3 cleverly balanced the political aspiration of re-unification with
the de facto position. Irish participation at Sunningdale is merely a practical expression of
this constitutional position. As subsequent case law has affirmed, this cooperation was
not incompatible with the Constitution and, in no way diminished the claim over
Northern Ireland.133 The Sunningdale negotiations were characterised by political
expediency, and such involvement can be viewed as the logical extension of the State‟s
constitutional obligations. Articles 2, 3 and 29 can all be read as compelling the State to
make peace with Northern Ireland. If we accept that the State is politically implored to
seek re-unification by Articles 2 and 3, then surely negotiations such as Sunningdale are
merely the logical consequence of that constitutional impulsion. The Agreement
demonstrates that the attitude of the State in relation to Northern Ireland had matured
considerably since 1937. Instead of demanding re-unification, the State was seeking
accommodation through politics and cooperation. Unity remained the objective, but the
State had recognised that this would only be achieved through a negotiated settlement.
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That in itself was progress. Although it can be reasoned that inter-governmental
accommodation over Northern Ireland was compatible with the Constitution, this had yet
to be fully tested by the Courts. Nevertheless the willingness of the State to help facilitate
an agreed settlement was an important step forward. The ultimate failure of Sunningdale
(as venerable a political experiment as it may have been) was that it left the constitutional
dispute unresolved.

THE ANGLO IRISH AGREEMENT (1985)
“…In the history of Ireland-both North and South…reality and myth from the seventeenth century to the
1920s take on an almost Balkan immediacy. Distrust mounting to hatred and revenge is never far beneath
the political surface. And those who step on it must do so gingerly.”134

So Margaret Thatcher described the pitfalls of involvement in Irish disputes.
Undoubtedly, in terms of Anglo-Irish policy, the so-called `Irish question` was viewed as
very much a poisoned chalice, one that Prime Ministers from both sides of the Irish Sea
were loath to become inculpated in. The reluctance to settle the question of Northern
Ireland was understandable. Previous attempts at arbitration (such as Sunningdale) had
demonstrated the difficulty in coercing the antagonists to compromise over historical
disputes. The intense bitterness that characterised the conflict was intrinsically offputting for successive British governments. Moreover the ongoing violence, although
providing a compelling reason to pursue peace, warned of the dangers posed in becoming
too directly involved. Another explanation for the reticence was that Northern Ireland is
one of the few issues which have the capacity to upset the `special relationship` between
Britain and the United States.135 That is not to say the British hadn‟t been concerned with
the resolution of the Northern Ireland problem. They had always offered the hope of a
negotiated settlement, whilst contact with Republicans had continued during even the
134
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darkest days of the Troubles.136 The scale of continuing violence had brought the need to
resolve the impasse into sharp focus. Sustained negotiations aimed at facilitating a
settlement had proved elusive, however.

Several developments helped reverse this established policy. Firstly the election of Garret
Fitzgerald as Taoiseach (for his second term in office in November 1982), heralded a new
philosophy in the Irish government. The premiership of Fitzgerald had been characterised
by a willingness to champion inclusiveness and promote change. Despite economic
difficulties, his time in office featured a more liberal and secular approach. By Irish
standards, his agenda can be considered fairly radical. 137 The nature of this agenda is
witnessed by his failed attempts to amend the constitutional ban on divorce, and his
rather more successful further liberalisation of contraception.138 This desire to facilitate
change extended to the vexed question of Northern Ireland, where the Taoiseach
conveyed a willingness to engage with unionists. This programme of outreach found its
expression in the creation of the New Ireland Forum in May 1983. The forum was
intended to be a vehicle for democratic parties (elected in both jurisdictions) to discuss
methods of resolving the conflict. Although all democratic parties were invited to attend,
both the Ulster Unionists and Alliance Party declined the invitation. The S.D.L.P. joined
the main Southern parties in addressing the debate.139 The establishment of the forum is
typical of the approach adopted by Fitzgerald in his Northern Ireland policy. The
intervention of the Taoiseach reflected a belief that the question of Northern Ireland
needed to be addressed urgently.

The electoral success enjoyed by Sinn Féin following the Hunger Strikes in 1981
(confirmed most spectacularly by the election of Bobby Sands as M.P. for FermanaghSouth Tyrone) had shocked constitutional nationalism to its core. Bew argues that the
136
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ousting of Gerry Fitt by Gerry Adams in the 1983 General Election was one of the factors
which inspired the search for an agreement.140 Certainly the political rise of violent
Republicanism provided a compelling reason for engagement. As Bew reveals, “it was
assumed in many quarters that the surge to Sinn Féin was now irresistible”.141 The
concern, held by the political establishment on both sides of the Irish Sea, was that once
Sinn Féin had generated electoral momentum, their progress would be impossible to
contain.142 Although negotiations commenced later in 1983143, it was the events of the
following year that underpinned British desire for a settlement. At the Conservative Party
Conference, the I.R.A. bombed the Grand Hotel in Brighton (12 October 1984), killing
five people and injuring thirty four others. Although Margaret Thatcher survived the
attack, several prominent Conservatives were killed144, whilst the wife of Norman Tebbit
was seriously injured. The fact that the I.R.A. could get so close to assassinating key
members of the British Cabinet marked an escalation in the threat posed. Such an
audacious attack had never been tried before. Although the I.R.A had targeted senior
politicians and members of the British establishment145 before, the stature (and scale) of
the Brighton bomb was far beyond anything which had been hitherto attempted. The
events of Brighton were, therefore, completely unprecedented. Thatcher‟s response to the
carnage had been typically resolute and defiant. Refusing to be cowed, she continued
with the Conservative Conference; confident in her belief that the bombing was a
fortuitous one off, never to be repeated. According to Thatcher the I.R.A. had merely
been lucky. Their infamous response was chilling:
“Today we were unlucky, but remember, we only have to be lucky once; you will have to be lucky always.
Give Ireland peace and there will be no war.”146
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The statement articulates the futility in attempting to defeat terrorism militarily: although
governments can be successful in preventing atrocities ninety-nine per cent of the time, it
only takes one breach to cause devastation. As Garret Fitzgerald later observed:
“A major factor in the tragedy of the last three decades was the difficulty successive British governments
had in grasping the futility of treating this crisis as one that could be solved by security measures. Such
measures gradually drove an ever growing proportion of the northern nationalist community into the arms
of the I.R.A., and it took two full decades for Irish politicians to convince British governments to review
radically that flawed policy.”147

The Brighton bomb highlighted the necessity of finding a workable settlement in
Northern Ireland to prevent further outrages. In its ruthlessness, the bombing had
confirmed the need to emphasise the primacy of politics in Northern Ireland, thus
alienating the terrorists. The Anglo-Irish Agreement must be viewed in the context of this
renewed desire to facilitate a peaceful settlement. In discussing the constitutional position
of the State prior to the 19th Amendment, it is clear that the Agrement was the critical
development which provided the impetus for change. The Agreement (signed on 15
November 1985) produced the definitive framework upon which amendments to Articles
2 and 3 could be drafted. From a British perspective, the primary motivation appears to
have been to “secure” more effective political “cooperation.”148 This, in turn, reveals
Bew, would help facilitate “better cooperation in the security field.”149 The emphasis on
security was paramount.150 I.R.A. violence could only be countered by a coherent,
collaborative approach. It was evident from the earliest stages that the existence of
Articles 2 and 3 was going to play an important role in the negotiations.151 Bew has
suggested that Thatcher‟s strategy in the talks concerned securing amendment to the
Articles in exchange for an Irish involvement in Northern Ireland, which would place
“emphasis on security” but fall “short of joint authority.”
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retreated, however, when the Irish made clear that they were only prepared to
contemplate changes to their Constitution in the event of joint authority.153

Nevertheless, the Hillsborough Agreement was significant from a constitutional
perspective. Firstly the Agreement enshrined the principle of consent, whereby changes
to the constitutional status of Northern Ireland could only be sanctioned with the support
of a majority of its people. Equally importantly, the Agreement provided that the Irish
State (for the first time since 1922) would have an internal role in the governance of
Northern Ireland, predicated on the basis of governmental cooperation.154 The Agreement
was endorsed by the Parliaments of both States and registered with the United Nations. 155
Article 1 of the text reads:
“The two Governments:

a) Affirm that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would only come about with the consent of a
majority of the people of Northern Ireland.

b) Recognise that the present wish of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland is for no change in the
status of Northern Ireland.

c) Declare that, if in the future a majority of the people of Northern Ireland clearly wish for and formally
consent to the establishment of a united Ireland, they will introduce and support in their respective
Parliaments legislation to give effect to that wish.”156

In relation to the constitutional issue, the change is obvious. The Agreement represented
the first time that the consent principle had been officially endorsed by an Irish
government since the inception of the State. This is a clear deviation from the 1937
Constitution. Although re-unification remained the determined goal of the Irish State, it
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would only be realised with the consent of the people of Northern Ireland.157 The new
position also implied that the State was prepared to amend the Constitution in the context
of a political settlement. In practical terms, the Agreement meant that unionists, as the
majority community in Northern Ireland, would exert considerable influence over any
constitutional change. While not giving unionists a veto, formal recognition of the
consent principle underlined the fact that re-unification could only be achieved by
persuading unionists of its merits.

Acceptance of the consent principle is something which had long been demanded by
unionists. Despite the realisation of this concession, the Agreement proved immensely
unpopular with the unionist community, provoking widespread protests. The
undemocratic nature of the Agreement obscured any satisfaction gleaned from Southern
acceptance of the consent principle. It is one of the bitter ironies of Hillsborough.
Persuading the Irish government to sign up to consent had been the central objective of
the unionist political establishment and yet, when it had been delivered, they were unable
to endorse the Agreement. Although the perceived undemocratic nature of the Agreement
accounts for much of the unionist unease, it was not the primary obstacle. Unionist
opposition to the Agreement revolved around the same issue as Sunningdale: the extent
of Irish involvement in the government of Northern Ireland.
The Agreement had provided, on an institutional level, for the creation of “formal links”
between the two governments, with the aim of providing more stable administration for
Northern Ireland.158 An Inter-governmental Conference was to be established which, in
turn, would be attended by both British and Irish ministers.159 Controversially, from a
unionist perspective, a “permanent secretariat” was to be based at Maryfield, and
administered by civil servants from both jurisdictions.160 The creation of an official Irish
presence in Northern Ireland, with responsibility for assisting in internal government, was
157
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a significant development. The permanent nature of its existence was particularly striking
(the secretariat was only replaced by the institutions established under the Good Friday
Agreement). The remit of the body was wide ranging, but focused primarily on “political,
legal, and security” issues.161 Various strands of cross-border cooperation were agreed.
The key area of concern was security, but other matters were provided for, including
justice and infrastructure.162

It was the symbolism of Southern involvement in Northern Ireland, however, that proved
so repulsive to unionists. The extent of involvement certainly went beyond mere
“consultation”, providing for a full cooperative role in the affairs of Northern Ireland. It
was equally evident, Bew argues, that the Southern role “fell short” of the co-decision
level nationalists desired. Although unionists portrayed the Agreement as de facto joint
authority, there is no doubt that it failed to realise such aspirations.163 Nevertheless, the
extent of Southern input remained unpalatable to the majority community. The spectre of
the `Trojan horse` had returned. It is worth noting the contrasting unionist and nationalist
interpretations of the Agreement. Unionists argued that the two governments had
negotiated an agreement that favoured the nationalist perspective. Nationalists did not
necessarily share this point of view. In his assessment of the impact the Agreement had
on the constitutional position, Garret Fitzgerald lamented that:
“Nothing substantive had changed.”164
Although not strictly accurate, Fitzgerald‟s summary betrays the impression that the
Agreement did not alter the constitutional position in a radical way.165 Whilst the
recognition of consent and the creation of an executive role in Northern Ireland were
important developments, it can be argued that they weren‟t a huge departure from
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established practice.166 As the constitutional review of 1967 and Sunningdale had proven,
the State was prepared to conceive of changes to its Constitution on the basis of a
negotiated settlement. The State, on a practical level, had made allowance for the
existence of Northern Ireland from its earliest days. Viewed in that context, the changes
negotiated at Hillsborough were not as far reaching as they initially appear. Indeed,
echoing Fitzgerald‟s conclusion, it can be argued that the Agreement owed more to
political expediency and spin, than substantive constitutional change. Although obviously
more than a cosmetic exercise, the Agreement can be viewed as a means of boosting
public confidence and easing the violence.

A political imperative existed which

demanded action, and the Agreement represented the most workable compromise the
governments could make. Nationalists had achieved an Irish input into the government of
Northern Ireland, while unionists had secured acceptance of the consent principle. The
need to be seen to be addressing the Northern Ireland problem, therefore, was more
important than the constitutional effect.

Unionists, however, did not share this analysis, and remained fixated on the granting of
an executive function to the Irish government. Their concern was not just the level of
involvement, but how that might evolve over time. I would also contend that a revisionist
interpretation of the Anglo-Irish Agreement underestimates the extent of constitutional
change provided. Firstly, the Agreement heralded the first time the Irish State had
secured an executive function in the internal government of Northern Ireland. Although it
had been conceded eleven years earlier, the change had now been put into practice and
had been enshrined in international law. More importantly, the State had formally
accepted that a change in the constitutional status of Northern Ireland would only occur
through the consent of a majority if its people. The importance of this development is
self-evident, contradicting the inalienable right to national territory and selfdetermination enshrined in the 1937 Constitution. In so doing, the Irish State had moved
some way not just from that document, but Sunningdale.167 According to the logic of the
166
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Agreement, the Irish constitutional position was no longer based solely on the irredentist
demand for re-unification, but was now underpinned by the notion of consent. Therefore,
while the State remained committed to pursuing the ideal of unity it had accepted, on a
practical level, that it could only be achieved through the consent of a majority in
Northern Ireland. Such an unambiguous recognition of consent exhibits a clear shift in
the policy of the State.
The extent of the constitutional significance is, however, a matter of debate.168 Whether
one views the Agreement as contrary to the Constitution hinges on the interpretation of
Article 1 (a). An acceptance of consent, it can be argued, reinforces the status of Northern
Ireland as part of the United Kingdom. Moreover Article 1 establishes that this status will
only be altered when the consent of the people of Northern Ireland has been obtained.
The reading of this Article gets to the crux of the matter: is such formal recognition of
Northern Ireland at odds with the Constitution? Article 1 of the Agreement was the
central tenet of the McGimpsey case. Unionist opposition to the Anglo-Irish Agreement
revolved around its undemocratic nature, and the way in which it ceded authority to the
Irish government which was, in their view, unjustifiable.169 What made this new Irish
dimension more unpalatable was that it was seemingly in contradiction of its own
Constitution. How could Ireland assume authority to help administer Northern Ireland (or
indeed recognise the consent principle), when its Constitution failed to recognise the
existence of that jurisdiction? The constitutional uncertainty which lay at the heart of the
Agreement gave unionists a foundation upon which to challenge its existence.170 John
Hume, according to Bew, had a rather different understanding of the Article.171 He
interpreted Article 1(c) as proving that the British government had no vested “interest” in
remaining in Northern Ireland.172 Not for the last time, Hume was advancing the
argument that Britain had become “neutral” on the Irish question and was prepared to
disengage.173 He cited clause C as evidence of this position.174 According to this theory,
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British policy had changed in a more fundamental way than Irish policy. The truth is that
the Agreement can be characterised as fudge. By placing an emphasis on consent while at
the same time accentuating the Irish dimension, and holding out hope of re-unification, it
can be argued that the governments were deliberately trying to “avoid a clash” with the
“Irish Constitution.”175 Such ambiguity made the Agreement ripe for constitutional
challenge. While there was even the hint of unconstitutionality, the authority of the
Agreement was undermined.176 That is why it was so important to test the legality of the
Agreement in the courts.

Although unionist objections to Hillsborough are well documented, perhaps the more
important aspect of the Anglo-Irish Agreement was the manner in which it emboldened
nationalism. The Agreement paved the way for the historic Hume-Adams dialogue, a
pivotal development in the peace process. In 1988, once the Hillsborough Agreement had
gestated, the S.D.L.P. leader initiated talks with his Sinn Féin counterpart, Gerry Adams.
In the modern context of Sinn Féin Ministers and political respectability, it is difficult to
conceive just how controversial this dialogue was at the time. For a start, the I.R.A was
still wedded to violence and continuing its armed campaign, both within Northern Ireland
and in Britain Sinn Féin had opposed the Anglo-Irish Agreement as a “partition based
solution” which had failed to achieve Irish unity.177 The political ostracising of Sinn Féin
was most visibly demonstrated by the broadcasting ban imposed by the Thatcher
government.178 Therefore, by engaging with Sinn Féin, Hume was displaying remarkable
political courage. The dialogue was to prove extremely profitable, however. The talks
helped drive Sinn Féin into the political mainstream, the hope being that this would
secure a cessation of violence. The Republican movement had been flirting with electoral
politics since the Hunger Strikes, but the leadership remained unconvinced that it
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provided the only mechanism for achieving a united Ireland. The election of Bobby
Sands had highlighted the potential for political expansion, although that success had
failed to turn the movement from violence. The opposition of Republicans to the
Agreement provided further evidence that they were still on the outside of the body
politic.

It is no exaggeration to state that the Hume-Adams dialogue constituted the most
important step in convincing Republicans of the primacy of politics. First, the
engagement demonstrated that constitutional politicians were prepared to enter into
dialogue with Republicans. This conferring of democratic legitimacy helped persuade
Sinn Féin that its future strategic direction lay with mainstream politics.179 The
interaction with the S.D.L.P. did much to advance the idea that re-unification could be
achieved through politics alone. One of Hume‟s first tasks was to convince a sceptical
Adams that not only was Britain neutral on the constitutional question, but that, under the
right circumstances, they could act as persuaders for Irish unity. One of the Republican
arguments against full scale political engagement was that as long as a British presence
remained in Ireland, an accommodation between the two traditions would be impossible.
Hume again advanced the argument that the British had no long term, strategic interest in
maintaining the Union.180 The receipt, and acceptance, of this argument, proved crucial in
the assertion of political primacy within the Republican movement. Subsequent
developments gave credence to Hume‟s advocacy of British neutrality.181 Combined with
its own electoral success, the Hume-Adams dialogue provided Sinn Féin with evidence
that the best prospects for success lay with politics. Without this intervention, it is
doubtful that the original I.R.A. ceasefire of 1994 would have been achieved. The
importance of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, from a nationalist perspective, cannot be over
stated. It marked the beginning of a new pan-nationalist agenda, which characterised Irish
politics for the next decade, and culminated in the Good Friday Agreement. As Bew
observes:
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“Constitutional and revolutionary nationalism were profoundly convinced that the Agreement was the
clearest indication that the tide of history was running their way. It was the first semi-constitutional
recognition of longer term structural shifts which were consigning unionists to the category of defeated
peoples.”182

The Agreement was a key turning point for all sides. For nationalists, it represented the
first occasion that their political aspirations had found expression in a Northern Irish
context. The political framework provided a tangible link between the State and the
nationalists of Northern Ireland, something the 1921 Treaty had manifestly failed to
do.183 Moreover the Agreement had established a template for the realisation of political
re-unification. For Republicans, the Agreement, through its inspiration for the HumeAdams dialogue, aided their journey towards political legitimacy and constitutional
politics. In that sense the Agreement had perhaps achieved one of its primary aims,
namely the demonstration that political violence was counter-productive. Although it
took nearly a decade to facilitate a ceasefire, the inter-governmental approach adopted at
Hillsborough demonstrated that a political settlement was possible, and that I.R.A.
violence was hindering that vision.

For unionists, the Agreement represented a watershed of a different kind, underlining the
need for political engagement within Northern Ireland. That way, an Agreement of this
nature could never be implemented over their heads again. The Agreement heralded a
more pragmatic approach by unionism, as demonstrated by the policy of James
Molyneaux and his successor David Trimble, who both sought to end the conflict by
engaging with other parties. From a constitutional viewpoint, the Agreement should be
viewed as a significant development. The granting of an executive role to the Irish
government in Northern Ireland and Southern acceptance of the consent principle
represented real change. The contention of unionist opponents was that such changes in
Irish policy were incompatible with the Constitution. It was the Irish courts who settled
the question: not only were Articles 2 and 3 fully compatible with the Agreement but
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they provided a “constitutional imperative” for re-unification.184 The de facto existence of
Northern Ireland was, therefore, fully compatible with the Articles; a recognition which is
inherent in Article 3.185

THE DOWNING STREET DECLARATION (1993)

The commitment of the State to constitutional change in the context of an agreed political
settlement was re-iterated in the Downing Street Declaration of December, 1993.186 The
Declaration resulted from the momentum created by the Hume-Adams process, whereby
the governments became convinced that political progress was possible. Although in
admiration of the potential generated by Hume-Adams, the British government,
according to Bew, was concerned that they failed to give adequate cognisance to the
“consent” principle.187 In order to build on this potential, Prime Minister John Major and
Taoiseach Albert Reynolds instigated a political process which they hoped would
produce substantive change.188 In one sense the inter-governmental Agreement
constituted a confirmation of its predecessor, negotiated at Hillsborough eight years
earlier. The Downing Street Declaration, however, was to alter the political landscape in
a fundamental way. Two notable concessions were to have a profound impact:
“…He (Major) re-iterates, on behalf of the British government, that they have no selfish strategic or
economic interest in Northern Ireland. The British government agrees that it is for the people of the island
of Ireland alone, by agreement between the two parts respectively, to exercise their right to selfdetermination on the basis of consent, freely and concurrently given, north and South, to bring about a
united Ireland, if that is their wish.
184
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The Taoiseach …considers that…..it would be wrong to attempt to impose a united Ireland, in the absence
of the freely given consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland. He accepts…that the democratic
right of self-determination by the people of Ireland as a whole must be achieved and exercised with, and
subject to, the agreement and consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland and must, consistent
with justice and equity, respect the democratic dignity and the civil rights and religious liberties of both
communities…..
The Taoiseach also acknowledges the presence in the Constitution of the Republic of elements which are
deeply resented by Northern unionists, but which at the same time reflect the hopes and ideals which lie
deep in the hearts of many Irish men and women.”189

The unprecedented admission by the British government that they had no “selfish,
strategic or economic interest” in Northern Ireland was one of the key moments of the
peace process. Without the statement, it is unlikely that an I.R.A. ceasefire could have
been delivered. John Hume had spent much of the preceding five years attempting to
convince Republicans that the British had no vested interest and could play the role of
honest broker in negotiations. Sinn Féin had been sceptical, the party being historically
suspicious of British intentions in Northern Ireland. Here it was, however, in black and
white: the British stating in unambiguous terms that they had no selfish motive in
remaining in Northern Ireland.190 Hume‟s position in his dialogue with Adams had been
vindicated.191 The British policy now appeared to be neutral regarding the future of
Northern Ireland. While the British government had not emerged as persuaders for Irish
unity, the Declaration committed the U.K. to neutrality, ensuring that one community
could not dominate the other. Historical discrimination such as gerrymandering would
never be repeated. The concession by the Taoiseach that the Constitution contained
elements which are offensive to unionists was also significant.192 Albert Reynolds
emphasised that the best prospect for progress lay in the acknowledgement of all
identities in “more balanced ways.”193 The statement served a double purpose; reiterating to unionists that they had nothing to fear from the State, while implying that
189
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Articles 2 and 3 could be amended in the context of a settlement. By accentuating the
flaws in its Constitution, the Taoiseach was holding out the possibility that the
Constitution could be amended to make it more amenable to unionists.194 The Declaration
stated that any change to the constitutional position of Northern Ireland would only occur
on the basis of consent.195 As a means of reinforcing that idea, the governments declared
that they would only introduce legislation to give effect to that change when the consent
of both jurisdictions for such developments had been determined.196 The Declaration
should be viewed as an important milestone in the journey towards the removal of the
legal claim. The categorical statement by the British government about their long term
intentions in relation to Northern Ireland helped provide the political context within
which the Dublin administration could contemplate changes to Articles 2 and 3.

By making recognition of the consent principle a central tenet of any future settlement,
the Governments were reassuring unionists that any changes to the status of Northern
Ireland could only occur through the support of a majority of its people.197 Both the
Hillsborough and Downing Street Declarations provided the framework for changes to
Articles 2 and 3. The Declaration demonstrates that the State had no difficulty endorsing
the consent principle. In so doing, Albert Reynolds was in no way abandoning a policy of
re-unification. On the contrary, the Irish government interpreted the Declaration as
enhancing the prospects for political unity, enshrining that permanent rapprochement
between the two parts of Ireland would only be achieved through consent. Moreover it
was clear that the State did not regard this policy as being contrary to its own
Constitution. Bew assesses the importance of the Declaration thus:
“The self-determination of the Irish people was conceded by Britain, but only on the basis that the Irish
government wished to operate that principle in favour of Irish unity with the support of a majority in the
North…The British, it is true, were now `facilitators` though not for Irish unity but for an agreed Ireland,
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and an `agreed` Ireland, by definition, could not be a united Ireland until there was majority consent in the
North.”198

THE GOOD FRIDAY AGREEMENT (1998)

“……The Agreement reached in the Multi-Party negotiations is a major achievement, both for its
negotiators and the peoples of Ireland and Britain. To make it, many politicians, officials, paramilitaries
and ordinary citizens had been through trials by ordeal. It emerged from a political desert whose only
landmarks were failed initiatives.”199

With nearly twelve years having elapsed since its signing, it is difficult to put the Good
Friday Agreement into its proper context. Given that its aftermath has witnessed a Sinn
Féin-D.U.P. partnership in government, Martin McGuinness as Deputy First Minister,
and the virtual retirement of the I.R.A., it is easy to forget the truly historic nature of the
compromise. Although previous attempts at accommodation had generated hope,
ultimately they had resulted in failure and recrimination. The Good Friday Agreement,
and the protracted negotiations which preceded it, represent the triumph of hope over
despair. Given the seemingly irreconcilable positions of unionism and Republicanism
that had existed pre-1998, the Agreement is nothing short of a political miracle. Over a
decade later, it is still the shining beacon for other attempts at conflict resolution around
the world. Israel-Palestine, Tibet, and even South Africa, can only dream of the
institutional, security and political stability, afforded to Northern Ireland by the Belfast
Agreement. It would be disingenuous not to recognise the Agreement‟s inherent flaws,
notably its sectarian and tribal nature. Nonetheless the Agreement is the most important
Irish political development of the latter half of the 20th century, an unprecedented
attempt at reconciling the two main political traditions on this island. The fruit of years of
198
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painstaking negotiations, the Good Friday Agreement represents the most important
constitutional change since 1922. As such, it should be considered a monumental
achievement.

The achievement is remarkable, considering that it occurred amidst a background of
violence. The I.R.A. had declared a complete cessation of violence on 31 August 1994,
offering the potential for a political settlement.200 The nature of the ceasefire was a matter
of fierce debate, but the development paved the way for inclusive all party talks involving
Sinn Féin.201 The momentum dissipated, however, as the months elapsed. The most
destabilising influence was the vexed issue of decommissioning. The key unionist precondition for the entry of Sinn Féin into negotiations was that the vast arsenal of I.R.A.
weapons would have to be decommissioned. The purpose was to prove the credentials of
Sinn Féin as a democratic party, and test the sincerity of the I.R.A. cessation. Bearing in
mind the recent history of Republican involvement in internecine, sectarian violence,
unionists considered decommissioning to be a legitimate test of their democratic
credentials.202 Republicans adopted a different position, viewing their place at the
negotiating table as an elected right, derived from their mandate. That is not to say that all
Republicans were averse to decommissioning as a concept. The Sinn Féin leadership had
been keen to emphasise that an unarmed society was the logical consequence of conflict
resolution.203

They remained

obstinately opposed,
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decommissioning as a pre-condition.
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Many Republicans viewed the unionist insistence

on decommissioning as a way of excluding them from talks.

The governments, therefore, had a difficult task in attempting to square this circle. The
original position had not been a million miles away from the unionist viewpoint, i.e. that
a start to decommissioning would have to be made before Sinn Féin could command their
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place at the negotiating table.205 The British government in particular advocated that a
gesture on decommissioning was essential in securing unionist acceptance of Sinn Féin
participation in the talks.206 Nationalists, on the other hand, were instinctively sceptical of
this position, realising that too adamantine an approach to the issue would threaten to
destroy the opportunity created by the ceasefire. John Hume had been particularly
vigorous on this point.207 By insisting in prior decommissioning as a pre-condition,
unionists were threatening to destroy conditions which had taken years to create.208
Moreover the dynamic of the peace process had changed from a Southern perspective.
Following the collapse of the Reynolds government in December 1994, John Bruton
formed the `Rainbow Coalition`, comprising Fine Gael, Labour and Democratic Left.209
The change in administration had repercussions for the peace process. Reynolds had been
an ardent supporter of the Hume-Adams approach.210 Bruton was to take a more neutral
line, seeking common ground with the Major government. Bruton seemed to have been
persuaded that the policy of prior decommissioning was correct.211
Meanwhile British policy also appeared to be drifting in a more unionist direction.212
The u-turn was inspired by practical rather than ideological considerations. Throughout
1995 and 1996, Major‟s government had been paralysed by infighting and discord,
particularly over Europe. More alarmingly, his majority had been steadily dwindling
through defections and by-election results.213 Naturally this made Major reliant on
smaller parties to shore up his administration. One ally in this period was David Trimble,
who had succeeded Molyneux as leader of the Ulster Unionist Party in 1995.214
Nationalists had been suspicious that the parliamentary alliance with Trimble had
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influenced Major‟s policy in the peace process. The Anglo-Irish insistence on prior
decommissioning must be viewed in this context.

The new policy placed the Adams leadership in a quandary. Much had been sacrificed to
create an environment where inclusive peace talks were possible. Republicans had
invested too much in the Hume-Adams approach to jeopardise the peace process by a
return to full scale violence. Decommissioning was at this point, however, impossible for
Sinn Féin to deliver.215 In the end, the resolution that prior decommissioning was
essential for Republican admission to talks proved terminal for this phase of the
process.216 The I.R.A. broke their cessation in spectacular fashion by planting a bomb in
Canary Wharf on 9 February 1996.217 The ceasefire had lasted a mere seventeen months
and all the momentum generated had apparently been lost. At this stage, the prospect of a
negotiated settlement seemed very remote indeed.

The peace process was to secure a much needed lifeline with the landslide election
victory of Tony Blair on 1 May 1997.218 The change in administration removed all the
obstacles to progress. Blair‟s election promised a new attitude in relation to the peace
process. Not only was the Labour party traditionally perceived as being more sympathetic
to the nationalist cause, Blair himself had committed his premiership to resolving the
Northern Ireland issue.219 Northern Ireland was a clear priority for the new government.
The most urgent focus was the reinstatement of the cessation, which in turn would open
up the possibility of all-party talks. Blair abandoned the flawed policy of prior
decommissioning, arguing instead that decommissioning could occur in parallel with
talks.220 Moreover the Prime Minister made it clear that Sinn Féin would be included in
the negotiations if the cessation was restored. The new approach was markedly more
successful than the obfuscation of Major, his healthy majority enabling Blair to act as an
215
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objective broker, free from the need to pander to the Ulster Unionists in parliament. The
change in government created fresh optimism that political progress could be renewed.
“…Those who accepted the nationalist view of the peace process believed that a Labour Government, with
its large majority and traditional sympathy for Irish unity, would easily succeed where the Conservatives
had failed.”221

The “complete cessation of military operations” was reinstated on 20 July 1997. 222 The
main barrier to the commencement of all-party negotiations had been removed, but
difficulties remained and unionists became increasingly concerned. The breakdown of the
original ceasefire had augmented unionist worries that the cessation was neither sincere
nor permanent. In addition, the removal of prior decommissioning as a pre-condition for
entry into talks had alarmed the unionist grassroots. A belief was fermenting that the new
government was biased in favour of the nationalist position. Pacification of the unionist
constituency was paramount if the mistakes of 1974 were to be avoided. Even if
strategically Trimble was inclined to lead his party into inclusive negotiations, there
would be no prospect of success if he was unable to deliver the broad unionist
constituency.
Trimble‟s plight was made more perilous by the fact the D.U.P. was characteristically
standing by to protest, accusing the Official Unionists of betrayal. Blair, therefore, sought
to reassure Trimble that the Union was secure and that any negotiations would occur on
the basis of consent.223 In summarising his position, he affirmed “the principle of consent
will be at the heart of my government‟s policy on Northern Ireland, it‟s the key
principle.”224 Despite internal dissent, Trimble calculated that unionists could exert more
influence within the talks. As a constitutional lawyer, he realised the importance of the
negotiations; that unionists could not afford another Hillsborough scenario where a deal
could be implemented over their heads. In a display of political fortitude, he entered the
221
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talks on 9 September 1997, flanked by members of fringe Loyalist parties.225 With
Trimble safely on board, all barriers to the inclusion of Sinn Féin had been removed.
Nevertheless Blair, acutely aware of the risks Trimble was taking, was keen to reassure
unionists and protect the Ulster Unionist leader from his critics.226 Following the
beginning of talks, he commented:
“Trimble has come further than Unionists wanted him to……It was important to remember that Trimble
was under constant attack from Paisley and (Robert) McCartney, so giving comfort to the Ulster Unionists
was vital.”227

The talks were convened under the chairmanship of George Mitchell, the senior United
States diplomat, who had previously been involved in the process as chairman of the
Independent International Commission on Decommissioning.228 The strategy of Trimble
in negotiations was probably rather straightforward i.e. to cement acceptance of the
consent principle and seek assurances on Articles 2 and 3.229 He was in quite a strong
position, therefore. His primary problem was that throughout negotiations he was
constantly undermined by unionist critics, both within and without his party. As well as
nationalist opponents, Trimble had to contend with the traditional unionist belief that they
were victims of a sell out. This fear was expressed with typical loquaciousness by Robert
McCartney:
“Without doubt the whole purpose of these talks is to wring further concessions from the majority that
would both undermine the strength of the Union and the quality and nature of their British citizenship and
identity.”230
225
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The priority for nationalists, meanwhile, was to maximise the Irish dimension in
negotiations.231 Although maintaining that re-unification remained their bottom line, even
Sinn Féin was realistic in its expectations.232 This attitude provided nationalists with a
certain freedom in negotiations. Echoing previous talks, the perception was that northern
nationalists had everything to gain, whereas unionists considered themselves as having
everything to lose. The traditional `siege mentality` posed a very real danger to the
process. Nationalist negotiators were sensitive to the internal machinations within
unionism. Enthusiasm for securing the best deal for their own constituency was tempered
by a desire not to push for a settlement that could not be sold to unionists.233 A
determination existed not to repeat the mistakes of 1974. As Dixon reveals:
“…Sunningdale cast a long shadow over negotiations. A senior S.D.L.P representative said that his party
was conscious over Trimble‟s difficulties and of the danger of a `dramatic scenario with echoes of
1974`………..The two governments once again appeared to be playing their role as champions for their
clients in Northern Ireland. U.U.P sources claimed `The Irish government are fully batting for Sinn Féin
and giving Sinn Féin a veto` and unionists expected Blair to `do for us what the Irish government appears
to be doing for nationalists` .”234

The strategy of the governments seems to have been that they would each use their
influence where appropriate. The Irish government engaged with Sinn Féin, with the
British concerned with shoring up Trimble.235 The approach appeared controversial;
conveying the impression of Anglo-Irish partisanship i.e. that the British were adopting a
unionist position, while Ahern‟s administration was advancing a pan-nationalist agenda.
The implication drawn was that the previous British policy of neutrality had been
abandoned in favour of support for the unionist position. This impression is misleading.
The pre-occupation of British negotiators with the Ulster Unionists should not be
interpreted as a return to a unionist position; rather it reflects the reality that Trimble
231
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could only manage internal difficulties with the support of Blair.236 Trimble‟s negotiating
hand was improved significantly with the withdrawal of the D.U.P. and U.K.U.P. from
talks. Although the dissenters could still protest from outside the talks, their absence gave
Trimble latitude for negotiation that would not have been possible otherwise. The
inclusion of the D.U.P., in particular, would have paralysed the process. Any conciliation
by Trimble would have been met with accusations of treachery. The importance attached
to the boycott of negotiations by the more implacable unionist parties is explained by
Mitchell:
“No-one can ever know for certain what might have been, but I believe that had Paisley and McCartney
stayed and fought from within there would have been no agreement.”237

The path was now cleared for Trimble to compromise. Accommodation seemed to be the
preferred strategy for the Ulster Unionist leader, who had absorbed the lessons of
1985.238 According to Cox, “the lesson of the Anglo-Irish Agreement appeared to be that
unionists could not afford to be on the outside of a process that would determine their
future.”239 Despite his internal difficulties, Trimble was edging closer to a deal. The
likelihood of a settlement was increased not just by Trimble‟s willingness to compromise,
but by the pressure exerted by the governments who did not want to see the historic
opportunity wasted.240 Still, the process went to the wire. Initially the target for
agreement had been New Year 1998, but as the months progressed it became obvious that
substantial differences remained.241 Primarily, these concerned the extent of North-South
cooperation and decommissioning. The issue of Irish involvement was emotive for
unionism. Trimble had accepted that a North-South dimension would form part of the
settlement, but sought assurances regarding the extent of its remit. Unionist concern
initially revolved around whether these bodies would have `executive` functions.242
Friction became inevitable as the nationalist parties were adamant that unless the North236
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South institutions possessed an executive function, they would be rendered meaningless.
As the deadlines extended, it seemed that a settlement would collapse on the same basis
as 1974. Unionist opposition to the idea of executive North-South bodies appeared to
soften, however. Rather than limit their role to that of consultation, Trimble instead
demanded that the institutions be accountable to the Northern Ireland Assembly, created
as part of the Agreement.243 It was a clever tactic by the Ulster Unionist leader,
highlighting that he was prepared to compromise over the Irish dimension, whilst
ensuring that the bodies would be accountable. Moreover, by insisting that North-South
bodies be accountable rather than `stand alone`, he made it easier to sell the idea to the
unionist constituency. Nationalists, therefore, would achieve North-South bodies with the
level of authority they deemed necessary. At the same time unionists could argue that
they had limited the extent of these bodies. The quid pro quo for unionist acceptance of
executive North-South bodies was the removal of the legal claim over Northern
Ireland.244

Decommissioning had proved a much trickier issue to resolve. As the talks progressed, it
became evident that paramilitary disarmament would not happen in parallel. The failure
to achieve decommissioning became a source of considerable disaffection within the
Ulster Unionist Party.245 The completion of decommissioning had been a pre-condition of
the party‟s entry into inclusive negotiations. The fact that this process had still not even
started seriously hampered the ability of Trimble to complete the deal. By early spring
1998, the substance of the deal had largely been agreed. The main elements comprising
an elected Assembly, North-South institutions and a British-Irish council had been
approved.246 Positive statements emanated from the talks, increasing optimism that a
settlement was possible. Trimble, in summarising his hopes for the Assembly, stated that
he wanted it to be a “pluralist parliament for a pluralist people”.247 In echoing Craig‟s
declaration, Trimble was emphasising that the new Assembly would break from the past;
represent all communities and be free from discrimination. Decommissioning represented
243
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the last major hurdle to having this vision realised. Frantic diplomatic efforts involving
the governments continued into April 1998, aimed at resolving the impasse.248

The focus moved to reassuring unionists that decommissioning would be commenced
before Sinn Féin could be included in the Executive. It was a delicate balancing act.
Without reassuring Ulster Unionists an agreement would be impossible, but the
governments did not want to go so far that they alienated Republicans. Pressure was
exerted on all parties to compromise, with Bill Clinton personally contacting Trimble to
commend him on his conciliatory stance.249 A mood of uncertainty prevailed throughout
the final days, the Ulster Unionists unsure that they had received enough assurances on
decommissioning to sell the deal to their electorate.250 Following intensive negotiations
which lasted through the night, the desire to settle prevailed. On 10 April 1998, all the
parties involved in the negotiations (including the two governments) signed the accord.
An historic compromise had been achieved, completely unprecedented in modern Irish
history. Sunningdale had been ambitious in its intent, but here was a settlement that
included virtually all the main parties.251 The only significant constituency unrepresented
had been the dissenting unionists. The Agreement had even surpassed Sunningdale by
providing an all-Ireland framework which had been accepted by the Ulster Unionist
Party. Remarkably, the Ulster Unionists had assented to the compromise in spite of their
internal concerns.252 The basis for an inclusive and workable system of government had
finally been agreed.
As Kelly acknowledges, the Agreement consisted of two elements; “the multi party
Agreement, and the inter-governmental Agreement.”253 The Agreement had been divided
into three principal areas or `strands`.254 Strand one provided for a 108 member cross-
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community Assembly, Strand two for the North-South Ministerial Council, which would
deal with areas of mutual cooperation and Strand three, which provided for the
establishment of the British-Irish Council.255 . The system incorporated in built systems
of checks and balances, designed to prevent discrimination and the domination of one
community over the other.256 The Assembly was conceived to act as a legislature and
executive, the governmental aspect provided by a ten person Executive and headed by a
First and Deputy First Minister.257 Although “distinct” for practical purposes, the
positions of First and Deputy Minister are essentially “equal.”258 Thus all important
decisions had to be made jointly.

As such, no one community could advance their agenda at the expense of the other.
Cross-community consensus lies at the heart of the Agreement‟s apparatus.259 The most
notable safeguard is the controversial D‟Hondt mechanism for appointing members of the
Executive.260 . The idea is to spread authority over as many parties as possible, provided
that they have sufficient votes.261 Further restrictions were applied to

prevent any

possibility of sectarian domination.262 For example, there is the system of crosscommunity designation where every member of the Assembly is required to designate
themselves as `nationalist`, `unionist` or `other`.263 .The North-South Ministerial Council
allows Ministers from both sides of the border to meet and discuss 12 areas of mutual
cooperation.264 The British-Irish Council represented the East-West element of the
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Dixon (2001): p.269. See also Ryan (2001), p.41.
Ibid.
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Dixon (2001): p.268.
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Ibid.
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Ibid.
260
Devised by a Belgian mathematician, the system appoints members based on their party strength in the
Assembly. Other safeguards are used for major decisions such as including cross-community voting
mechanisms, such as “parallel consent and weighted majority voting.” See Dixon (2001): pp.268-269.
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Dixon (2001): p.270.
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Ibid.
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See Dixon (2001): p.269. The system of cross-community designation has proved controversial in
practice. The biggest controversy concerned the restoration of the Executive in November 2001, where
David Trimble and Mark Durkan could only be elected as First Ministers by the re-designation of members
of the Alliance Party and Women‟s Coalition.
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The twelve areas of cooperation involved six subjects for cooperation (“Transport, Agriculture,
Education, Health, the Environment and Tourism) and six implementation bodies (Inland waterways, Food
Safety, Trade and Business Development, Special E.U programmes, Language and Agricultural/Marine
matters).” See Dixon (2001): p.70.
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The main criticism of the Agreement was that it institutionalised

sectarianism rather than eradicating it. The argument is that by having a mandatory as
opposed to a voluntary coalition, divisions are merely reinforced. Some commentators
have attacked the Agreement on this basis.267 According to O‟Leary, this argument is
flawed. He writes:
“The unionist intellectual Robert McCartney, ironically mimics anti-Agreement Republicans in claiming
that the power sharing institutions are `impermanent`, dysfunctional` and `unworkable`………..
These criticisms are not convincing…There is a basic inability to distinguish, between on the one hand,
policies that promote injustice and incite conflict between groups, and policies that are designed to promote
equitable settlements and better inter-group relations.”268

It is better to view the Agreement as a workable framework within a divided society.
Although imperfect, the checks and balances were necessary to safeguard against the
discrimination suffered by nationalists in the past. There was still no guarantee at this
stage that the Agreement would be endorsed. Nationalists were overwhelmingly in
favour, but anxiety remained within unionism over decommissioning and other
controversial elements.269 An intensive P.R. campaign was launched to counter this
concern, the governments realising that the Agreement would only have authority if
endorsed by majorities in both jurisdictions. Key moments included David Trimble and
John Hume appearing with U2, and Tony Blair offering a series of handwritten pledges to
reassure the unionist electorate. The pledges were seen as a seminal moment in turning
unionist opinion as they included an assurance that Republicans would only be included
in an Executive once a process of decommissioning had been initiated.270 The campaign
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Ibid: The Council provided for an irregular, but informal meeting of representatives from the U.K.
parliament, Irish parliament, and the devolved Assemblies of Scotland and Wales.
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There was also to be representation from the Channel Islands and other smaller jurisdictions.
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Socialist writer Eamonn McCann is one such critic, claiming that the tribal nature of the institutions
prevents conventional left/right politics from emerging in Northern Ireland.
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O‟Leary (2004): p.341.
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evidently worked: the referendum was passed by a 71.1% majority.271 A majority of both
communities had supported the Agreement, giving it the democratic approval required for
implementation.

From a constitutional perspective, the most important aspect was the removal of the legal
claim over Northern Ireland. The new Articles read:

Article 2: It is the entitlement and birthright of every person born in the island of Ireland, which includes its
islands and its seas, to be part of the Irish Nation. That is also the entitlement of all persons otherwise
qualified in accordance with law to be citizens of Ireland. Furthermore, the Irish nation cherishes its special
affinity with people of Irish ancestry living abroad who share its cultural identity and heritage.

Article 3: It is the firm will of the Irish nation, in harmony and friendship, to unite all the people who share
the territory of the island of Ireland, in all the diversity of their identities and traditions, recognising that a
united Ireland shall be brought about only by peaceful means with the consent of a majority of the people
democratically expressed, in both jurisdictions of the island. Until then, the laws enacted by the Parliament
established by this Constitution shall have the like area and extent of application as the laws enacted by the
Parliament that existed immediately before the coming into operation of this Constitution. 272

The amended Articles convey a more aspirational tone. The Agreement, therefore,
represented a watershed in the State‟s relationship with Northern Ireland. It had accepted
that unity could only be realised through reconciliation of the Irish people. The nation
had now been defined in popular terms. Moreover the nation had been extended to people
of Irish origin living abroad, removing an anomaly in the 1937 Constitution.273 The
ambition for unity had not been abandoned, merely updated. Re-unification would only
come about through the will of the people democratically expressed, north and south.274
The new Articles are grounded on the principle of consent; unity will not be realised until
a majority in both jurisdictions agree to the change. Although merely a codification of the
Irish policy which had pertained since Hillsborough, the consent principle had now been
271

Dixon (2001): A high turnout of 81 % helped the pro-agreement cause. Protestant support was much less
emphatic, however. “An R.T.E poll suggested that only 51% of Protestants” backed the Agreement. Dixon
(2001): p.273.
272
Constitution of Ireland: the new Articles, as provided by the Nineteenth Amendment.
273
People of Irish origin living abroad were still not technically included in the Irish nation. Instead, the
revised Articles 2 and 3 expressed an “affinity” with Irish people overseas. See below.
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See O‟Leary (2004): p.341.
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afforded constitutional protection. Recognition of Northern Ireland‟s status as part of the
United Kingdom had now been enshrined in the fundamental law of the State.

The context for this change was provided by the establishment of the North-South
Ministerial Council. For the first time the State would have a fully Executive role in
Northern Ireland, extending its authority beyond the cooperative model agreed in 1985.
The assumption of this function heralds the most important constitutional provision to
affect both jurisdictions in Ireland since 1937. Although underpinned by consent, the
State now had a direct role in the governance of Northern Ireland, which nationalists
hoped would form an institutional basis for achieving unity. Moreover the role had been
enshrined as permanent and,275 although unionists could maintain that the bodies were
accountable to the Assembly, their very existence signalled closer integration between the
two jurisdictions. Previously Southern input into Northern Ireland could only be
exercised at the discretion of the British government. Now the State exercised an
Executive role independent of British goodwill. The correlation between the North-South
Ministerial Council and the 19th Amendment is evidenced by the timing of the
implementation. Despite being ratified in 1998, the Amendment only became effective
once the Council had been established in December 1999.276 The establishment of the
North-South Ministerial Council, therefore, had been a pre-condition for the removal of
the legal claim. The Irish government had been prepared to sacrifice the legal claim over
Northern Ireland for a direct role in its government.277

The Agreement signifies something deeper, however. Irish nationalism (and the Irish
State in particular), had moved beyond the irredentist values of 1937. There had been an
acceptance that unity could not be achieved through coercion. Re-unification would not
be achieved by simply inculcating unionists with nationalist ideas. Although political re275

The independent nature of the North-South bodies is highlighted by the fact that they continued to meet
even during periods of suspension of the Executive.
276
The nature of the Amendment was debated in Riordan v. An Taoiseach [1999] 2 I.R. 337. The plaintiff
had claimed that this method of amendment was unconstitutional. The Supreme Court held that the people,
being fully sovereign, could amend the Constitution in whatever manner they wished. See Ryan (2001):
p.41.
277
The comprehensive manner in which the State dropped the legal claim implies that it was never overly
committed to its retention.
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unification remained a key nationalist objective, the signatories to the Agreement had
accepted that it could only be realised by consent. Nationalism had become more relaxed
and confident about the national question, secure in the belief that unity would occur
eventually. Militant Republicans perceived the existence of the old Articles as
justification for continued violence.278 Armed groups had viewed themselves as fulfilling
a constitutional requirement. All such justifications had been removed. The template for
national re-unification had been established: two jurisdictions living in harmony and
respect, who would only seek to unite once consent had been established. The Irish State
had resolved to constitutionally persuade its unionist neighbours to share its political
ambitions, rather than demand compliance. As such, the nationalist representatives who
signed the Agreement had come a considerable way from their predecessors of 1937. The
evolution in nationalist thought throughout the intervening years had been remarkable.
Politics alone do not do justice to the enormity of this journey. The eradication of the
legal claim over Northern Ireland owes just as much to the protracted debate conducted
by the Irish courts.
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See above.
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CONSTITUTION:

PRAGMATISM OR PRINCIPLE?-THE MCGIMPSEY CASE

CHAPER 2: CASE LAW RELATING TO ARTICLES 2 AND 3

“One of the theories held in 1937 by a substantial number of citizens was that a nation, as distinct from a
state, had rights; that the Irish people living in the….Republic of Ireland and in Northern Ireland together
formed the Irish Nation; that a nation has a right to unity of territory in some form, be it as a unitary or
federal state, and that the Government of Ireland Act 1920, though legally binding, was a violation of that
right to unity which was superior to positive law. This national claim to unity exists not in legal but in the
political order and is one of the rights which was envisaged in Article 2.”1

So the Supreme Court (O‟Higgins C.J.) interpreted the legal claim over Northern Ireland
in Re Article 26 and the Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Bill 1975 [1977]. The 1937
Constitution had created a problem for the courts. The existence of Northern Ireland had
been provided for by the Anglo-Irish Treaty (1921), and had been given legal recognition
by the Government of Ireland Act 1920. Northern Ireland, therefore, had been afforded
full legal status, and was consequently protected by international law. A universally
recognised provision of international law is that it is illegal for states to claim jurisdiction
over other sovereign states. Protection for the sovereignty of individual states is given
expression in several international agreements; notably the U.N. Charter.2 The adoption
of the new Constitution meant that the fundamental law of the State was now in conflict

1

Re Article and the Criminal Law (Jurisdiction) Bill 1975 [1977] I.R. 127 at 147. As cited in Kelly (2004):
p.70.
2
See above: it should be noted that the Constitution (as the fundamental law of the State) takes precedence
over international law. Nevertheless the political significance of an apparent conflict between the
Constitution and international law remained significant.
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with these international agreements and legislation. Whilst the Constitution remained
largely impervious to allegations that it was incompatible with central tenets of
international law, the potential conflict left the State vulnerable to both internal and
external criticism. Therefore, although the Constitution was legally protected from such
allegations, the charge that a part of the document was contrary to the principles of
international law was more difficult to justify in terms of international opinion. It was the
perceived political vulnerability of the vexatious Articles that the McGimpsey brothers
sought to exploit in their landmark case.3 In this context, Articles 2 and 3 placed an
obligation on the courts to reconcile the political claim over Northern Ireland with the de
facto reality on the ground. One of the ways the judiciary had attempted to resolve the
quandary was by advancing the argument outlined above. Political theory had long held
that a nation (as a political idea) was distinct from a state, and that a nation possessed
rights. Among these rights is the right to unity of territory and the right to decide its own
political future (self-determination).4 According to Clarke the concept of nationality is
inextricably connected to the idea of statehood. Thus, if a people share common
characteristics and aspire to nationhood, then the logical consequence of that shared
identity is the realisation of statehood. As Clarke explains:

“…Whether nations evolve into states or states cultivate nationalism to provide political unity in times of
crisis or transition, it is widely assumed that nations have a right to self-determination. This is reflected, for
example, in the fact that Article 1 of two United Nations Covenants, the Covenant on Economic, Social
and Cultural Rights and the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights both begin with exactly
the same provision:
` 1. All peoples have the right to self-determination. By virtue of that right they freely determine their
political status and freely pursue their economic, social and cultural development 5`.”

3

See below.
Desmond Clarke: Nationalism, the Irish Constitution, and Multicultural Citizenship. As cited in Northern
Ireland Legal Quarterly [Vol.51.No.1] (2000): pp.101-119.
5
Ibid: p.3.
4
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The theory is linked to the traditionally geographic notion of nationality; that a nation is
perpetually bound to a defined territory. Moreover, this right is characterised as
inalienable, and, as such, supersedes all other law. Hence the nation is more important
than any transient legal framework, and the rights it possesses entitle citizens to
determine their own political destiny. In this context, nationalism is viewed as a dominant
philosophy and, provided that nationhood can be established, the inhabitants of that
nation are free to pursue their own destiny, regardless of existing political arrangements.
The right of the Irish nation to self-determination is codified in Article 1 of the
Constitution:
Article 1: “The Irish nation hereby affirms its inalienable, indefeasible, and sovereign right to choose its
own form of Government, to determine its relations with other nations, and to develop its life, political,
economic and cultural, in accordance with its own genius and traditions.”6

The constitutional elevation of the concept of nationality is given clearest expression in
the distinction between the nation and the state. Although the state provides a necessary
legal framework for government, it is separate from the nation which pre-dates its
creation.7 Indeed according to this definition of nationality the nation may prosper long
after the state has ceased to exist.8 Legal structures, therefore, are transient and
impermanent entities, whilst the nation exists in perpetuity; possessing its own rights
which are inherently superior to those rights possessed by the state. In explaining the
nationalist ethos which inspired the Constitution, Clarke writes:

“Since the vote to enact the Constitution was a majority decision by those who were registered in what was
then called the Irish Free State, it is consistent with both the reality of the referendum and with the legal
implications of Article 4 to suggest that the `people of Éire` mentioned in the Preamble are not identical
with the Irish nation, but with the citizens of the Irish Free State who claimed to speak on its behalf. So

6

Article1: 1937 Constitution.
See Clarke (2000): pp.101-119.
8
Although without the legal apparatus of the state it is doubtful that a nation could prosper for long.
7
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when the Constitution refers to `the people`, it is referring to the Free State; the nation is a separate and
autonomous entity.”9

It is worth noting that such an essentialist and absolutist interpretation of nationality is far
from universally accepted. Modern nationality, after all, is basically a construct, an
invented idea which came to prominence in the 18th and 19th centuries.10 Although
nationalism has evolved into an ascendant philosophy, it is worth remembering its recent
antecedence, whilst events of the 20th century offer a vivid demonstration of the negative
connotations that can be attached to the idea of nationality. In an Irish context, the preeminence of nationalism as an ideology cannot be disputed. With the concept of the Irish
nation well established, the more pertinent question perhaps is not whether or not an Irish
nation exists, but rather who is it comprised of, and who is excluded? For unionists this is
the key question posed by Irish nationalism. Are they excluded from the nation by virtue
of their own political beliefs? The interpretation of Irish nationalism goes to the heart of
any discussion about Articles 2 and 3.
In his endorsement of the theory that the right to unity of territory and self-determination
is superior to positive law, O‟Higgins C.J. is referencing an interpretation of Irish
nationalism that has traditionally been favoured by the Irish courts. Nationalist
philosophy held that as the right to unity of territory was inalienable, it could not be
eroded by statute law.11 As in other rights protected by the Constitution, selfdetermination is innate, a birthright of every Irishman which cannot be undermined by
passing political caprice. Therefore, as the right to unity pre-dates the creation of the
State, it is superior to the legislation which enacted partition. The idea is consistent with
constitutional theory of modern times, and has parallels in the U.S. Constitution which

9

Clarke (2000): p.105. See also Ryan (2001): pp.2-4.
The invented nature of nationality was illustrated by Austrian statesman Metternich who, prior to the
campaign to achieve Italian unification, described Italy as a “geographical expression”. See Bew (1996):
227-239.
11
See Clarke (2000):pp.105.119.
10
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characterises certain rights as inalienable and thus superior to positive law. As Clarke
explains:
“The classification of this right as inalienable suggests that it belongs to the same genre as the `inalienable
and imprescriptible rights, antecedent and superior to positive law` that are attributable to the family in
Article 41.1.1, or the `inalienable right…of parents to provide….for the religious and moral education of
their children (Article 42.1).”12

The interpretation of the right to unity of territory advanced by O‟Higgins C.J., therefore,
is consistent with the nationalist ethos pervading the Constitution. The collective rights of
the nation were inalienable and irrefutable; providing the cornerstone of the constitutional
determination to re-unify the national territory.13

It was through such an exalted

definition of nationality that the courts have been able to reconcile the constitutional
requirement to advance re-unification with the political reality provided by the existence
of Northern Ireland. By expounding this ideology and adhering to a strictly geographical
idea of nationality, the Irish courts (prior to the Good Friday Agreement) have helped the
Irish State retain an irredentist policy in relation to Northern Ireland. This concept of
national sovereignty is manifestly evident in the old Articles 2 and 3: the Irish nation
possessed a right to self-determination, as expressed through a desire to unify the national
territory. Therefore, the achievement of re-unification became a legal necessity, and was
codified in the fundamental law of the State.

The 1937 Constitution, however, posed a dilemma for Irish law. By making reunification a central tenet of the Constitution, the framers had placed the State at odds
with several international agreements (not least the legislation that had enacted partition;
the Government of Ireland Act and the 1921 Treaty).14 The inclusion of a legal and

12

Clarke (2000): p.108.
Ibid.
14
The Government of Ireland Act was not an international agreement but an internal legislative measure
within the United Kingdom. The Act did, however, have inter-jurisdictional implications as the piece of
13
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political claim over Northern Ireland, therefore, potentially held the Constitution open to
the allegation that the document was incompatible with international law. That is not to
mention the effect the claim had on relations between the State and the United Kingdom.
The emphatic nature of the claim over Northern Ireland, and the consequent legal
compulsion to pursue unity, created a tangible problem for the State in terms of
definition. How could the Constitution (and specifically Articles 2 and 3) be made
compatible with both the principles of international law, and the de facto existence of
Northern Ireland? This was perhaps the key legal dilemma provided by De Valera‟s
Constitution. In the end, it was left to the judiciary and case law to fill the legal void.

BOLAND V.AN TAOISEACH [1974]

Despite the obvious constitutional importance of this issue, there has been relatively little
case caw dealing with the national question. Given the magnitude of the problem, the
lack of jurisprudence is surprising. It must be remembered, however, that Northern
Ireland remains of the most politically and constitutionally sensitive issues involving the
Irish State. The controversial nature of the Northern Ireland question was magnified by
the emergence of wholesale political violence in the late 1960s. In terms of Anglo-Irish
relations, the issue was conscientiously avoided by a succession of governments.15 Given
the polarising effect of Northern Ireland and the political sensitivities involved, it was
perhaps understandable that the issue seldom came before the courts. In our attempts to
clarify the constitutional position, however, such inaction is rather unhelpful.

legislation that formalised the partition of Ireland and the creation of two parliaments within the island. See
above.
15
A notable exception to this policy of evasion was the all party Constitutional review (1966/67) which
suggested an amendment to Article 2. See above.
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Of course the judiciary can only intervene if the matter is referred to them, and it is
hardly the fault of the courts that there has been such a dearth of relevant cases for them
to consider. There does seem, nevertheless, to be a distinct lack of litigants in relation to
this issue. Perhaps inspired by an inevitable desire to avoid political controversy, very
few cases involving Articles 2 and 3 have been referred to the courts, and those which
have been considered have tended to shy away from political controversy. Thankfully
the cases that have sought to raise their head above the parapet have done much to
enhance our understanding of the legal claim. These interventions are significant: it is
impossible to definitively interpret McGimpsey without understanding the cases that
preceded it. Thus, the interpretation of case law is essential in the attempt to define the
constitutional position, and the manner in which the McGimpsey case reflected State
policy.

The inaction of the court in terms of providing assistance in relation to the legal claim is
highlighted by the fact that the first major case to wrestle with this issue occurred nearly
40 years after the codification of the 1937 Constitution. This, in itself, provides clear
evidence of the political sensibilities involved. The gap in time between the writing of the
Constitution and the advent of this case is one of the reasons why Boland v.An
Taioseach16 is so significant. The correlation between this case and the later McGimpsey
case is obvious, with Boland foreshadowing the legal issues arising in McGimpsey.17 The
case concerned the intergovernmental agreement negotiated at Sunningdale, which had
sought to give the State an enhanced role in the affairs of Northern Ireland. The plaintiff
(Kevin Boland)18 had objected to the Agreement on the basis that it contravened Articles
2 and 3. His argument was that, by entering into the agreement, the Irish government was
contradicting its own Constitution. Thus, as the State (by virtue of Articles 2 and 3) didn‟t
recognise the existence of Northern Ireland, it was unconstitutional for it to negotiate the
16

Boland v. An Taoiseach [1974] I.R. 338.
See below.
18
Kevin Boland was a prominent Fianna Fáil politician and former Irish government minister. He was
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future of that jurisdiction. More relevantly, the plaintiff contended that as the Articles
claim a de jure right to govern Northern Ireland, they expressly prohibit the State
“conceding the right of another State (the United Kingdom) to exercise jurisdiction over a
part of the national territory.”

19

The motivation of the plaintiff is explained in the

introductory case notes:

“On 17 December 1973, the plaintiff issued a summons in the High Court in which he claimed that the
signing of any agreement, formal or informal, by the Government of Ireland in terms of the communiqué
would be repugnant to the Constitution of Ireland (1937), and he claimed an injunction restraining the
Government of Ireland from implementing any part of the communiqué and from entering into any
agreement which would limit the exercise of sovereignty over any portion of the national territory or which
would prejudice the right of the parliament and Government of Ireland to exercise jurisdiction over the
whole of the national territory”.20

The argument of the plaintiff was that the Irish government (by signing the communiqué)
had acted unconstitutionally as Articles 2 and 3 expressly forbid the recognition of
Northern Ireland. In particular, the plaintiff objected to clause 5 of the communiqué
which contained explicit references to Northern Ireland. In paragraph 8 of his statement
of claim, he argued that clause 5 was repugnant to Articles 1-6 and 34 of the Constitution
in that:

“(a) it acknowledged that a portion of Ireland described as “Northern Ireland” was part of the United
Kingdom.
(b) It acknowledged that “Northern Ireland” cannot be re-integrated into the national territory until…..a
majority of the people of Northern Ireland indicate a wish to become part of a united Ireland.”21

19

Casey (2000): pp.249-250.
Boland v. An Taoiseach [1974] I.R. 338: p. 338.
21
Ibid: p.339.
20
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The apparent endorsement of the consent principle by the Irish government appears to
have provided particular motivation for the plaintiff‟s challenge. The plaintiff claimed
that the rights of Irish citizens living in Northern Ireland would be aversely affected by
this concession.22 In the High Court Murnaghan J. rejected the claim. He stated:

“It was submitted that clause 5 of the communiqué is to be read as an entity and was a joint declaration. I
reject that submission….I read that portion of clause 5 as relating to the de facto status of Northern Ireland
and as a statement of policy of the Irish Government, bearing in mind the contents of clause 3 of the
communiqué….I am unable to accept that those citizens of the Republic of Ireland who might now be
resident in Northern Ireland have any or greater rights than those citizens at present residing in the
Republic.”23

On appeal, the Supreme Court concurred that Sunningdale was not unconstitutional. The
case serves as an important precursor to McGimpsey, but although the Supreme Court
held that Sunningdale did not contravene Articles 2 and 3, the court offered very different
logic to that employed in McGimpsey. Rather than providing a definitive interpretation of
the legal claim, the court instead rejected the plaintiff‟s claim on “the basis of
jurisdiction.”24 The Court argued that as foreign policy was the sole responsibility of the
Executive, the courts had no authority to interfere.25 The Supreme Court was effectively
invoking the Separation of Powers doctrine and, in so doing, avoided having to adjudicate
over whether Sunningdale breached Articles 2 and 3. The logic seems to be that, under
Separation of Powers, the court has no right to intervene in foreign policy i.e. that the
Executive is exclusively responsible for this area of government.26 As Fitzgerald C.J.
explains:
“In my opinion the courts have no power, either express or implied, to supervise or interfere with the
exercise by the Government of its executive functions, unless the circumstances are such as to amount to a
22

See Ryan (2001):pp.38-39.
Boland v. An Taoiseach [1974] I.R. 338: p.353.
24
Casey (2000): p.249.
25
Ibid.
26
See Casey (2000):p.249.
23
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clear disregard by the Government of the powers and duties conferred upon it by the Constitution…..the
status of Northern Ireland and the acceptance of it is, to my mind, a reference to the de facto position of
Northern Ireland and to nothing else and the respective declarations are no more than assertions of the
policies of the respective Governments and matters clearly within their respective executive functions.
Consequently clause 5, in my opinion, is not capable of being construed as any action by the Government
which would bring it within the jurisdiction of the courts to supervise or restrain”. 27

Even if we accept this premise, the question of Judicial Review arises. If the courts have
no constitutional authority to regulate foreign policy, are they still able to judicially
review an international agreement if it conflicts with the Constitution? The traditional
theory was that foreign policy was the sole preserve of the Executive and the courts have
no authority to intervene.28 The summation of Fitzgerald C.J. reflects this judicial
reticence to become involved in foreign policy. In Boland the Supreme Court is less than
emphatic on the issue. The court held that such an agreement or measure could only be
subject
29

to

Judicial

Review

“if

it

subsequently

became

statute.”

This implies that an international agreement (such as Sunningdale) falls outside the

remit of Judicial Review i.e. that the courts can only judicially review a measure if it has
been translated into statute law. Later case law, however, has indeed confirmed that
international agreements do fall under the scope of Judicial Review. Crotty v.An
Taoiseach definitively held that an international treaty (the Single European Act) fell
within the authority of the courts to judicially review legislation, and that this function in
no way contravened the Separation of Powers doctrine.30 Boland, therefore, can be
viewed as having rejected the plaintiff‟s claim on rather shaky logic. As the Executive
had not intended to infringe Articles 2 and 3 and, as the government has sole authority to
formulate foreign policy, Sunningdale was not unconstitutional.31 The courts‟ ability to
intervene in this area of foreign policy seems to hinge on whether Sunningdale is

27

Boland v. An Taoiseach [1974] I.R. 338: pp.362-363.
See Casey (2000):p.249, Ryan (2001):pp.38-39.
29
Casey (2000): p.249.
30
Crotty v. An Taoiseach [1987] I.R. 713, See Ryan (2001):pp.60-62. See below.
31
Kelly (2004): p.863.
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considered to be a legally binding international agreement. As Casey acknowledges, both
Boland and Crotty are somewhat vague over whether Sunningdale is a bona fide
international treaty. He observes:
“The ratio of that decision (Boland), as Walsh J. pointed out in Crotty’s case (at 779-780) seems to have
been that the Sunningdale Agreement was not an agreement or treaty, but merely a declaration of policy
and hence not restrainable.”32

Budd J. agreed with his Chief Justice that the Separation of Powers doctrine prevented
the courts from interfering in foreign policy. Moreover he seems to endorse the view that
the Sunningdale communiqué was merely an expression of policy rather than a legally
binding international agreement. He argued:

“The judiciary has its own particular ambit of functions under the Constitution. Mainly it deals with
justiciable controversies between citizen and citizen or the citizen and the State and matters pertaining
thereto. Such matters have nothing to do with matters of State policy…..It would seem that that would be
an attempted interference with matters which are functions of the Executive and no part of the functions of
the Judiciary….the declaration in the communiqué by the Irish Government of its policy does not affect the
legal rights of any citizen.”33

Here the indecisive nature of the judgement is evident: the Supreme Court does not seem
to be saying that an international agreement could never be subject to Judicial Review but
rather that Sunningdale, as it was constituted, fell outside that remit.34 Clarke agrees that
the Supreme Court is open to criticism.
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He writes:
“In the course of explaining their decisions, O‟Keefe J. argued that it would have been ultra vires for an
Irish government to have agreed that the State does…..not claim to be entitled `as of right` to jurisdiction
over Northern Ireland`, and Budd J. interpreted Sunningdale as merely an expression of `policy` on the part
of the State rather than an `agreement as to the future of Northern Ireland`”. 35

It is fair to observe, therefore, that the rejection of the plaintiff‟s claim resulted from a
legal technicality rather than a substantive assessment of whether the Agreement had
breached Articles 2 and 3. In that sense, the decision in Boland sidestepped having to
resolve the issue. Instead of providing clear legal guidance over whether the State (in
pursuing a policy to facilitate peace in Northern Ireland) was acting unconstitutionally,
the Supreme Court avoided the question. Their rationale was that as foreign policy was
the constitutionally protected function of the executive branch of government, they had
no jurisdiction to interfere.36 This decision does appear vulnerable to criticism and, on
reflection, seems to be rather unsatisfactory. If the court was so convinced that Articles 2
and 3 held up to legal scrutiny, and did not in any way inhibit the Executive from
pursuing peace in Northern Ireland, it would have been very easy for them to affirm that
position. The fact that they did not suggests to me that the Court itself was perhaps unsure
over the coherence of the Articles. Although the Court had held that Sunningdale did not
contravene the Articles 2 and 3 as the Articles provide for the existence of Northern
Ireland, their argument is unconvincing.

There is a strong legal argument to be made that the old Articles (particularly Article 3)
provide for a definitive definition of territoriality that respects the boundaries established
by the 1921 Treaty. Article 3 expressly provides that until re-unification is realised, the
authority of the State shall be limited to Free State boundaries. So although the
35
36
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Constitution claims a de jure right to unify the national territory, it has always recognised
the de facto limits of the State‟s jurisdiction. Subsequent case law was much more
confident about the reliability of the old Articles; not only did they accept the limit of the
State‟s jurisdiction, but they created a constitutional imperative for re-unification.37 Later
cases were also mindful that Articles 2 and 3 cannot be interpreted without a harmonious
reading of the Constitution, incorporating Articles 1, 29 and the Preamble.38 That the
Supreme Court in Boland was not similarly emphatic about the legality of Articles 2 and
3 betrays doubt over the coherence (or even the political defensibility) of the Articles.39

Boland also reflects a distinct reticence by the courts to interpret the scope of the Articles.
This again is a consequence of the political sensitivities involved. The question arises
over whether the Court was subject to any political influence to reach that decision. In
interpreting the judgement it is beneficial to go beyond a simple recitation of the facts, a
deeper analysis requires a jurisprudential perspective. When interpreting decisions with
such inherent political ramifications, it is helpful to consider the existence of a realist
influence. According to Penner the philosophy of realism emerged in the 19th century as
“a reaction to formalism” and the more structured application of the law.40 Along with its
sister philosophy of legal positivism, realism seeks to interpret law and to describe it
accurately.41 Ratnapala observes that the two philosophies differ in terms of legal
characterisation. Positivists contend that law is derived primarily from statute, whereas
realists suggest that it is necessary to analyse other ancillary factors such as politics.42
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The difference in emphasis is explained by Ratnapala thus:
“Realists are also positivists in the sense that they seek to explain the law as it is as opposed to what the law
ought to be….[but]…..theirs is a very different complaint: namely that positivists misrepresent the nature of
law by their undue focus on its formal features”. 43

A key theme of the realist position is that judges make decisions based on external
influences,44 i.e. that non-legal factors (both subtle and overt) may affect judgements.45
Realism, according to Penner, is the antithesis of the “formalist” theory of law, which
decrees that decisions are reached according to a logical and structured assessment of the
evidence.46 Realists accept that decisions are reached through a reasoned analysis of the
evidence, but maintain that other factors are equally important in judicial decision
making.47 As such, Penner argues, “realism rejects a simplistic and syllogistic
interpretation of law.”48 The emergence of this “pragmatic” ideology owes much to
Oliver Wendell Holmes Jr., regarded as the father of American realism.49 Wendell
Holmes expounded his theory as a response to the “orthodox” legal thinking that was
prevalent at the time.50 Wendell Holmes believed that a host of external factors exerted a
tangible influence over judges in terms of decision making51. As he explained:

“…The life of the law has not been logic, it has been experience. The felt necessities of the time, the
prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or unconscious, even the

43
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prejudices which judges share with their fellow men, have a good deal more to do than the syllogism in
determining the rules by which men should be governed. The law embodies the story of a nation‟s
development through many centuries, and it cannot be dealt with as if it contained only the axioms and
corollaries of a book of mathematics.”52

As Penner confirms, the theory does have its detractors, the most common critique being
the manner in which realist philosophy potentially usurps the democratic function of the
legislative branch of government to enact legislation.53 Indeed Karl Llewellyn goes even
further; arguing that judicial input into “legislative” decision making was essential for
probity and morality in “society.”54 What is certain is that judges are subject to indirect
and subtle external influences. All cases (especially those involving matters of acute
political sensitivity) should be viewed in this context. Whatever its deficiencies, realism
is an important philosophy, serving a valuable purpose in the attempt to decipher judicial
decisions. Decisions relating to areas of political controversy always benefit from a realist
interpretation. Certainly the interpretation of case law in relation to Articles 2 and 3 is
advanced by an understanding of realist philosophy and, in discussing the more
contentious cases; it is helpful to keep the theory in mind.

Certainly the political establishment would have wished to see the credibility of Articles
2 and 3 endorsed, thus confirming that the Constitution was fully compatible with
international law. The government of the day would have been appalled at the prospect of
being prevented from advancing peace in Northern Ireland by its own Constitution. The
decision of the Supreme Court, however, reflects judicial sensitivity over these issues as
opposed to any overt political pressure. In reaching its decision, the Supreme Court
would have realised that a judgement in favour of the plaintiff would have had the
potential to destroy any political settlement. I submit that it is likely that the Court would
52
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have approached their decision with a realist perspective in mind, and that the justices
would have had due cognisance of the potential consequences arising from a judgement
in favour of the plaintiff. This, therefore, placed an onus on the courts to reach a decision
that would leave Sunningdale intact. That is not to accuse the courts of negligence in
reaching their decision: there is no reason to think that the constitutional issues were not
debated thoroughly. It is evident that the judgement represented the Court‟s interpretation
of the constitutional position as it stood at the time. Equally, it must be remembered that
the unique opportunity offered by Sunningdale potentially exerted pressure on the Court
to reject the plaintiff‟s claim. Had the plaintiff‟s claim been upheld, the whole edifice of
Sunningdale would have crumbled and the Supreme Court would have shouldered the
brunt of the blame. It is hard to deny that such considerations would have weighed
heavily with the Supreme Court in reaching its decision. Of course it was still possible
that the Court could have endorsed the plaintiff‟s claim. If the judges had decided that
Sunningdale was not compatible with the Constitution, they would have been compelled
to take action. It is clear, however, that the conditions prevailing at the time favoured a
rejection of the plaintiff‟s claim.

Although primarily concerned with the Separation of Powers doctrine and the issue of
legal jurisdiction, Boland also has some important points to make in relation to the
discussion of Articles 2 and 3. The Boland case provides an accurate representation of the
constitutional position as had been defined post-1937. Articles 2 and 3 had traditionally
been perceived as fundamentally political in nature: symbolising an ideal of the Nation
and a broad aspiration for unity.55 This interpretation held that whilst the Articles
expressly referred to the national territory as the whole island, they should be
characterised as an aspiration.56 Therefore, they were viewed as representing a political
idea which sought the unification of the geographic area comprising the island, its islands
and the territorial seas. The chief importance of Boland was that it as well as endorsing
55
56
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the idea that Articles 2 and 3 constituted a political claim over Northern Ireland, the case
clarified the constitutional position For the first time since 1937 the Supreme Court
implicitly established that the nature of the claim was not merely political, but a legal
claim (de jure) to govern Northern Ireland.57

The idea that the claim over the North could be considered as something more than a
simple political aspiration first surfaced in this case. The possible identification of a
substantive legal claim to exercise jurisdiction over Northern Ireland was derived from a
statement made by O‟Keefe P.58 In discussing the nature of Articles 2 and 3, the former
President of the High Court seems to imply that the legitimacy of the Oireachtas to
legislate for the whole of the national territory exists as of legal right. He stated:

“An acknowledgement by the Government that the State does not claim to be entitled as of right to
jurisdiction over Northern Ireland would in my opinion be clearly not within the competence of the
Government having regard to the terms of the Constitution.” 59

The statement is significant, and represents the first occasion where such a suggestion
had been raised. If endorsed, the opinion of O‟Keefe P. would serve to confirm that
Articles 2 and 3 should no longer be considered as simply a political aspiration which
expressed the hope that the national territory would eventually be re-united, but should
instead be characterised as a fully fledged legal claim to govern Northern Ireland. It
should be acknowledged, however, that the statement is far from emphatic, and its
slightly ambiguous nature leaves the opinion open to interpretation. O‟Keefe P. is far
from definitive about the precise nature of the claim over Northern Ireland, and it was left
to subsequent cases to provide a more reliable definition.60 Nevertheless, the importance
57
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of the statement in the evolution of the constitutional position should not be understated ,
as it is the first time an Irish court appears to endorse the view that the claim to exercise
jurisdiction over Northern Ireland exists as of legal right.61 Indeed the significance of the
assertion is substantiated by the fact that the opinion offered by O‟Keefe P. is
acknowledged by both parties in the McGimpsey case, and referenced by Barrington J. in
his summary in the High Court.62 Whilst acknowledging the significance of the
statement, it is necessary to remember that O‟Keefe P. merely implied that the nature of
the claim was legal and alluded to its existence. It was left to subsequent case law to
provide a more thorough and reliable definition of the nature of Articles 2 and 3.63

Here an obvious parallel with McGimpsey is discernible: the later case followed the logic
that the constitutional position should be defined in terms of a substantive legal claim
rather than a political aspiration.64 Boland, therefore, should be considered an important
milestone in the evolution of the constitutional position and the first notable precursor to
McGimpsey. The precedent had been established that Articles 2 and 3 could be defended
on the basis that they codify a legal claim, and consequently place a constitutional
obligation on the State to pursue re-unification of the national territory. Boland is a
marker for McGimpsey in another sense as well. It established that an international
agreement could be challenged on the basis that it conflicted with the Constitution.
65

Although unsuccessful, a legal template for constitutional challenge had been set. More

importantly, the precedent had been established that such a constitutional challenge could
be rejected on the basis that an international treaty (such as Sunningdale) did not
contravene Articles 2 and 3 on the basis of Separation of Powers.66 By advancing the
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argument that Articles 2 and 3 constituted a legal claim, and that foreign policy should
not be interfered with by the courts67, the Supreme Court had expressed an interpretation
of the Constitution that it was free to follow in McGimpsey.

The rationale that international treaties do not conflict with the Constitution is rooted in
an interpretation of Article 3. Article 3, in particular, makes plain that the State cannot
exercise jurisdiction over the entire island. The old Articles are something of a
contradiction: although they claim that the State has a legal right to govern the territory of
Northern Ireland, they are equally adamant that, under the political arrangements that
existed at the time the Constitution was written, the State is unable to exercise that right.
68

Something that is often overlooked in constitutional discussions is that the old Article 3

provided for the existence of Northern Ireland. Whilst the Articles were intended to
convey an aspiration that the island should be re-united, they recognised that under the
terms of the 1921 Treaty that ambition had still to be realised. The language that is used
in Article 3 makes a constitutional challenge, as in Boland, very unlikely to succeed. In
order to mount a successful challenge, the plaintiff needed to demonstrate that the State‟s
complicity in the Sunningdale Agreement was incompatible with Articles 2 and 3. The
old Articles, along with Article 29 and the Preamble, have proved remarkably robust to
successful constitutional challenge. The reason for this is two fold. It is my contention
that a harmonious reading of the Constitution which places Articles 2 and 3 in the context
of the overall document makes it very difficult to challenge them politically. Moreover
the framers of the Constitution undoubtedly intended Articles 2 and 3 to be read in
harmony with the other Articles.69 Viewing Articles 2 and 3 alongside the provisions
relating to international diplomacy in Article 29 and the definition of nationhood offered
in the Preamble, the Constitution is perfectly compatible with governmental participation
in an international agreement or communiqué intended to achieve peace in Northern
67
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Ireland. The wording of Article 3, specifically, makes it emphatically clear that until such
times as re-unification is realised, the State will only exercise jurisdiction within Free
State borders. In that sense invoking Articles 2 and 3 to challenge the Constitution
politically is a fraught exercise; case law has demonstrated that the Constitution has been
immune to such challenges.

The importance of Boland is obvious. Although ostensibly concerned with the Separation
of Powers doctrine, the case did much to enhance our understanding of Articles 2 and 3.70
It endorsed and supported the retention of the political claim in the Constitution. Indeed it
was the first case to affirm that Articles 2 and 3 constituted a fully legal claim to govern
Northern Ireland.71 At this stage, however, the identification of a substantively legal
claim had merely been implied rather than confirmed. As well as that, Boland provided
an inspiration for the McGimpsey case in that it established that an international
agreement could be challenged on the basis that it conflicted with Articles 2 and 3. In the
overall assessment of case law relating to this issue, however, the judgement in Boland
can be considered a failure. The Supreme Court shirked having to decide whether
Sunningdale contravenes the Constitution. By rejecting the plaintiff‟s claim on the basis
of the Separation of Powers doctrine, the Court avoided the substantive constitutional
issue. That is the missed opportunity of the case; the failure to provide clear legal
guidance on the scope and meaning of Articles 2 and 3. Article 3 provides a clear legal
basis for rejecting the plaintiff‟s claim and it was a pity that the Court did not have the
confidence to defend the Constitution. It was left to subsequent case law to offer more
thorough guidance, and a more formidable defence of Articles 2 and 3.72
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STATE (DEVINE) V. LARKIN [1977]
The question of how the courts reconciled the existence of Northern Ireland with Articles
2 and 3 arose again in this case.73 It provides another example of the difficulties created
by the 1937 Constitution and its claim over Northern Ireland. Again it fell to case law to
provide the definition of how the borders created in 1921 could be compatible with the
claim. The case demonstrates the manner in which partition (and the later 1937
Constitution) had made the application of law throughout the island problematic,
particularly in border areas. State (Devine) v. Larkin concerned the Foyle Fisheries Act
1952.74 The prosecutor (Brendan Devine) had been convicted under the said act and
attempted to have their convictions quashed on the basis that the Act contravened Articles
2 and 3.75 The background to the case is explained in the case notes:

“The prosecutors on these applications…..are seeking to have made absolute, notwithstanding
cause shown, the conditional orders of certiorari made on 14 May 1975, for the purpose of
quashing certain orders and convictions made by District Judge Larkin in the District Court area
of Newtowncunningham in the county of Donegal on 28 January 1975. The prosecutors are
resident in the said District Court area and the orders sought to be quashed are convictions made
by the District Justice on foot of a number of summonses charging the prosecutors jointly with
fishery offences under the Foyle Fisheries Act 1952, and the Regulations made under 5.13 of that
Act and entitled the Foyle Area (Control of Netting) Regulations, 1966.”76

The parallels with its predecessor, the Boland case, are obvious, but here it was domestic
law that was being challenged on the grounds that it was incompatible with Articles 2 and
73
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3. The prosecutors contended that Article 3 limited the power of the Oireachtas to “enact
laws which had extra-territorial effect.”77 As the Foyle Fisheries Act concerned interjurisdictional relations with Northern Ireland it would naturally come within the terms of
any such restriction.78 Specifically, the prosecutors argued that the language of Article 3
rendered the Act unconstitutional.79 They contended that the reference in Article 3 „to the
laws of Saorstat Éireann‟ “was restricted to laws existing whenever the 1937
Constitution was created.”80 Thus, as Casey explains, the prosecutors contended that as
“the 1952 legislation had not been in place in 1937, the provisions applying to extraterritorial effect could not be invoked in relation to it.”81

McMahon J. rejected the claim on the basis that it would be “illogical if the State created
in 1937 did not have the same capability to make laws as the Free State.” 82 Therefore, as
the 1937 Constitution represents the fundamental law of the State, it is rational that the
State created under it should have equal legislative power as its predecessor.83 As Casey
notes, it would be inconsistent for laws enacted after 1937 “not to have the same extraterritorial effect as those created by the Free State.”84 The judge argued that Article 3
should permit laws made by the Oireachtas to have “the same level of extra-territoriality
as those enacted by Saorstát Éireann.”85 He states:

“If power to make regulations can validly be delegated to one authority, I see no reason why power cannot
be validly delegated to another authority…..having a legitimate interest in the matter.”86
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The judge did, however, hold that some of the extra-territorial legislation passed in 1966
did contravene the Constitution.87 The 1952 Act, however, did not come under these
constitutional restrictions.88 McMahon J. held that “the regulations established by the
Foyle Fisheries Act” were valid on the basis that:

“Reciprocal arrangements cannot be unilaterally altered (i.e.) that the transfer of functions in Northern
Ireland was ineffective to validate them here; a separate Act of the Oireachtas would be required.”89

The rationale does seem to be rather shaky: the assertion that reciprocal arrangements can
never be unilaterally altered is surely legally suspect. If domestic law is found to
contravene the Constitution, then surely the courts are legally bound to strike it down,
regardless of whether or not the law is formulated through an arrangement with another
jurisdiction. If the logic of the judgement is followed through, it provides that any legal
arrangement entered into with another jurisdiction cannot be found to be unconstitutional.
The assertion is manifestly untrue: although the presumption of constitutionality does
apply in relation to domestic legislation the courts are nevertheless required to intervene
if domestic law is found to be in conflict with the Constitution.90 Political sensitivity,
therefore, perhaps played a part in the judgement.91 Inter-governmental cooperation was a
sensitive issue in the 1970s. The I.R.A. campaign was at its most violent and had brought
the issue of cooperation with the U.K. into sharp focus. This context of violence and
sectarian tension had highlighted the necessity of the two governments working together.
In that sense, the same judicial logic that had applied post-Sunningdale would have
weighed heavily here. As in Boland, the courts would have been very reluctant to strike
down any legislation or treaty which had been secured through negotiation with the U.K.
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That is not to say the courts would not have intervened had the legislation been found to
conflict with the Constitution; they surely would have. It is fair to say, however, that the
judiciary would have been aware of the potential political consequences accruing from
striking down such legislation. It was important to maintain good relations with the U.K.
government for a host of reasons, and the courts would have been reluctant to go against
State policy in this respect without good reason.

The case is another good example of the position adopted by the courts in relation to
Northern Ireland. As well as demonstrating a judicial reluctance to become involved in
issues relating to Northern Ireland, the case shows that in any dispute the courts were
inclined to determine against a breach of Articles 2 and 3. There may be political reasons
for this position, but I think it reflects the legal effect of the old Articles. Like Boland,
this case demonstrates the difficulty in proving a breach of Articles 2 and 3. The
formidable nature of the old Articles is once again evident. In order to prove a breach of
the Articles, the claimant must show that the Act or measure concerned is incompatible
with their existence. The wording of Article 3, however, makes that task very difficult.
As outlined above, Articles 2 and 3 have proved consistently difficult to challenge
politically.92 The Larkin case, therefore, re-iterates the constitutional position of the State
in relation to Northern Ireland which was outlined in Boland. Although there existed a
constitutional claim to govern Northern Ireland by right, Article 3 accepted that until such
times as re-unification is realised, the jurisdiction of the State would only apply to Free
State boundaries.93 Judicial interpretation of the constitutional position had been
consistent: whilst the Constitution expressed a de jure right to govern Northern Ireland
Articles 2 and 3 were fully compatible with the existence of that jurisdiction.94 Article 3,
in particular, is relevant here. Without the mention of Free State limitations, the old
Articles would have proved much more difficult to defend legally.
92
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The wording of Article 3 makes it plain, however, that the de jure claim is restricted by
the de facto reality. Hence governmental cooperation with Northern Ireland (like the
Foyle Fisheries Act) is protected against constitutional challenge. The question of
whether more wide ranging governmental measures were similarly protected had yet to
be definitively decided, but Larkin makes it clear that the old Articles in no way
prevented the government interacting with Northern Ireland in areas of mutual
cooperation. The case is another important signpost in the journey towards judicial
clarification. It confirms the constitutional position offered in Boland; supporting the
view that the courts were loathe to intervene in legislation on the basis that it breached
Articles 2 and 3. The case re-iterates that the old Articles can be considered fully
compatible with the existence of Northern Ireland. The invocation of Article 3 is an
important precursor to McGimpsey. By rejecting a breach of the Articles on the basis that
they support recognition of Northern Ireland, the courts were adopting a position that was
followed (and extended) in McGimpsey.95 Although it was the most important milestone,
the judgement in the McGimpsey case merely extended a judicial precedent that had
already been well established: Articles 2 and 3 were fully compliant with the existence of
Northern Ireland.

THE STATE (GILSENAN) V. MCMORROW [1978]

The practical outworking of the constitutional position in relation to Northern Ireland is
again evident in this case.96 Here the courts again appeared to have little constitutional
difficulty in recognising Northern Ireland.97 The case concerned a car which had been
stolen in Northern Ireland, with the defendant being charged under the Larceny Act
95
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1916.98 Articles 2 and 3 were invoked by the defence and went to the very heart of the
case. It was alleged that as the State did not recognise the existence of Northern Ireland, it
could not bring charges relating to an offence that had originated in that jurisdiction.99 A
breach of Articles 2 and 3 was again being claimed, although this time indirectly.100 The
essence of the defence hinges on the interpretation of the 1937 Constitution. If we read
the Constitution as having a de jure claim to govern Northern Ireland and which
precludes recognition of that jurisdiction, then it is logical that it is difficult to charge a
citizen of the State with an offence that originated in Northern Ireland. An ideologically
Republican reading of the Constitution supports such a viewpoint i.e. that Articles 2 and
3 express a geographical notion of the Irish nation which claims that the State has the
right to govern the whole island, its islands and territorial seas. This right is inalienable
and supersedes all other claims of jurisdiction and authority. According to this definition
the national territory (and hence the State) can only consist of the whole island, and that
any rival entity (such as Northern Ireland) cannot be recognised constitutionally.

The courts have never subscribed to such a narrow definition, however. The courts and
institutions of the State have always forged a more practical definition of the territorial
claim. The attitude of the State to Northern Ireland has been driven primarily by
expediency. Despite the Republican nature of the Constitution, the Treaty arrangements
of 1921 had created a set of circumstances which required practical cooperation with
Northern Ireland. Rhetoric aside, it would have been impossible for the State post-1937 to
deny the existence of Northern Ireland and avoid cooperation. A whole plethora of
governmental departments and responsibilities (particularly in border areas) demanded
not only cooperation but close integration.101 In such an inter-dependent context,
complete insularity was simply not feasible. More relevantly, Articles 2 and 3 compel the
State to pursue re-unification. If the Constitution places an onus on the State to advance
98
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unity, then surely this requires interaction (and indeed negotiation) with Northern Ireland.
This reveals the ideological paradox at the heart of the 1937 Constitution. It is impossible
to pursue a policy of re-unification if the existence of Northern Ireland is denied; the two
positions are logically incompatible with one another. The constitutional obligation to
advance unity, therefore, demanded a more practical interpretation of Articles 2 and 3.102
A more harmonious interpretation of the Constitution must acknowledge the balancing of
the de jure claim with the de facto reality.103 The courts have consistently applied this
logic. Here the Supreme Court followed the earlier decisions in re-iterating that Articles 2
and 3 were compatible with the existence of Northern Ireland. Gannon J. stated:

“It is true that since 1937 there has been no general statutory interpretation or adaptation of the expression
`Northern Ireland`, but the frequency with which it occurs in our statutes, the unambiguous way in which it
has been used to identify the six counties over which the State does not exercise jurisdiction, and the clear
intention of the legislature in such use that the Courts of this State should give judicial recognition to the
identity of the territory comprehended by the expression….would make it impossible for our courts to say
that Northern Ireland is other than an officially recognised and clear appellation for the part of this island
which has remained within the United Kingdom.” 104

So we can see a clear demarcation between the ideology of the Constitution and the
practical policy of the State, as interpreted by the courts. Although the Constitution
placed a requirement on the State to pursue unity, since its inception it clearly had little
difficulty in recognising Northern Ireland on a practical level. The courts, therefore,
rather than following an ideologically rigid interpretation of the Constitution, have
instead respected this practical reconciliation of the legal claim with the reality on the
ground. This attitude represents a judicial recognition of the need to balance the de jure
claim with the de facto reality inherent in the old Article 3.105 The case provides another
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illustration of the way in which the courts have interpreted Articles 2 and 3, affirming the
constitutional position that the old Articles do not preclude cooperation with Northern
Ireland

RUSSELL V. FANNING [1988]

The manner in which the judiciary interpreted the scope of Articles 2 and 3 is more
clearly visible in subsequent case law.106 In assessing the constitutional position which
applied pre-1998, the case of Russell v. Fanning107 was one of the most important
components in terms of definition. Moreover the case was to prove the most relevant
precursor to the judgement provided by the Supreme Court in the McGimpsey case.
Indeed the judgement in this case was cited by Finlay C.J. in his summation when
McGimpsey reached the Supreme Court.108 It is impossible, therefore, to understand the
constitutional interpretation offered in McGimpsey without reference to this important
predecessor.109 It is fair to say that the position adopted by the Supreme Court in the
latter case would not have been possible had the constitutional principle defined in
Russell v. Fanning not been established. In our analysis of the way in which the
constitutional position evolved in McGimpsey the earlier case is of fundamental
importance. The case concerned the vexed issue of extradition, with the plaintiff (Robert
Peter Russell) claiming the right to be protected under the Extradition Act 1965.110

The background to the case is explained in the case notes:
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“The plaintiff, a member of the Irish Republican Army, was convicted at Belfast Crown Court of attempted
murder and sentenced to twenty years imprisonment. He subsequently escaped from prison. Some time
later he was arrested in Dublin on….nineteen warrants from Northern Ireland backed for execution in the
State by the first defendant….The plaintiff applied to the High Court for release on divers grounds,
including that the offences for which he sought to be extradited were political offences or offences
connected with political offences.”111

The case offered an insight into the legal questions raised by the Extradition Act 1965; in
particular the provisions relating to political offences (S.50). S.50 offered an “exemption”
to defendants who had been charged with such offences.112 The plaintiff‟s legal team had
sought to use the exemption to prevent his extradition to Northern Ireland.113 Extradition
had proved to be a particularly sensitive issue in the context of the ongoing I.R.A. (and
indeed I.N.L.A.) campaign and had strained relations between the State and the United
Kingdom. In fact there had been a whole series of cases where offences had been
committed in the U.K. and the alleged perpetrators had fled to the Irish State.114 The U.K.
government, in turn, had been quite zealous in insisting that individuals charged with
these offences (many of whom were members of the Provisional I.R.A.) be tried in its
own courts. The policy of the British government, in such circumstances, had been to
seek extradition of suspects to U.K. jurisdiction wherever practically possible.115 This
policy set the U.K. on a potential collision course with the Irish courts which, inevitably,
proved more amenable to Irish suspects being tried within their own jurisdiction.116 In
attempting to resolve this tension, the Irish courts became the venues where this friction
between the two states was played out.
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As well as the practical issue of extradition, the case became embroiled in a philosophical
and legal debate about the nature of re-unification.117 In considering the arguments of the
defence, the Supreme Court conducted a fierce and comprehensive debate regarding the
way in which the Constitution deals with the issue of Irish unity. The debate was of
critical importance in helping us to understand the constitutional position relating to
Northern Ireland. The Court considered, in a harmonious manner, how Articles 2 and 3
co-existed with the rest of the document. As such, it was the first occasion that the
Supreme Court had debated the national question in a thorough manner, and opened up
the prospect of a definitive definition of the legal status of the old Articles.118 In fact the
debate provoked a split within the opinion of the Court.119 The deliberations centred on
how the issue of national re-unification was defined by the Constitution in its entirety.
The judges considered not only Articles 2 and 3, but also how other relevant Articles of
the Constitution defined national unity. In particular, they wrestled with the scope of
Article 6, and how it fitted in with the requirement to pursue re-unification.120 It reads:

1. “All powers of government, legislative, executive and judicial, derive, under God, from the people
whose right it is to designate the rulers of the State and, in final appeal, to decide all questions of national
policy, according to the requirements of the common good.

2. These powers of government are exercisable only by or on the authority of the organs of State
established by the Constitution.”121

The debate focused on how Article 6 could be compatible with Articles 2 and 3 and their
claim over Northern Ireland. The issue was of supreme importance when considered in
the context of I.R.A. violence. Articles 2 and 3 had traditionally been used by armed
117
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groups as justification for their campaign.122 The argument held that such groups were
following the impulsion demanded by the Constitution i.e. that they too were pursuing a
policy of re-unification, but were merely using other means. The traditionally Republican
interpretation of Articles 2 and 3 was explained by John Bruton in a Dáil debate on the
issue. He argued:

“The Provisional I.R.A. defend their murders by reference to the so-called national struggle. These Articles
of our Constitution (Articles 2 and 3) define this nation in a way that gives a spurious justification to what
the I.R.A. do.”123

The reading of Article 6, in unison with Articles 2 and 3, goes to very heart of the matter.
Do Articles 2 and 3 vindicate the utilisation of violence in pursuit of re-unification or
does Article 6 preclude any organisation outside the Oireachtas from advancing unity?
The answer depends on the interpretation of Article 6. One reading of the Article is that it
asserts that the people (through their elected representatives) are the sole arbiter of the
national good and, as such, only the people can advance the cause of re-unification.124
The theory is that the Constitution confers legitimacy on Oireachtas deputies who, as the
elected representatives of the people, are the only body capable of determining the
national good. Hence no other unelected body (such as the Provisional I.R.A.) possesses
the democratic legitimacy to express the popular will. Popular sovereignty, therefore, is
defined exclusively by the representatives of the people, democratically elected to
parliament.125 Only they can determine the democratic wishes of the people. In this
analysis, only members of the democratically elected legislature and Executive are
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permitted to determine the national good, and are thus the only organisation which has
the legitimate right to work towards unity.126

This theory is diametrically opposed to Republican ideology which holds that the Army
Council of the Provisional I.R.A. is the only body possessing the popular mandate to
determine the national good.127 Such a perspective is fundamentally unconstitutional, but
derives from the belief that the I.R.A. is the successor to the only legitimately democratic
parliament to be elected on this island.128 As the direct descendant of the Provisional Dáil
proclaimed in 1916 (and endorsed in 1918), Republicans viewed themselves as the only
legitimate political authority on the island. This idea gave rise to the notion that the I.R.A.
campaign was merely an expression of the popular will; that militant Republicans were
attempting to realise the vision of the Republic. Articles 2 and 3 were viewed as adding
another layer of justification to this position, in that I.R.A. violence was fulfilling a
constitutional requirement. The debate in this case sought to provide definitive legal
definition of the constitutional position on the national question.

O‟Hanlon J. refuted the idea that armed Republicans were performing the constitutional
will of the people. He argued instead that the I.R.A. campaign to unify the national
territory conflicted directly with Article 6.129 In relation to the rights enshrined in Article
6 and how they could be invoked, a schism emerged within the Supreme Court: “Finlay
C.J., Henchy and Griffin JJ. were on one side of the debate with Hederman and McCarthy
JJ.”, adopting an opposite position.130 The former contingent argued in favour of the
rights protected by Article 6; stating that as the Oireachtas is the only legitimate authority
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to act in pursuit of re-unification the I.R.A. campaign was “subverting the Constitution
and usurping the functions of government”.131 The logic employed by the judges is a
complete inversion of Republican ideology. Republicans had claimed that they, as the
successors to the 1916 Dáil, were the only body with a democratic mandate to advance
re-unification. Moreover they viewed the 1937 Constitution, and Articles 2 and 3, as
giving constitutional protection to their violent ideology. The argument advanced by this
faction of the Supreme Court rejected the view that Articles 2 and 3 provide any sort of
constitutional justification for the I.R.A. campaign.132 They used this rationale to reject
the defendant‟s claim, arguing that members of the I.R.A. “should be denied the
protection and benefits offered by s. 50 of the Extradition Act 1965”.133

The latter contingent, however, offered a different interpretation. In particular, McCarthy
J. interpreted Article 6 as “simply defining the Separation of Powers” and that the Article
in no way prevented other organisations from advancing national unity.
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observes, the judge rejected the idea that just because an action facilitating re-unification
was “opposed by the government”, it was therefore contrary to Article 6.135 He reasons
that, under such circumstances, a defendant was still entitled to the protection offered by
the Extradition Act. He states:

“ If Article 6 is to be read as, in my judgement, it should be read, as merely defining the Separation of
Powers into legislative, executive and judicial and their derivation under God, from the people, this
unhappy result will not follow, Article 6 is one of the Articles in the schematic arrangement of the
Constitution under the general heading of “The State”….I do not accept that an act committed for the
purpose of pursuing a particular policy which may be opposed to that expressed by the government of the
day whether or not expressly endorsed by the legislature, can, on a construction of Article 6, be deprived of
the protection of section 50…… The people, in final appeal, must decide all questions of national policy
131

Russell v. Fanning [1988] I.R.505: p.547, see Kelly (2004): p.106.
Ibid.
133
Kelly (2004): p.106.
134
Russell v. Fanning [1988] I.R. 505: p.547, see Kelly (2004): p.106.
135
Kelly (2004): p.106.
132

R.W. McGimpsey

Case Law Relating to
Articles 2 and 3

34

and decide them according to the requirements of the common good………It seems clear that the
legislature has no power to decide on questions of national policy to the exclusion of the people‟s
power”.136

McCarthy J., therefore, offers a wider definition of popular sovereignty than that which
restricts the concept exclusively to Oireachtas deputies. He argued that the Executive (or
legislature) alone cannot unilaterally determine the method of re-unification. and that the
constitutional role of the people must be protected.137 Presumably he is referring to the
right of the people to ratify constitutional change by referendum. Such a broader
definition of national sovereignty is definitely more in keeping with the ideals of the
Constitution. Undoubtedly the founding fathers would have envisaged the people, as
referred to in the Constitution, as encompassing much more than elected representatives
at any given time. The notion of the “people” was intended to be an inclusive one, which
would comprise all members of the nation. Indeed the “people”, rather than being
confined solely to parliamentary representatives, were intended to act as a check and
balance to the government of the day.138 If we accept the argument that the “people” of
Ireland refers to more than the Oireachtas, then it logically follows that other groups can
work towards unity (provided they do so within the limits of the law). At first glance, the
stance adopted by McCarthy appears to be controversial, giving succour to the idea that
the I.R.A. is legitimately pursuing re-unification by other means. Such an interpretation
is a misunderstanding of the judge‟s position, however. First he is advocating that
organisations other than the State can only pursue unity if the means employed are
constitutional. As the I.R.A. campaign is neither legal nor constitutional it clearly falls
outside the judge‟s definition. Rather than endorsing the Republican position, McCarthy
J. is instead making the wider constitutional point that the Oireachtas is not the only
organisation which can legitimately pursue unity.139 Under Article 2 of the 1922
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Constitution (and followed in the 1937 document) the people of Ireland are sovereign:
hence it is the people who must decide on the timing and method of re-unification.140
The judge is also alluding to an interpretation of the Separation of Powers doctrine. As
the Constitution makes plain, the authority of the Executive and legislature are limited. It
rationally follows, therefore, that they do not possess an exclusive role in determining the
method of national unity. 141

The most important aspect of the judgement in relation to the McGimpsey case was the
assertion by Hederman J. about the nature of the obligation to re-unify the national
territory, as imposed by Articles 2 and 3. The judge reasoned that Articles 2 and 3 placed
a constitutional obligation on the State to pursue re-unification. Rather than merely
representing a political aspiration, Hederman J. held that Articles 2 and 3 represented a
“constitutional imperative”.142 On the nature of the right to unify the national territory,
the judge extends the constitutional position considerably further than previous case law.
He argued:
“The re-unification of the national territory, which consists of the whole island of Ireland, its islands and
territorial seas, is by the provisions of the Preamble to the Constitution and of Article 3 of the Constitution
a constitutional imperative and not one the pursuit or non pursuit of…is within the discretion of the
Government or any other organ of State. Therefore, the only question of policy which arises is as to the
manner in which this may be achieved.”143

The importance of the opinion in relation to the McGimpsey case cannot be overstated.
The judge‟s assertion represented not just a repetition, but an extension of the
constitutional position in relation to Northern Ireland. Previous case law had implied that
Articles 2 and 3 should be characterised as constituting a legal claim over Northern
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Ireland, and that they codify a political aspiration to govern that jurisdiction.144 Hederman
J. had gone a step further: Articles 2 and 3 not only represented an aspiration but a
constitutional imperative, which legally compelled the Irish State to seek re-unification.
Articles 2 and 3, therefore, amount to a substantive legal claim which placed a
constitutional obligation on the State to pursue a policy of unity.145 The extension of the
constitutional position is significant. According to this interpretation unity was not an
option which could be discarded according to the political whim of the government.
Unity was no longer a populist issue which could be flirted with by successive
governments as they saw fit. If Hederman J‟s logic is endorsed, all governments,
regardless of affiliation, are legally bound to actively advance the cause of Irish unity.
This delineates the ultimate significance of the “constitutional imperative” idea: all
citizens of the State are subject to a constitutional obligation requiring them to work
towards securing the assimilation of Northern Ireland into the State. As well as
establishing this principle, the case provided another important precedent for McGimpsey
in that Hederman J. invoked the Preamble to support his argument.146

Although dissenting, the opinion of Hederman J. is of paramount importance in the
clarification and evolution of the constitutional position. Moreover his assertion was to
have profound implications for the McGimpsey case. In the latter case Finlay C.J.
followed the constitutional interpretation offered by Hederman J.147 In so doing, he
established the definitive constitutional nature of Articles 2 and 3. They constituted a
legal claim to govern Northern Ireland by right (de jure), and placed a constitutional onus
on the Irish State to realise that right. The die had now been cast. Previous assertions that
Articles 2 and 3 represented no more than political aspiration had been made redundant.
The constitutional position defined in earlier cases had not been discarded, however.
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Hederman J. had re-iterated the effect of Articles 2 and 3, and their interpretation has
been fairly consistent throughout case law. Russell v. Fanning did mark the vital first step
towards the evolution of the constitutional position, and the affirmation that the
Constitution provided not just an aspiration for unity but an obligation. Without this
development, the judgement in McGimpsey would simply not have been possible. The
idea of “constitutional imperative” had replaced that of constitutional aspiration.
Although it took two years for the Supreme Court to ratify Hederman‟s position, the
principle had been established. Although not his intention, the judge had unwittingly
confirmed what unionists had always suspected to be the true constitutional position. In
so doing, he gave renewed hope to unionists who sought to negotiate amendments to
Articles 2 and 3. When the opinion of Hederman was finally followed in McGimpsey, the
plaintiffs in that case viewed the opinion as a vindication of their position.

FINUCANE V. MCMAHON [1990]

Another case which featured the Extradition Act 1965, and its implications, was
Finucane v. McMahon148. The case occurred in the aftermath of the infamous escape by
38 I.R.A. prisoners from the Maze prison in September 1983.
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Although daring, the

escape was a controversial affair; during the break out several officers were injured and
one subsequently died of a heart attack.150 Inevitably the escape provoked tensions inside
the prison and the ensuing period witnessed claim and counter-claim.151 The remaining
prisoners alleged a policy of “retribution” by prisoner officers, whilst the prison
authorities refuted all such allegations.152 When the accusations were investigated
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153

38

Amidst such

a rancorous background, it proved difficult to establish the true state of relations within
the prison. Republican prisoners had traditionally accused prison authorities of
mistreatment and prison officers were deemed legitimate targets during the Troubles as a
consequence.154 On the other hand, the prison authorities would have remained sceptical
about the alleged malpractice, viewing it as a means of retrospectively justifying the
escape in the aftermath of the fatality. Despite the contradictory nature of the evidence,
and with both sides attempting to vindicate their version of events, the truth gradually
began to emerge. Allegations of prisoner mistreatment, according to Kelly, were
substantiated in “Pettigrew v. Northern Ireland Office (1989)”,155 where a prisoner
brought a civil action against the prison authorities. Here the court endorsed the view that
some prisoners had been subjected to orchestrated discrimination by the authorities in the
Maze.156 The implications of the judgement are obvious: if such abuse had occurred in
the Maze, then it is likely that the behaviour was being replicated in other prisons
throughout Northern Ireland. Bearing in mind the history of mutual animosity between
Republican prisoners and prison officers, this seemed a logical conclusion to make.157

Either way, the decision in Pettigrew engendered a negative perception of both prison
officers and the entire Northern Ireland prison system. Consequently some officials in the
(Irish) State lost faith in the integrity of the arrangements for incarceration within
Northern Ireland.158 In my opinion such an attitude can be considered naïve and rather
unfair. Prison officers in Northern Ireland operated in extremely taxing circumstances;
their personal safety and lives being under constant threat from both Republican and
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Loyalist paramilitaries. Despite this context, there is no evidence to suggest that the vast
majority of prison officers did not discharge their duties in a professional and lawful
manner. Moreover, at the time of the escape prison officers in the Maze had been
operating against a backdrop of sectarian murder, which directly impacted their capacity
to carry out their jobs effectively. As well as that, any maltreatment by prison officers in
the aftermath of the escape needs to put in the context of the breakout, which witnessed
their colleagues being terrorised and injured. Although nothing justifies the abuse of their
position by prison authorities (any mistreatment is deplorable), circumstances within the
Maze need to be understood within this overall context. Also, it is worth noting that
Pettigrew had merely confirmed that mistreatment of prisoners had occurred at the hands
of certain prison officers. It had not established that such practices were endemic or
institutionalised.159 Nor had the case concluded that a policy of discrimination was being
operated by the prison service.160 Whether the maltreatment related to isolated incidents,
or was typical of behaviour throughout the prison system had yet to be established. We
must remember, however, that under the terms of the Extradition Act 1965, the courts
would have been obliged to refuse extradition if they believed that the “constitutional
rights of the plaintiff” would be adversely affected by the intervention.161 The outcome
of the case had, therefore, aroused concern within the Irish judiciary over the state of
prisoner welfare in Northern Ireland.162

Finucane v. McMahon occurred against this backdrop of suspicion. In the case the
plaintiffs had objected to their extradition to Northern Ireland under the Extradition Act
1965 on the basis that they would be subject to “discrimination” and mistreatment.163
They argued that placement within a prison Northern in Ireland would pose a tangible
159
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risk to their personal safety.164 In their assessment of the evidence, all Supreme Court
justices agreed that the risk of personal injury was sufficient to refuse the request for
extradition.165 Explaining their position Finlay C.J. reasoned:

“I have come to the conclusion that there is probable risk ….. that he (the plaintiff) would be assaulted or
injured by the illegal actions of prison staff. The total absence of any repercussions on the staff as a result
of the ill treatment of prisoners….would appear to make the applicant….a probable target for ill
treatment.”166

The judgement offered by the Supreme Court is important on several levels. First, as
Kelly acknowledges, by refusing to approve the request for extradition the Supreme
Court is “making a judgement on the conditions of prisons within another jurisdiction.”167
Essentially the Court was suggesting that the conditions of prisons and prisoner welfare
within “another jurisdiction” were of a lesser standard than that pertaining within the
State‟s jurisdiction.168 As such, the Supreme Court accepted the premise that the personal
safety of the prisoners was likely to be compromised if they were extradited to Northern
Ireland.169 The judgement does appear overtly political and controversial. As Kelly
acknowledges, the interpretation of the Supreme Court pre-supposes a level of condition
of the prison facilities that existed in Northern Ireland.170 The consequence of this
presumption was that it created potential for political disagreement with the U.K.
authorities who were responsible for maintaining prison standards within their
jurisdiction.171
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Certainly the Supreme Court judges would have been aware of the political sensitivities
involved in reaching a decision which pronounced on prison standards within Northern
Ireland.172 Whether any external political pressure existed which impacted the Court‟s
decision is questionable. What the judgement does demonstrate, according to Kelly, is
that the Irish Judiciary was prepared to “comment” on the internal conditions within the
Northern Ireland Prison Service.173 In this sense the judgement is indicative of the
constitutional position as it was defined at the time. Not only were the courts prepared to
fully recognise the existence of Northern Ireland, they were comfortable with
“contrasting” their own legal standards with those of that jurisdiction.174 The judgement
highlights that the Irish judiciary was prepared to comment and make judgements
regarding Northern Ireland.175 Such an attitude can only be realised through the
constitutional position as it was interpreted at the time. A rigid, ideological interpretation
of Articles 2 and 3 prohibits recognition of Northern Ireland, thus rendering any
commentary on internal conditions within Northern Ireland impossible.176 The Irish
courts have never abided by such limiting principles, however. Instead the courts have
always reflected the pragmatic position adopted by the State, which necessitated working
in partnership with their neighbouring jurisdiction. This approach is made possible by the
nature of the old Articles, and their capacity to recognise the existence of Northern
Ireland.177 The case is therefore typical of the constitutional position as it was recognised
at the time.

Moreover the case is following the rationale of the contemporary McGimpsey case. The
parallels are clear: Articles 2 and 3 being interpreted as representing a legal claim over
172
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Northern Ireland, but at the same time being fully compliant with the de facto existence
of the territory. McGimpsey confirmed the dissenting opinion offered by Hederman J. in
Russell v. Fanning i.e. that re-unification was a constitutional imperative requiring the
State to advance unity.178 In addition, the McGimpsey case re-affirmed the constitutional
position which had been established by earlier case law, that Articles 2 and 3 profess a
legal claim to govern Northern Ireland and a resolution that the national territory consists
of the whole island.179 One of the central tenets of judgement in McGimpsey was that the
Irish government‟s signing of the Anglo-Irish Agreement was compatible with the
Constitution on the basis that Articles 2 and 3 provide for the existence of the
jurisdiction.180 Indeed in his summary Finlay C.J. specifically refers to the recognition of
the de facto position enshrined in Article 3.181 This case, therefore, is in keeping with the
constitutional position that was confirmed and extended in McGimpsey.182
Finlay C.J. is thus applying consistent legal logic to the two cases in 1990 in which the
Supreme Court was forced to consider the nature of the legal claim. In both cases the
Chief Justice‟s analysis of the constitutional position is clear. Articles 2 and 3 do not
prohibit recognition of Northern Ireland and are fully compatible with the State
interacting with its neighbour. Although the Supreme Court had extended the
constitutional interpretation with their endorsement of Hederman J. in McGimpsey, the
fundamentals remain the same. Articles 2 and 3 represented a constitutional obligation to
unify the national territory, which is balanced by an acceptance of the reality on the
ground. Finucane v. McMahon reflects the essence of the constitutional position applied
by the Irish courts in relation to Northern Ireland pre-1998. 183
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MCGLINCHEY V. IRELAND [1990]

Another contemporary case which affirmed the constitutional interpretation outlined in
McGimpsey is McGlinchey v. Ireland184. Again the Extradition Act 1965 had produced
circumstances which forced the courts to consider prisoner welfare in Northern Ireland.
The plaintiff had objected to being moved to a prison in Northern Ireland by virtue of the
Act.185 Echoing the concerns expressed in Finucane, the plaintiff argued that his personal
safety would be compromised should he be moved to Northern Ireland.186 The case
forced the courts to consider “conditions” existing within Northern Ireland, as well as the
wider question of whether the Constitution restricted their ability to pronounce on
Northern Irish affairs.187 Here the question again arose: did Articles 2 and 3 prohibit Irish
courts from recognising the jurisdiction of Northern Ireland? The plaintiff had used the
same arguments outlined in earlier cases i.e. that the claim over Northern Ireland legally
invalidated the implementation of the Extradition Act in relation to Northern Ireland.188
The court had to determine if the plaintiff possessed the locus standi to challenge the Act;
i.e. whether his personal safety was sufficiently threatened by the prospect of
extradition.189 After consideration, Costello J. permitted the plaintiff to challenge the Act
on the basis that his personal safety was potentially threatened by a move to a prison in
Northern Ireland.190 The learned judge stated:

“The particular and highly exceptional circumstances of the case, the plaintiff‟s apprehensions
that his liberty may be curtailed by a request for extradition to Northern Ireland gave him……the
184
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standing to challenge the constitutionality of the statute by which that request would be
implemented” i.e. the Extradition Act 1965.191

The judgement in the case goes on to confirm that the terms of the Extradition Act are
limited by the circumstances existing in Northern Ireland.192 The judgement reflects the
constitutional position as defined at this time and is in line with the judicial interpretation
outlined in the other cases of that year. First, the case re-affirms that Articles 2 and 3 in
no way inhibit the judiciary from recognising the jurisdiction of Northern Ireland.
Moreover McGlinchey highlights that the Irish courts were not only comfortable with
recognising Northern Ireland but also “commenting” on internal affairs within that
jurisdiction.193 The judgement, according to Kelly, demonstrates that the courts had no
difficulty in making a judgement about “conditions” in Northern Ireland in circumstances
where they considered that the rights of a citizen of the State had been infringed. 194 In its
interpretation of the constitutional position, the Court had left itself vulnerable to the
accusation that it was adopting a political position. By commenting on the circumstances
existing within another jurisdiction the Court was risking inducing political
controversy.195 The judgment, however, should not be read as overtly political or
controversial. The case does not reflect a judicial determination or policy to prevent
extradition to Northern Ireland, but rather a venerable attempt to clarify a difficult area of
law.196

The application of the Extradition Act had created a palpable problem for the courts
when confronted with attempts to extradite prisoners to Northern Ireland. 197 How could
such pieces of legislation be fully implemented when the Constitution included an
191

I.R. 220: p.225, Kelly (2004): p.828; see also pp.1650-1651.
Ibid.
193
Ibid.
194
Ibid.
195
See Kelly (2004): p.828.
196
Ibid.
197
Ibid.
192

R.W. McGimpsey

Case Law Relating to
Articles 2 and 3

45

explicit, inalienable claim to govern Northern Ireland? The Court‟s quandary was made
more acute by the backdrop of intensifying levels of violence in Northern Ireland which
had forced them to consider this issue on a regular basis. The exemptions provided by the
Extradition Act 1965 (particularly those relating to political offences) added a further
complication. Moreover it was common practice for prisoners who committed offences in
Northern Ireland to seek sanctuary in the Irish State.

The courts resolved the issue by reference to the State‟s own constitution. Rather than
being the cause of the problem, Articles 2 and 3 provided the solution. The courts
confirmed the constitutional position which had been applied since the signing of the
1937 Constitution. Clarke has argued that judicial interpretation of Articles 2 and 3 has
been vague and inconsistent. He states that, on the issue of the legal effect of the Articles,
the courts “have been neither clear nor consistent”.198 I am not inclined to agree.
Certainly Boland abdicated thorough judicial scrutiny of the Articles at a time when a
definitive interpretation of the claim would have been invaluable. In that case the
Supreme Court fudged the issue, and the judgement is neither satisfactory nor
authoritative. The Court had tantalisingly raised the suggestion that the claim over
Northern Ireland contained legal and political elements, but stopped short of a definitive
assessment.199 A more comprehensive interpretation of Articles 2 and 3 had yet to be
delivered. Thereafter the courts have applied a consistent interpretation of the legal
claim, rooted in the language of the Articles themselves. Articles 2 and 3 did indeed
represent a legal and de jure claim to govern Northern Ireland. This claim, however, was
restricted by the recognition in the Constitution that the boundaries of the State would be
confined to Free State borders until unification is realised.200 Subsequent cases expanded
on the theme; confirming that the claim was essentially political and legal in nature. 201
Even a cursory reading of Article 3 confirms this position. If we include the other
198
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Articles of the Constitution (specifically Articles 1, 29 and the Preamble), then it is clear
why the Irish courts have had such little difficulty in recognising Northern Ireland.
Clumsily constructed and restrictive they may have been, but the old Articles were
legally sound. In assessing the case law which deals with the national question, what
becomes apparent is just how robust the old Articles were against political challenge.
This invulnerability can only be partly explained by a judicial reticence to pronounce on a
politically sensitive area of the Constitution. Instead, it reflects the reality that Articles 2
and 3 provided for co-existence with Northern Ireland. The Articles successfully marry
the Republican ideal of re-unifying the national territory with the reality provided by the
1921 Treaty.202 Perhaps the nature of Articles 2 and 3 made it virtually impossible to
successfully challenge them in the Irish courts. The earlier cases had confirmed that such
challenges were fraught with difficulty. The Constitution protected the claim over
Northern Ireland, whilst the Irish government and judiciary formed a homogenous and
formidable legal establishment which tended to support a Nationalist interpretation of the
national territory. In this context, the prospect of a successful legal challenge to Articles
2 and 3 in the Irish courts seemed very unlikely indeed. If the Articles were exposed as
being politically indefensible, it was deduced, the Irish government would be subjected to
overwhelming pressure to amend them. The Anglo-Irish Agreement had induced a
rancorous and febrile set of political circumstances, but had also created an opportunity
where a political challenge to the retention of the claim over Northern Ireland could be
mounted. There is no doubt that a successful challenge in the Irish courts constituted a
tall order. A daunting challenge it may have been, but motivated by their determination
to prove the political illegitimacy of the Articles, it was the McGimpsey brothers who
came closest to achieving that objective.
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PRAGMATISM OR PRINCIPLE?-THE MCGIMPSEY CASE

CHAPTER 3: MCGIMPSEY V. IRELAND
“If Irish nationalists had attempted to attract and encourage Irish unionists to espouse their dream of a
united Ireland, they would today be closer to achieving their aim than they are.” 1

In these terms Chris McGimpsey described the negative effect the constitutional claim
had on the realisation of Irish unity. The words were written in 1990, in the immediate
aftermath of the Supreme Court decision in McGimpsey v. Ireland.2 Twenty years on,
however, the sentiments are just as relevant. Although the claim over Northern Ireland
has long been consigned to history, the basic principle remains the same. Unity can only
be achieved through the consent of Irish unionists. That is why the McGimpsey case is so
important. It demonstrates how exclusive nationalist ideology needed to be updated in
order to facilitate accommodation between the main traditions. It is for this reason that
the case forms the foundation of my thesis. Indeed Dr. McGimpsey himself was keen to
share his own recollections on how the case came to exert such a pivotal influence.3

It is easy to underestimate the radical manner in which McGimpsey v. Ireland extended
the constitutional position. As previous case law has testified, the interpretation of
Articles 2 and 3 by the courts has been fairly consistent.4 Although different judges had
applied varied interpretations, the underlying constitutional reality stayed constant.
Articles 2 and 3 should be considered a legal claim to govern the territory of Northern
Ireland, but with that right being impeded by the political conditions on the ground. 5
1

Cited from That this house would abolish the Constitutional Claim to Northern Ireland: speech delivered
by Dr. C.D McGimpsey to the Philosophical Society, University College, Cork, 15 December, 1990.
2
McGimpsey v. Ireland [1990] I.R. 110.
3
As part of my methodology, I conducted interviews with the plaintiff, Chris McGimpsey. Here, Dr.
McGimpsey articulated his own thoughts on the relevance of the case.
4
See above.
5
It is important to note that previous case law had only implied that the claim to exercise jurisdiction over
Northern Ireland was de jure. Boland had only hinted that the claim was legal while Hederman’s assertion
that the claim was a “constitutional imperative” (cf. Russell v. Fanning [1988] I.R. 505) was delivered as
part of a dissenting opinion. The chief importance of McGimpsey was that it represented the first occasion
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While the assessment of the constitutional position by Hederman J. in Russell v. Fanning6
had been important, his views had been expressed as part of a dissenting opinion. As
such, they could not be said to definitively represent the constitutional position.
Consequently the opinion carried limited legal weight. Until the objection to the AngloIrish Agreement by the McGimpsey brothers reached the Supreme Court, Hederman’s
opinion would continue to have limited constitutional impact. Although the notion of
“constitutional imperative” had been established, it had yet to be accepted as the
definitive interpretation of Articles 2 and 3.

That is why Finlay’s invocation of

Hederman J. assumed such importance.7 Hitherto the claim over Northern Ireland could
be perceived as a constitutional aspiration, a codification of the political idea that reunification of the national territory was a worthy constitutional objective.

By following Hederman J., Finlay C.J. is saying something much more significant. Reunification of the national territory is demanded by the Constitution, and placed an
obligation on all citizens (and thus the government) to realise that imperative. 8 The
decision was to have far reaching consequences. Unionists had always claimed that
Articles 2 and 3 should be characterised as an illegal, irredentist claim by one state to
exercise jurisdiction over another, contrary to accepted principles of international law.9
The Irish courts had traditionally shied away from such a radical interpretation, preferring
to view Articles 2 and 3 as complementing other Articles that articulate a nationalist
ethos which aspired to unite Ireland. Here, however, was the Supreme Court apparently
endorsing the view that Articles 2 and 3 form part of a substantive, legal claim to exercise
jurisdiction over another sovereign state.10 The interpretation of Articles 2 and 3 as a
“constitutional imperative” had now been given authority by the highest court in the
State. The perception of Articles 2 and 3 had been altered permanently. Nationalists now
had to accept that the Constitution contained a de jure claim to govern Northern Ireland.
Unionists, meanwhile, had obtained confirmation in the Supreme Court that the
where the Supreme Court had confirmed unanimously that Articles 2 and 3 constituted a fully legal claim
to govern Northern Ireland. See below.
6
Russell v. Fanning [1988] I.R. 505.
7
See below.
8
See later discussion.
9
See above.
10
See below.
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Constitution insisted on the right to exercise jurisdiction over them. Articles 2 and 3 had
again assumed centre stage in the political arena, and a chain of events had been put in
place which would culminate in their amendment.

THE CROTTY INSPIRATION
According to Chris McGimpsey the motivation to challenge Articles 2 and 3 in the Irish
courts stemmed from the perceived injustice of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. The signing
of the Agreement had provoked widespread anger within the unionist community. The
pervading attitude was that an unjust and illegitimate treaty had been implemented over
the heads of the majority community in Northern Ireland. The fact that the people of
Northern Ireland had been unable to either endorse or reject the Agreement added to the
sense of grievance. The underlying feeling was that Hillsborough had not been
democratically approved, and was therefore invalid. Attempts by the unionist parties to
stimulate democratic debate on the Agreement met only with stern resistance. For
example, a motion in the Northern Ireland Assembly11 calling for a referendum on the
Agreement was effectively ignored.12 The first reaction to the sense of injustice within
the unionist community was typically demagogic: a series of protest marches and
demonstrations were mounted in order to apply pressure on the British government to
abandon the Agreement. The traditionally partisan unionist parties united against the
Agreement, forming an uneasy alliance of U.U.P., D.U.P., the Orange Order and the
more marginal pro-Union parties.13 Although the demonstrations confirmed the level of

11

An Assembly was introduced into Northern Ireland (1982-86) to help ease the political situation.
Conceived as a way to end the “democratic deficit”, the experiment was initially hailed as a success with
elections being contested by both traditions. Nationalists and the Alliance party later boycotted the body,
and it became dominated by unionists. It remained important as a forum for debate, particularly in the
aftermath of the Anglo-Irish Agreement where it became a conduit for unionist dissatisfaction. See Bew
(1996): pp. 192-227.
12
16 November 1985.
13
The most famous demonstration occurred on Saturday 23 November 1985 when an estimated crowd of
over 100 000 people protested outside Belfast City Hall. The speakers included James M olyneaux and Ian
Paisley. This event was the occasion where Dr Paisley uttered his famous declaration “Never, never, never”
in relation to Southern involvement in the affairs of Northern Ireland. It was also, incidentally, an important
event in terms of the McGimpsey case. Chris McGimpsey attended the demonstration and he remembers
the day as one of the first occasions where he began to seriously ruminate about the possibility of a legal
challenge. See Bew (1996): pp.201-206.
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public opposition to the Agreement, the British government remained insistent that
Hillsborough remained the only viable political solution.

An opinion developed, therefore, that a more coherent strategy was needed. It is in this
context that the idea of a legal challenge to the Agreement originated. A belief had
already developed that the Agreement was potentially incompatible with the Irish
Constitution, and it was logical that any challenge would revolve around Articles 2 and
3.14 Although a legal challenge provided a structured path for opponents of the
Agreement to follow, the strategy was never officially endorsed by the Ulster Unionist
Party. Nor did the party provide the inspiration for the case. Instead the case was the
brainchild of Dr. Chris McGimpsey, then a 35 year old property developer from Belfast.15
An Ulster Unionist Party activist from a traditionally unionist family, it was Dr.
McGimpsey who came up with the idea of challenging the Agreement in the Irish courts.
In recalling his reaction to the Agreement, Chris McGimpsey explains how the idea of a
legal challenge germinated:
“I was reading a lot about the 1937 Constitution at the time and couldn’t help but compare the document
with the Anglo-Irish Agreement, particularly Article 1. One of the things that struck me about the AngloIrish Agreement was that it seemed (by attaching so much emphasis to the consent principle) to be placing
the self-determination of Ireland in the hands of a majority in Northern Ireland. By stating that
constitutional change could only come about through a majority vote in Northern Ireland, the Agreement
was effectively giving citizens in that jurisdiction a veto over constitutional change. To my mind, this
clause served to discriminate against citizens in the 26 counties. I reasoned that such discrimination must
surely be unconstitutional. The legal challenge developed from this original idea.”16

Dr. McGimpsey chose to employ an essentially nationalist argument to challenge the
authority of the Agreement. By attacking the defects of the Agreement from a nationalist
14

As the legal foundation of the constitutional claim over Northern Ireland, it was inevitable that Articles 2
and 3 would be at the centre of any prospective constitutional challenge.
15
Maginnis (1990): p.2. It was Chris McGimpsey who first conceived of challenging the Anglo-Irish
Agreement in the Irish courts. An Irish historian, he attained a PhD. from Edinburgh University and is a
“former fellow of the Institute of Irish Studies, Queen’s University, Belfast.” Dr. McGimpsey was heavily
involved in the organisation of the Peace Train Committee. He also served as a Belfast city councillor for
twelve years and is still an active member of the Ulster Unionist Party. See Ken Maginnis: McGimpsey &
McGimpsey v. Ireland (Dungannon, 1990): p.2.
16
In interview with myself.
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perspective, Dr. McGimpsey was increasing the likelihood of his complaint being
received favourably in the Irish courts. The first issue facing the potential plaintiff was
that of funding. A legal challenge was invariably going to prove expensive, and the
hierarchy of the Ulster Unionist Party were reticent to support a costly legal process. In
response, Dr. McGimpsey established a fund to cover the costs of the action, with
supporters being invited to contribute.17 The case would not have been possible without
financial contributions from all sections of unionist society, and the success of the fund is
testament to both the efficiency of the campaign, and the palpable anger within unionism
over the Hillsborough Agreement. Chris McGimpsey was undoubtedly the inspiration
behind the case and its figurehead. That being said, Dr. McGimpsey would be the first to
admit that the constitutional challenge would never have materialised without the
assistance of other unionist supporters. For the case to succeed, Dr. McGimpsey needed
to marshal organisation and expertise. To that end, he enlisted the support of his brother
Michael, a fellow businessman and member of the Ulster Unionist Party, who had also
maintained an interest in Irish politics.18 Together the two brothers became the bedrock of
what became known as the McGimpsey case.

What is not as well known is that another figure within the Ulster Unionist Party was
extremely influential in the challenge. That figure was Ken Maginnis19, the serving M.P.
for Fermanagh and South Tyrone, and fellow moderate within the Official Unionist Party.
Maginnis provided vital assistance to the brothers, canvassing the unionist population for
financial and political support. Maginnis also advanced the merits of the constitutional
challenge within the party. Moreover Maginnis played a prominent role in the
organisation of the legal fund, helping to raise thousands of pounds to cover the costs of
the case. Although often neglected in historical accounts of the case, the role played by

17

The first three contributions to the fund came from Dublin and a pensioner in Northern Ireland. The
original plan was to raise the necessary funds in 6 months. In fact, the McGimpseys met their target in a
mere 3 months. See Maginnis (1990): p.2.
18
Maginnis (1990): p.2: Michael McGimpsey graduated in History and Economics at Trinity College,
Dublin. An active member of the Ulster Unionist Party, he has served as a Belfast city councillor and is a
former member of Queen’s University Senate. He is currently an M.L.A. for South Belfast and the Minister
for Health in the Northern Ireland Executive. See Maginnis (1990): p.2
19
Lord Maginnis remains a member of the Ulster Unionist Party and is currently serving as a life peer in
the House of Lords.
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Maginnis was immense. As Chris McGimpsey puts it, “Without Ken, the case would
simply not have been possible.” The next step for the plaintiffs was to assemble a legal
team with sufficient constitutional expertise to challenge the Agreement in the Irish
courts. The brothers did not disappoint, constructing a formidable team with the
experience and legal acumen to mount a successful constitutional challenge. As Maginnis
reveals, the team included: “Hugh O’Flaherty S.C.20, Frank Clarke S.C.21, and Gerard
Hogan B.L.” The counsel was ably supported by solicitor Brendan Walsh.22

With a formidable legal team assembled, the only remaining obstacle concerned the
financing of the case. That hurdle was eventually surmounted by the tireless work of Ken
Maginnis. Maginnis was relentless in helping to raise the necessary funds, as well as
garnering unionist support in favour of the challenge. With the required funding in place,
the brothers were now free to take their challenge to the High Court. What still needed to
be established, however, was whether two unionist individuals possessed the legal
standing to challenge the Constitution in the Irish courts.23 It was unprecedented for a
unionist to seek constitutional redress in this manner, but the aftermath of the Anglo-Irish
Agreement had created a unique set of political conditions. Such was the extent of
unionist dissatisfaction over the undemocratic Agreement; the arguments in favour of the
challenge became compelling. Recent events, moreover, had created a legal precedent for
the successful challenge of an international agreement in the Irish courts. The impetus
behind the case is explained by Maginnis:
“When the Anglo-Irish Agreement was signed on 15 November, 1985 it provoked from the McGimpsey
brothers…exactly the same traumatic reaction as it engendered throughout the entire Unionist community.
But while they identified with, and joined in, Unionists’ protests against the unjust imposition of the Diktat,
they were soon convinced that only through legal action could there be any hope of proving just how
dangerous and deceitful it really was. Being historians, who had taken a special interest in Irish affairs, they
concluded that the best chance of success would be through the Irish Republic’s courts. While a similar

20

O’Flaherty J. was later appointed as a justice of the Supreme Court.
Frank Clarke also became a member of the judiciary.
22
Maginnis (1990): p.2. The initial legal opinion had been provided by “Finbar Murphy B.L. who resigned
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action against the Agreement to be taken by Enoch Powell in the High Court in London would soon run
into the sand, because the United Kingdom does not have a written constitution, the McGimpseys’ initiative
was based on the fact that the Irish Republic had. Moreover, the Republic’s Constitution had been the basis
for a successful legal challenge in respect of a previous international agreement entered into by the
Government of the day.”24

While the prevailing mood within the unionist community favoured a challenge to the
Anglo-Irish Agreement, the brothers had still not received official endorsement from their
party. To that extent the case remained something of a personal crusade by the
McGimpsey brothers, representing the concerns of thousands of ordinary unionists who
were appalled that an undemocratic agreement could be implemented over their heads.
The challenge appeared daunting: two private citizens taking on the might of the Irish
State in its own courts. The McGimpseys, however, were now backed by a sizeable
contingent of sympathetic supporters. In addition, recent case law suggested that the time
was right to mount a constitutional challenge.25
The “successful legal challenge” that Maginnis is alluding to occurred a year before Chris
and Michael McGimpsey were heard by the High Court. The former case provided the
clear inspiration for the McGimpseys’ action. Events of 1987 had given credence to the
view that an international agreement could be successfully challenged in the Irish courts.
Previous case law had been less than encouraging. Boland had established a precedent for
challenging an international agreement, but had ultimately ended in failure. The
invocation of the Separation of Powers Doctrine in that case demonstrated the reluctance
of the judiciary to adjudicate on matters of foreign policy.26 If Boland had been the only
previous example, it is doubtful that a constitutional challenge would have been
attempted. Although the motivation for the McGimpsey case had been provided by the
reaction to the Anglo-Irish Agreement, the timing was influenced just as much by the
decision in Crotty v. An Taoiseach.27 After the initial optimism had subsided, doubts
began to emerge within the legal team about the feasibility of the case. Consequently the
24
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That feeling

dissipated, however, when Dr. McGimpsey received a call from one of his solicitors to
advise that the challenge was indeed legally justifiable. The decision by the Supreme
Court in Crotty had changed everything. That case also involved the challenging of an
international agreement by a private citizen.28 The plaintiff (Raymond Crotty)29 had
objected to Ireland’s implementation of the Single European Act 1986. “The Act was the
first major amendment to the Treaty of Rome” and its ratification was to have
implications for the Constitution.30 In particular, Crotty objected to Title III of the Treaty
which committed Ireland to the “implementation of a common and single European
foreign policy.”31 The constitutional implications of such a radical commitment are
obvious.32 Foreign policy is the constitutionally protected preserve of the Executive.
According to Doyle, by ceding this function to a supra-national body, the S.E.A. was
potentially conflicting with several central tenets of the Constitution, including “Articles
1, 6 and 29.”33 As Casey states, the Act could also be interpreted as placing restrictions
on the Separation of Powers doctrine, impinging on the “sovereignty of the Irish
people.”34

The issue of locus standi was central to the case. Traditionally in constitutional law, an
individual had been required to demonstrate that they had been “personally or
individually affected” by a measure, in order to challenge its constitutionality.35 The
defence claimed that Crotty had not been any more adversely affected by the ratification
of the Act than any other member of society and, therefore, did not possess sufficient
locus standi to challenge it.36 The question arose: had the rights of the plaintiff been
affected by the implementation of the Act and did he possess any individual grievance

28

See Casey (2000): pp.214-219.
Crotty was an historian and social scientist who had objected to the methods employed by the Irish
government in their attempt to ratify the Single European Act.
30
See Doyle (2008): pp.340-343.
31
Ibid.
32
See also Ryan (2001): pp.18-21.
33
Ibid.
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For a detailed discussion of the case see Casey (2000): pp.214-219.
35
See Ryan (2001): pp.18-20.
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against its successful ratification?37 Both the High Court and Supreme Court held that, as
a concerned member of society, whose constitutional rights were potentially threatened
by the Act, the plaintiff had the locus standi to challenge its ratification.38 A majority in
the Supreme Court concurred that it had been unconstitutional for the Irish government to
acquiesce in Title III of the Single European Act. Walsh J. argued:
“(Title 3) impinges upon the freedom of action of the State not only in certain areas of foreign policy but
even within international organisations such as the United Nations or the Council of Europe…I mentioned
earlier in this judgement that the government is the sole organ of the State in the field of international
relations. This power is conferred on it by the Constitution (Article 29.4)….The freedom to formulate
foreign policy is just as much a mark of sovereignty as the freedom to form economic policy and the
freedom to legislate……To acquire the power to do so would, in my opinion, require a recourse to the
people `whose right it is` in the words of Article 6…. `to decide all questions of national policy, according
to the common good`. In the last analysis it is the people themselves who are the guardians of the
Constitution…..the assent of the people is a necessary prerequisite to the ratification of so much of the
Single European Act, as consists of Title 3 thereof.”39

Walsh J. argued that by assenting to Title III, the government was conflicting with the
ideal of popular sovereignty inherent in the Constitution. In particular, he reasoned that
the implementation of the S.E.A. into domestic law conflicted with “the right of the
people to decide the common good”, enshrined in Article 6.40 The inspiration for the
McGimpsey case is evident: a clear legal precedent had been established that an
international agreement could be challenged on the basis that it was contrary to the
Constitution. Therefore, if an agreement is found to be incompatible with the
Constitution, it is consequently rendered illegal. The ratio of Walsh J. clearly creates an
authority for the courts to judicially review an international agreement.41 The Separation
of Powers doctrine, therefore, does not restrain the courts from striking down
international agreements if they are found to be unconstitutional.42 As the fundamental
law of the State the Constitution (whose authority derives directly from the people),
37

Ryan (2001): p.18.
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overrides any international body.43 This includes the European Union, despite the fact
that membership is provided for in Article 29.4.44The decision provided for the extension
of Judicial Review to cover international agreements entered into by the government of
the day.45 It should be noted, however, that not every justice in the Supreme Court agreed
with Walsh’s logic. Finlay C.J. and Griffin J., although agreeing in principle that the
courts can strike down a foreign treaty if it is found to be unconstitutional, didn’t feel that
the S.EA. showed enough of a “clear disregard” to justify judicial intervention.46 Finlay
C.J. reasoned:
“I interpret the decision of Griffin J. in Boland as being consistent with the view already expressed by me
that where an individual comes before the courts and establishes that action on the part of the Executive has
breached…….one of his constitutional rights that the courts must intervene to protect those rights…..It
appears probable that under modern conditions a state seeking cooperation with other states in the sphere of
foreign policy must be prepared to enter into not merely vague promises, but actual arrangements….I can
find no warrant in the Constitution for suggesting that this activity would be inconsistent with the
Constitution and would…..require a specific amendment to the Constitution.”47

Although disagreeing on whether the constitutional right of the government to formulate
foreign policy had been breached, both factions seemed to agree that it would be
unconstitutional for the Executive to “cede this jurisdiction to an external authority.”48 A
clear legal precedent for challenging an international agreement as unconstitutional had
been established, however. Crotty was to have profound implications for the proposed
McGimpsey case. The brothers were arguing that the recognition of Northern Ireland in
Article 1 of the Anglo-Irish Agreement breached Articles 2 and 3. As Doyle observes, the
Agreement also appeared to cede a “constitutionally protected provision (the right to
exercise jurisdiction over Northern Ireland) to a third party (the U.K. government).”49
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Under the logic of Walsh J. in Crotty, it would seem that such recognition is
unconstitutional.50

For a challenge to be feasible the plaintiffs needed not only motivation, but also a clear
path to follow. The Anglo-Irish Agreement engendered the motivation, but it was the
Crotty case which provided the legal precedent. According to Maginnis the judgement in
Crotty was central to the McGimpsey case and its prospects for success. He writes:
“It was the case of Crotty v. An Taoiseach which provided the real impetus for the McGimpseys. Here the
Dublin Supreme Court had ruled that the Republic’s government did not have the competence to implement
the Single European Act without the consent of the electorate, through a referendum. The crux of the Crotty
argument was that no aspect of foreign policy could be ceded by the Republic’s government to another
government or, in that case, subordinated to a European Community decision. The Irish Constitution, under
Articles 28 and 29, precludes any fettering of the power of the Government in its conduct of the external
affairs of the State. The McGimpseys to mount a successful challenge had therefore to prove:
1. That Article 2 of the Irish Constitution was intended to be a legal claim and not merely a political
aspiration; and if this was so,
2. That Article 1 of the Anglo-Irish Agreement constrained the Republic’s government from pursuing that
legal claim, is so far as it was a recognition of a de jure right of the United Kingdom’s government to
govern Northern Ireland, and hence, to dictate foreign policy for that part of the island of Ireland.”51

Therefore, in order to mount a successful challenge, the McGimpsey brothers decided to
follow the example of Crotty.52 They argued that the Anglo-Irish Agreement ceded the
constitutionally protected right of the State to govern Northern Ireland to “another
jurisdiction.”53 Moreover the plaintiffs argued that the constitutionally protected right of
the State to formulate foreign policy (cf. Articles 6, 28 and 29) included Northern Ireland
as part of the “national territory”.54 By following Crotty, the McGimpseys were
maximising their chances of success. The inspiration provided by the Crotty case is
confirmed in the legal opinion provided to the McGimpseys before they embarked on
their challenge. In respect of Crotty, Finbar Murphy B.L confirmed:
50
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“The first difficulty querists have to overcome is the issue of locus standi. In Cahill v. Sutton (1980) I.R.
269 the Supreme Court held that plaintiffs in constitutional actions must…`be able to assert that, because of
the alleged unconstitutionality, his or other person’s interests have been adversely affected`. (per Henchy
J). His (Crotty) argument was that if the Government deposited the instrument of ratification of the Single
European Act, that act would be immune from constitutional challenge thereafter….. In the Supreme Court
Mr. Crotty was held to possess the necessary locus standi notwithstanding his failure to prove the threat of
any special injury or prejudice to him, as distinct from any other person………Another conclusion flowing
from the Supreme Court judgement in the Crotty case is that international agreements which have not been
converted into domestic law do not enjoy a presumption of validity.…….The language of title 3 is not
coercive but aspirational….nonetheless, because these aspirations appeared in a `solemnly covenanted
commitment` which was not submitted to the people and was not in the form of an act of Parliament, they
were deemed to be unconstitutional. The Anglo-Irish Agreement is a solemnly covenanted commitment`
which has not been submitted to the people. The language of the Agreement is equally aspirational….In my
opinion, the reasons for rejecting Title 3 of the Sibgle European Act are equally applicable to the AngloIrish Agreement…… As O’Keefe J. said in Boland `An acknowledgement by the Government that the
State does not claim to be entitled as of right to jurisdiction over Northern Ireland would in my opinion be
clearly not within the competence of the government having regard to the terms of the
Constitution`….Therefore, the Government has, contrary to Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution, conceded
the right of the British Government to exercise sovereignty over Northern Ireland, and this concession has
been made in an internationally binding agreement. According to the decision of the Supreme Court in
Boland and Crotty, this unconstitutional action is reviewable by the courts.”55

Crotty, therefore, set the template for the McGimpsey brothers to follow in several
respects. First it demonstrated that an international agreement could be successfully
challenged in the Irish courts on the basis of its unconstitutionality. As such, the
judgement offered encouragement that the challenge was feasible.56 Moreover the case
challenged the presumption of constitutionality in relation to international agreements.57
Previously the courts had been loath to involve themselves in any aspect of foreign
policy, believing it to be the exclusive preserve of the Executive.58 Crotty confirmed that
international agreements could be subject to Judicial Review. More importantly, the case
had established that an individual did not need to demonstrate any “individual grievance”
55
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in order to possess sufficient locus standi to challenge a constitutional measure.59 An
inspiration and strategy for the legal team had been identified. It is fair to say that without
Crotty, the challenge of the McGimpsey brothers would never have got off the ground.

THE HIGH COURT CASE
With the funding in place and the legal precedent established, the path was now clear for
the brothers to take their case to the High Court. The challenge of 1988 aspired to
succeed legally where no individual had succeeded before. Despite the magnitude of the
challenge, the McGimpseys had high hopes for success. They believed that the
endorsement of consent in the Anglo-Irish Agreement conflicted with the Irish
Constitution, and their legal opinion had confirmed that a challenge on that basis was
feasible.60 Their rationale is explained by Barrington J. thus:
“Both (plaintiffs) complain that the Irish government, in entering into the Anglo-Irish Agreement,
neglected its duty to the majority community in Northern Ireland and violated the provisions of its own
Constitution.”61

In the aftermath of Crotty, the circumstances appeared conducive for a successful
challenge to the Hillsborough Agreement.62 While the McGimpsey brothers and their
supporters entertained such lofty ambitions, it remained uncertain whether their case
would get a sympathetic hearing in the High Court. After all it was completely
unprecedented for a unionist to use the Irish legal system in such a manner. A difficult
few weeks lay ahead, especially given the political nature of the case. In the
circumstances, it was debatable if the brothers even possessed the necessary standing to
challenge the Constitution in the courts.63
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Locus Standi

In the early skirmishes of the case, the issue of locus standi loomed large. Irish legal
convention decreed that a plaintiff must prove an “individual or special grievance” in
order to challenge an aspect of the Irish Constitution.64 In practice this qualification
meant that an individual was only deemed capable of challenging a measure if they could
demonstrate that they had been personally affected by its existence.65 If Crotty had
shattered that assumption, there remained the condition that an individual needed to be a
citizen of Ireland in order to plead a breach of the Constitution.66 Invariably this
provision caused difficulties for the two brothers, who unashamedly referred to
themselves as British, rejecting the imposition of Irish citizenship upon them. The
defence invoked the restrictions imposed by locus standi to refute the entire basis upon
which the brothers were mounting their challenge.67 The issue did appear to present a
hurdle for the plaintiffs to overcome. How could individuals who rejected Irish
citizenship then rely on Articles of the Constitution which had been designed to protect
the rights of citizens?68 The issue of locus standi threatened to derail the case before the
proceedings had commenced in earnest. The invocation of locus standi was a useful tactic
by the defence, at once turning the strength of the plaintiffs (their status as two unionist
individuals who had been affected by the ostensibly unjust imposition of the Anglo-Irish
Agreement), into a potential weakness. The argument advanced by the defence is
explained in the Supreme Court case notes:
“The plaintiffs do not have the locus standi necessary to seek the reliefs sought in the statement of claim on
the grounds that neither of them has any interest or right which has or will suffer any injury or prejudice by
reason of the coming into force of the said agreement, nor has either a common interest with any person
who could claim to be or to be likely to be adversely affected thereby.”69
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As well as claiming that the plaintiffs could not demonstrate that they had been
prejudiced by the Agreement, the defence claimed that the McGimpsey brothers could
not invoke Articles 2 and 3 because they “do not believe that the national territory
consists of the whole island of Ireland.”70 The rationale of the defence was simple. As the
plaintiffs did not consider themselves to be citizens of Ireland, and did not agree with the
definition of the national territory outlined in the Constitution, they could not then claim
a breach of Articles 2 and 3 which provided that definition. Effectively the defence was
putting forward a two-sided objection. First they were claiming that as the plaintiffs had
not been personally affected by the implementation of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, they
did not possess the locus standi to challenge its constitutionality. 71The argument follows
the traditional logic that an individual can only challenge the constitutionality of a
measure if they can demonstrate that they have been individually affected by its
existence.72 As Crotty had restricted the reliability of that dictum, however, the defence
needed another argument in terms of locus standi.73 That is where the issue of nationality
came in. The defence shrewdly invoked the plaintiffs’ own denial of Irish citizenship in
an attempt to deny their locus standi.

74

They reasoned that Articles 2 and 3 defined the

Irish nation and were thus intended to protect the rights of Irish citizens by delineating
the national territory.75 As the Articles relate directly to nationality, therefore, they could
not be relied upon by individuals who expressly refuse to accept Irish nationality.76 As
the plaintiffs did not agree with the constitutional definition of the nation offered by
Articles 2 and 3, it was illogical for them to oppose the Anglo-Irish Agreement on the
grounds that they had been breached.77 The argument was explained by the defence in the
Supreme Court thus:
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“The statement of claim contains no claim that either plaintiff is a citizen of Ireland, although it is stated
that the first plaintiff (Chris McGimpsey) is the holder of an Irish passport. No evidence was given by
either plaintiff that either he or any of his parents had made the prescribed declaration pursuant to section 7;
sub-section 1 of the Irish Nationality and Citizenship Act 1956, or of any facts which would indicate that he
was otherwise an Irish citizen.”78

The defence, therefore, linked Irish nationality with citizenship. Their argument was that
if someone is entitled to citizenship but decides to reject it, they can’t reasonably expect
to rely on constitutional protections reserved for Irish citizens.79 According to this logic, a
unionist could never possess the locus standi necessary to prove a breach of the
Constitution. This logic is in itself suspect, contradicting the proclamation in Article 2
that the national territory consists of the entire island of Ireland. If unionists inhabit the
territory that comprises the nation, then surely they are a part of that nation, regardless of
whether they choose to define themselves as British? The plaintiffs refuted this claim by
arguing that, as unionists living in Northern Ireland, they had been directly and
demonstrably affected by the undemocratic imposition of the Agreement. 80 Moreover, as
Articles 2 and 3 defined the national territory as comprising the whole island, it is only
logical that a unionist (according to the Constitution) is a citizen of Ireland, and perfectly
entitled to invoke any Article thereof.81 To deny this fact is to reject the values of the
Constitution. Chris McGimpsey claimed that the decision of the Irish State to grant him a
passport confirmed that they had accepted his entitlement to citizenship, validating his
right to mount such a challenge.82 Barrington J. rejected the defence’s contention that the
unionist background of the plaintiffs prevented them from having the required locus
standi to take the case. The learned judge argued:
“Both plaintiffs were born in Ireland and are therefore, in contemplation of Irish law, citizens of Ireland.”83
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The Constitution makes the position clear. Article 2 confirms the national territory as
comprising the entire island. All inhabitants of the national territory, therefore, (including
unionists who refuse to define themselves as Irish), have a constitutional right to
citizenship.84 Even if they decide not to fulfil the legal requirements of citizenship (or
indeed refuse to even consider themselves Irish), their right to be part of the Irish nation
is enshrined in the Constitution.85 As Barrington J. explained:
“The defendants plead that the plaintiffs have no locus standi to put forward any of these submissions and
they rely upon the decision of the Supreme Court in Cahill v.Sutton I.R. 269. The defendants admit-indeed
claim- that both plaintiffs are citizens of Ireland but they deny that that fact alone gives them status to
mount the present proceedings. In Crotty v. An Taoiseach the Supreme Court, and indeed the High Court,
accepted that a citizen who is exposed to no greater injury than that of the citizens at large might still have
status to challenge legislation or a treaty if he could show that the proposed action violated the Constitution
and that he, in common with his fellow citizens, was being denied the right to be consulted in a
referendum….The present case is, to say the least, unusual and there is no exact precedent governing it. But
it appears to me that the plaintiffs are patently sincere and serious people who have raised an important
constitutional issue which affects them and thousands of others on both sides of the border. Having regard
to these factors and having regard to the wording of the Preamble and of Articles 2 and 3, it appears to me
that it would be inappropriate for this court to refuse to listen to their complaints.”86

Barrington, therefore, had accepted the rationale of Crotty that a citizen did not need to
demonstrate any individual grievance in order to possess the locus standi to invoke the
Constitution in an Irish court.87 A concerned citizen merely had to demonstrate that they,
in common with other citizens, had experienced general injury as a result of a measure
which potentially conflicted with the Constitution.88 The first hurdle had been overcome.
More importantly, Barrington J. rejected the contention of the defence that the plaintiffs’
unionist beliefs prevented them from invoking Articles 2 and 3. As Barrington
acknowledges, such an argument is unconstitutional, and fundamentally “anti-
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Republican.”89 As Article 2 defined the national territory as the whole island, all the
people residing on the island are considered part of the nation. Moreover Article 3
confirmed that the Irish people possessed a “right” to govern the whole island. All
unionists, therefore, have a right to belong to the nation and be considered citizens of
Ireland. If Articles 2 and 3 confirmed these rights, it followed that unionists were just as
entitled to invoke the Articles as any other citizen. As legally recognised citizens of
Ireland who could demonstrate that they had cause to object to the Anglo-Irish
Agreement, the McGimpsey brothers had exhibited the standing necessary to take the
case.90

With the issue of locus standi resolved, the plaintiffs were left with the more challenging
task of proving that Hillsborough contravened Articles 2 and 3. The early stages of the
case, however, imbued the plaintiffs with confidence that their concerns would receive a
sympathetic hearing. The Court’s acceptance of their locus standi was an encouraging
signal that it would listen respectfully to their concerns. Even if the brothers were to be
unsuccessful in their primary ambition of striking down the Anglo-Irish Agreement, there
remained hope that they could accomplish their ancillary objective of proving the
incoherence of Articles 2 and 3.91 After all, if the Court could accept their credentials as
citizens with enough of a vested interest to take the case, then it was possible that it could
also accept that the letter and spirit of the Anglo-Irish Agreement contravened Articles 2
and 3. As their legal team had confirmed, the brothers had a sound argument that Article
1 of the Agreement was incompatible with the Constitution.92 Moreover Crotty had
confirmed that an international treaty could be subject to Judicial Review.93 In this
context the plaintiffs were hopeful that a positive response to their claim would be
forthcoming. The aspirations held by the plaintiffs (and the unionist community in
general), are summarised by Maginnis thus:
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“If the McGimpseys were correct in their “legal claim” thesis then unionist fears of being subsumed within
a politically united Ireland would be justified but, at least, the hated Agreement must then be deemed
unconstitutional and would, we reasoned, have to be abandoned. On the other hand, if the “political
aspiration” argument was correct there would be an end to unionist fears……The atmosphere of suspicion
and distrust-the unionist “siege mentality”- which has pervaded our community since the Irish Republic’s
Constitution was adopted in 1937 would change, and the basis for new relationships would be created.”94

Although the case was gathering momentum, significant obstacles remained. The
conditions prevailing at the time favoured a rejection of the plaintiffs’ claim. First we
must consider the unprecedented nature of the exercise. No unionist had hitherto even
contemplated using Irish courts to challenge the Constitution. What the brothers were
attempting was both daunting and unique. It must be remembered that the legal
precedents that the McGimpseys were relying upon were far from watertight. If their
claim was successful, the plaintiffs would have achieved something that had never been
accomplished before. Boland had proven that an international agreement could be
challenged in the courts, but the claim had ultimately failed.95 Although Crotty had
succeeded in proving that the original ratification of the S.E.A. was unconstitutional, the
case had failed to prevent the assimilation of the Treaty into Irish law. 96 So there existed
no exact precedent for what the McGimpseys were attempting to achieve. In addition,
there remained concern over whether the politicians would receive equitable treatment in
an Irish court. That is not to accuse the judiciary of sectarianism. The judicial system
protects the rights of all citizens regardless of political affiliation, while the description of
the plaintiffs as “sincere and serious people” was an encouraging sign that the
McGimpseys’ concerns were being received positively.97 Nevertheless the plaintiffs were
navigating in uncharted waters. As there were no historical parallels, it was difficult to
assess their prospects for success. Previous case law had suggested that the Irish courts
tended to favour the traditionally Republican interpretation of the national question.98
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Bearing in mind the lessons of the previous cases, history did not seem to favour the
McGimpsey project. Moreover the traditional reticence of the judiciary to involve
themselves in areas of political sensitivity militated against a successful outcome in the
plaintiffs’ favour. The Anglo-Irish Agreement had been perceived in nationalist Ireland
as a workable settlement, a sensible accommodation which catered for the aspirations of
all communities. The Irish courts, therefore, were always likely to be more sympathetic to
the Agreement than a unionist community who viewed the document very differently. As
in Boland, the courts would have been aware of the potential difficulties arising from an
acceptance of the plaintiffs’ claim and, consequently, would have been loath to reach any
decision which placed the Agreement in jeopardy. 99

When the judgement was delivered on 29 July 1988, therefore, it was not the outcome the
plaintiffs had been hoping for. Although the Court had recognised the sincerity of their
protest and listened sympathetically to their arguments, the plaintiffs’ claim had
ultimately been rejected. In delivering his assessment, Barrington J. referenced Boland in
interpreting the Constitution as establishing a claim to govern Northern Ireland “by
right”.100 The argument appears to be that no Irish government, having regard to the
Constitution, could deny the right to govern Northern Ireland.101 Therefore, in signing the
Anglo-Irish Agreement, the Irish government could not be accepting the right of the U.K.
to govern Northern Ireland as such a position is unconstitutional.102 All references to the
consent principle contained in the Agreement, therefore, were merely acknowledging the
situation on the ground.103 This acknowledgement of the de facto reality did not
compromise the right to govern the whole of the national territory.104
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Barrington J. is offering an interpretation of the Anglo-Irish Agreement that differs
significantly from the commonly accepted wisdom. Article 1 had been perceived as
recognition of the consent principle by the Irish government, an acceptance that had been
enshrined in a legally binding international treaty. The orthodox interpretation held that
the Agreement confirmed that the State now embraced the consent principle, and that this
position was protected by international law.105 Unionists had never accepted this version
of events. The majority in the unionist community argued that the Anglo-Irish Agreement
had been conceived as a vehicle to facilitate enhanced cooperation between the British
and Irish governments in respect of Northern Ireland.106 They reasoned that the entire
raison d’être of Hillsborough had been to give the State an enhanced role in the affairs of
Northern Ireland. In this analysis any concessions relating to the consent principle were
merely cosmetic, and did not alter the legal substance of the Agreement. Any lip service
paid to the consent principle did not in any way diminish the legal claim.107

The McGimpseys had not accepted this wisdom. It was their view that Article 1 did
endorse the consent principle, and that the endorsement conflicted with Articles 2 and 3.
108

The widely held belief within the unionist community that Article 1 did not

compromise the legal claim is rooted in the Constitution.109 The McGimpseys argued that
any references to consent were invalidated by Articles 2 and 3. As Articles 2 and 3
asserted the right of the Irish State to govern the whole of the national territory, any
admission

of

U.K.

jurisdiction

over

Northern

Ireland,

they

argued,

was

unconstitutional.110 The Irish government, therefore, did not possess the authority to sign
up to the Agreement as the Constitution prohibited the State from recognising the right of
the U.K. to govern Northern Ireland.111 As such, the unionist analysis echoed the well
worn path that had been followed in previous case law. The most important aspect of the
judgement delivered by Barrington J. is his apparent endorsement of this interpretation.
Although Barrington was careful not to say anything that denied the legitimacy of the
105
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Hillsborough Agreement, he seemed to agree that Articles 2 and 3 prevented the State
from recognising external authority in relation to Northern Ireland. The judge followed
Boland, arguing that the Irish government’s recognition of Northern Ireland as nothing
more than an observation of the de facto reality on the ground.112 As in Sunningdale, the
Irish government had merely referred to the de facto reality.113 The Agreement did not
alter the legal claim.114 Barrington seemed to be saying that the adoption of any other
position by the Irish government would have been unconstitutional. He appeared to
believe that any emphatic endorsement of the consent principle was prohibited by
Articles 2 and 3. In rejecting the plaintiffs’ claim Barrington J. explained:
“The plaintiffs claim that since the dissolution of the Stormont Parliament and the collapse of the Power
Sharing Executive they have largely been governed by….direct rule. They have still, of course, got their
representatives in the Imperial Parliament in Westminster but they complain that the system of rule by
Orders in Council is largely undemocratic. This may be so but I doubt that the Anglo-Irish Agreement can
be blamed for it.….Under these circumstances it appears that the plaintiffs’ constitutional challenge to the
Anglo-Irish Agreement fails.”115

Ostensibly the McGimpseys’ case had failed, and their attempt to have the Anglo-Irish
Agreement revoked lay in tatters. Several aspects of the judgement were unsatisfactory,
however. First the assertion by the Court that the Agreement did not recognise U.K
authority in Northern Ireland is questionable. The Agreement116 was a legally binding
international treaty between two sovereign governments, which provided for an enhanced
role in the government of Northern Ireland by the State.117 Moreover Article 1 of the
Agreement explicitly states that there can be no change to the constitutional status of
Northern Ireland until the “consent” of the majority in that jurisdiction is established.118
Therefore it is incongruous to suggest that the Agreement does not refer to U.K.
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jurisdiction in Northern Ireland. Both the letter and spirit of the Agreement provide for
governmental cooperation in Northern Ireland. The consent principle is clearly expressed
throughout the document, and underpins the Agreement. Bearing that in mind, the
contention that these clauses refer only to the de facto situation on the ground was surely
open to challenge.119

We have seen that the Irish courts have always been comfortable with recognising
Northern Ireland, and that Article 3 provided constitutional protection for this position.120
In that sense Barrington J. was merely following the legal precedents established from
earlier cases. His view that Hillsborough referred only to the de facto position is certainly
debatable. Although inspired by Sunningdale, the provisions contained in the Agreement
went well beyond those agreed eleven years previously. The extent of governmental
cooperation and the unambiguous references to consent enshrined in Hillsborough, are
greater than those conceived by Sunningdale. Furthermore, while the judiciary had been
somewhat uncertain as to the exact nature of Sunningdale, there could be no doubt as to
the true character of Hillsborough. The Anglo-Irish Agreement was universally
recognised as a legally binding international treaty, and was registered as such with the
United Nations.121 Sunningdale may have been ambiguous, but it was impossible to
dismiss the Anglo-Irish Agreement as simply a “declaration of policy”.122 As a signatory
to the Agreement, therefore, the Irish government was legally obliged to ensure that its
terms were constitutional. On the face of it, the McGimpseys had a sound legal case that
Article 1 conflicted with Articles 2 and 3. Barrington’s assertion that the recognition of
Northern Ireland acknowledged only the de facto reality was far from convincing. The
weakness of this argument alone gave the plaintiffs grounds for appeal.123
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Maginnis has observed that rather than endorsing consent, the Irish government may have
“deliberately left their assurances vague.”124 He quotes senior counsel for the defence,
who suggested that the Irish government’s commitment to consent had been far from
resolute. During the case Mr Fitzsimons S.C. commented:
“Now, Mr O’Flaherty referred to Article 1, my Lord, headed “The Status of Northern Ireland”. When one
reads that Article, one looks at the status of Northern Ireland, it is not defined at all. It is carefully not
defined my Lord, carefully not defined.” 125

By this statement, the counsel seems to be suggesting that Article 1 should not be
interpreted as an endorsement of consent. Instead, the Irish government deliberately left
the references to Northern Ireland vague in order to “avoid a conflict with the
Constitution.”126 The suggestion is in line with Barrington’s synopsis that Article 1 could
not be emphatic as the Constitution forbade the Irish government from making such a
commitment.127 The rationale appears to be that because such an undertaking is clearly
unconstitutional, it is illogical to suggest that the Irish government entered into it.
According to this interpretation, Article 1 should be read as recognition of the reality on
the ground, and nothing more.128 The argument employed by the defence (and seemingly
endorsed by the Court) doesn’t really hold up to scrutiny. Rather it seems to be a
retrospective downgrading of the consent provisions in order to avoid doubts over the
constitutionality of the Agreement. What is more, the evidence of the Agreement
counteracts the defence’s assertion. On the issue of consent, the Anglo-Irish Agreement is
emphatic. Article 1 (a) states:
“The two governments affirm that any change in the status of Northern Ireland would only come about with
the consent of a majority of the people of Northern Ireland.”129
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Even accounting for the latitude to recognise Northern Ireland granted by Article 3, the
commitment offered by the Irish government is hard to reconcile with the Constitution.
Certainly the consent principle appears to be comprehensively endorsed by the pledge.
Given such an emphatic recognition, it is difficult to support the contention that Article 1
refers solely to the de facto position of Northern Ireland. It is true that previous case law
had confirmed that the existence of Northern Ireland was compatible with the legal
claim.130 As discussed above, Articles 2 and 3 successfully combined an expression of
the right to govern Northern Ireland with the de facto reality of U.K. jurisdiction.
Nevertheless it is harder to see how the unambiguous ratification of the consent principle
in Article 1, is consistent with the nationalist ideals of the Constitution. It is doubtful that
the Republican founding fathers would have considered Articles 2 and 3 compatible with
such explicit recognition of the U.K. role in Northern Ireland.

Such pragmatic acceptance of realities is, however, typical of the manner in which the
courts have interpreted the legal claim.131 Barrington’s assessment of the constitutional
position provides further acceptance that recognition of Northern Ireland by the Irish
government was fully constitutional. As such, the High Court judgement is confirmation
of the judicial position adopted in earlier cases. However the disparity between the
endorsement of the consent principle, and the claim to govern Northern Ireland by “right”
enshrined in Article 3 of the Constitution, gave the McGimpseys a firm basis upon which
to lodge an appeal. An opinion formed within the camp that an appeal to the Supreme
Court was feasible and, rather than being defeatist, the mood within the team was
cautiously optimistic.132 The hope was grounded in the seemingly unsatisfactory nature of
Barrington’s judgement. As Maginnis remembers:
“The judgement was generally considered by lawyers to be a clever “fudge”, in so far as Mr Barrington,
while rehearsing the relevant arguments arising from previous cases involving a constitutional challenge,
carefully avoided any examination of anomalies which appeared to exist as a result of those decisions. For
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the McGimpseys it was an unsatisfactory, if not unexpected, outcome. An appeal to the Supreme Court was
now a necessity.”133

The inevitability of the appeal is confirmed by Chris McGimpsey, who recalls that his
intention had always been for the case to reach the Supreme Court:
“We always expected to go to the Supreme Court. If we had won in the High Court the State would have
appealed, and it was always our determination that we would appeal if we lost. There was great excitement
in the High Court, and our evidence was received with courtesy and respect. But the decision was no
surprise. Justice Barrington and I were both involved in the Irish Association for Cultural, Economic and
Social Relations, so I knew our complaints would be taken seriously. There was a feeling that Barrington’s
judgement was clever, and framed in such a way as to give grounds for us to appeal. Barrington felt that the
evidence obliged him to find in favour of the State, but he knew the case needed to go to the Supreme
Court. Barrington had a judicious and brilliant legal mind, and knew it was necessary for the Supreme
Court to decide.”134

Chris McGimpsey is not questioning the integrity of Barrington J., who he held in the
highest esteem. Dr. McGimpsey is stating an opinion that the judge, contemplating the
magnitude of the issue, realised that an appeal to the Supreme Court was necessary. In
offering this analysis, Dr. McGimpsey is adopting an essentially realist interpretation of
the decision.

The brothers approached the appeal with confidence. Although their claim had failed, the
High Court had received their arguments more favourably than many had anticipated.
Most strikingly, Barrington J. seemed to agree that any Agreement that emphatically
accepted the consent principle would be unconstitutional.135 Where the Court differed
from the McGimpseys was in its assessment of whether the Agreement had caused such a
breach. The plaintiffs had advanced the commonly accepted definition of the Agreement
(namely that it copperfastened consent), whereas Barrington had invoked Boland in
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viewing such commitments as an acceptance of the de facto position.136 With their central
supporting argument having been accepted, the McGimpseys did not have too far to
travel to persuade the Supreme Court that the Anglo-Irish Agreement conflicted with
Articles 2 and 3. It was clear that the plaintiffs did not view the appeal as another
opportunity to rehash unsuccessful arguments. They genuinely believed that they had a
reasonable chance of winning. As Chris McGimpsey reveals, “we wouldn’t have gone (to
the Supreme Court) if we didn’t think we could succeed.” Whether the soundness of
their case would translate into success, however, was another matter. The Supreme Court
would not be any more inclined than the High Court to jeopardise the Agreement. On
appeal, the plaintiffs still faced a daunting task. The lack of clarity by Barrington,
however, had offered hope that the brothers could (at the very least) use the appeal to
demonstrate the anomalies inherent in the Anglo-Irish Agreement.

APPEAL TO THE SUPREME COURT
“…..The High Court decided that the claim about “the national territory” in Article 2 “exists in the political
and not in the legal order” (at p.584). However, the Supreme Court on appeal decided not to follow the
interpretation of the High Court and decided instead that Article 2 represented a “claim of legal right” about
the extent of the national territory, and that Article 3 expressed a constitutional imperative for its eventual
re-integration…..It is not clear what “a claim of legal right” means here. The use of the term “claim”
suggests that Article 2 involves a claim in international law which has not been decided by any relevant
legal authority, and it is not clear what such an authority might be. Perhaps a “claim of legal right” is a
claim made by a given jurisdiction that it has a right to legislate for a specific region, even though the claim
is not accepted by other claimants. In that case (McGimpsey) it seems as if the claim itself is a political or
moral claim, rather than a legal claim, and hence the Supreme Court decision differs rhetorically, rather
than legally, from the earlier decisions in Boland, Crotty, and Russell v. Fanning.”137

So Clarke assesses the ideological differences between the decisions reached by the High
Court and Supreme Court. It has become legal gospel that the chief importance of the
136
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Supreme Court decision was that it shattered the old constitutional assumptions about
Articles 2 and 3, by confirming that the claim was a legal right rather than a political
aspiration.138 If correct, the judgement represented a vindication of the McGimpsey
brothers’ claims. Clarke, however, disputes the simplicity of this analysis, and questions
what the Supreme Court meant by claim “as of legal right”.139 The interpretation of this
contentious phrase goes to the heart of the matter. Does acceptance of the “constitutional
imperative” position nullify the traditional view of Articles 2 and 3, or is the judgement
simply an extension of the position endorsed in earlier case law? Clarke seems to suggest
that the use of the expression is not as legally significant as one may assume, viewing it
as a rhetorical accentuation of the political aspiration as opposed to a re-definition of the
legal nature of the claim.140 Certainly the judgement in McGimpsey takes its inspiration
from earlier decisions, relying heavily on Boland and Russell v. Fanning.141

Clarke seems to be suggesting that the Supreme Court in McGimpsey was following the
interpretation of Articles 2 and 3 established by earlier case law.142 This theory fits in
with my thesis that the interpretation of the claim by the Irish courts has been rigidly
consistent. The former Articles 2 and 3 expressed a determination to re-unite the national
territory, based on a belief that the State was entitled to govern the whole of that territory
by right, but that this right was restricted by recognition of the de facto reality. Such de
facto recognition, however, in no way diminished the legal claim which existed by right,
and was inalienable.143 This has been the consistent position of the Irish courts from
Boland onwards, enabling the judiciary to reconcile the nature of the legal claim with the
existence of Northern Ireland. A pragmatic interpretation of the claim helped
accommodate Republican ideology with practical political realities. Perhaps a
reassessment of the meaning of McGimpsey is overdue. If the traditional interpretation of
the case holds true, the plaintiffs were vindicated in their contention that Articles 2 and 3
expressed a substantive legal claim to govern Northern Ireland. If Clarke’s assessment is
138

Ibid, see also Maginnis (1990): pp.2-6.
Ibid.
140
Clarke (2000): p.110.
141
See above.
142
See Clarke (2000): pp.110-112.
143
See above.
139

R.W. McGimpsey

McGimpsey v. Ireland

29

correct, perhaps O’Higgins C.J. was valid in his assertion that the claim existed “not in
the legal but the political order.”144

So, at the beginning of their appeal to the Supreme Court, the ambitions for the
McGimpsey brothers remained the same as those stated before the High Court. The
interpretation of the nature of the claim by the Supreme Court, therefore, would go a long
way to determining whether the case had been successful. From the outset, most unionists
realised that the primary objective of proving a breach of Articles 2 and 3, and thus
invalidating the Anglo-Irish Agreement, was a daunting task. A more realistic objective
was the ancillary ambition of proving that the Articles represented a substantive legal
claim to govern Northern Ireland. Therefore, even if the primary aim of striking down the
Anglo-Irish Agreement was not attained, the brothers would secure a moral victory by
revealing what they regarded as the true nature of Articles 2 and 3. The High Court
judgement, although accepting that Articles 2 and 3 contained a determination to govern
Northern Ireland, seemed to follow the traditional stance of the courts which viewed the
claim as essentially political rather than legal.145

The need for a definitive definition is one of the reasons why the appeal assumed
importance far beyond the vested interests of the unionist constituency. Previous
jurisprudence had been reasonably consistent about the nature of Articles 2 and 3. Boland
had first raised the suggestion that the essence of the claim was legal, and that position
had been followed intermittently by subsequent cases.146 The overriding position,
however, was that the claim contained political and legal elements.147 A definitive
interpretation in relation to the nature of the claim was essential. The approach of the
courts had been to interpret Articles 2 and 3 by reference to their semantic meaning,
considering them in harmony with other Articles of the Constitution. By placing the
Articles in their proper context, the courts have achieved a coherent interpretation of the
144
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claim over Northern Ireland. The only dissenting voice within the constitutional position
was raised by O’Higgins C.J. in 1977. His placing of the claim in the political rather than
the legal order, enabled the State to retain the claim, and made it difficult for opponents
to challenge it politically. By emphasising the political nature of the claim, the courts
were able to deflect criticism of the constitutional position, given the incompatibility of a
legal claim with international law.148 O’Higgins’ assessment of the claim was in keeping
with how the Constitution had been viewed by many within the State i.e. that it codified
the idea that the national territory should be united, but conveyed a political aspiration
rather than a constitutional obligation.149

O’Higgins’ interpretation may have reflected political theory popular at the time, but
created a conflict with the other cases that contemplated the nature of the claim. Certainly
Boland (and subsequent cases) felt more inclined to present the claim over Northern
Ireland as containing political AND legal elements.150 The hallmark of the judicial
definition was that Articles 2 and 3 should be viewed as construing a political
determination to govern Northern Ireland, whilst at the same time affirming that the
State’s authority to legislate for the whole island existed by right.151 This inalienable right
was only frustrated by positive law.152 In that sense Re: Article 26 and the Criminal Law
(Jurisdiction) Bill 1975 can be viewed as striking something of a discordant note. It
should be noted, however, that O’Higgins is emphatic about other elements of the claim,
asserting the right of the Irish nation to self-determination, and confirming that this right
is superior to positive law.153 The identification of the claim as political is significant,
however. The importance of O’Higgins’ position is magnified by the fact that his
interpretation is seemingly followed in the High Court case. Barrington appears to concur
that the claim is essentially political rather than legal.154 In this context, the Supreme
Court’s interpretation was going to prove crucial. Was it going to endorse the view of
previous cases (principally Boland and Russell v. Fanning), that the claim over Northern
148
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Ireland was legal as well as political? Or would the Court agree with O’Higgins and
Barrington that the claim was political in nature? The McGimpseys’ appeal held out the
prospect of a definitive interpretation of the claim. Whatever opinion the Supreme Court
favoured, their assessment was going to be critical in terms of whether the plaintiffs
succeeded or failed in their objectives.

The plaintiffs hoped that the Supreme Court would endorse their belief that Articles 2 and
3 amounted to a legal claim, and that the `political aspiration` argument would be
definitively refuted. Barrington J. and the High Court had remained vague on the issue,
and the appeal provided scope for a more reliable interpretation. As in the High Court
case, the first obstacle to overcome was locus standi.155 Although the High Court had
accepted the constitutional standing of the plaintiffs to present their case, there was no
guarantee that the Supreme Court would follow suit. After all, the Supreme Court could
avoid having to adjudicate on such a politically sensitive matter if it rejected the right of
the plaintiffs to mount their challenge. Bearing in mind the potential political controversy
accruing from considering these issues, a denial of locus standi seemed an expedient path
for the Supreme Court to follow.156 After consideration, the Court confirmed that because
the McGimpseys can be considered Irish citizens, they possessed the locus standi for
their case to the heard. The case notes state:
“The defendants claimed (in the High Court) that the plaintiffs could not invoke Article 2 of the
Constitution because they themselves “do not believe the national territory consists of the whole island of
Ireland”. However, the trial judge responded that `the plaintiffs were born in Ireland and are therefore, in
contemplation of Irish law, citizens of Ireland.”157

The appeal hinged on the plaintiffs’ ability to prove that Article 1 (of the Agreement)
directly conflicted with Articles 2 and 3.158 Once that principle had been established, the
plaintiffs’ objectives were two fold: the identification of the claim as legal rather than
155
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political, and the consequent striking down of the Agreement as unconstitutional. It was
the language of the High Court decision that gave the McGimpseys cause for optimism.
Barrington’s ambiguity on the nature of Articles 2 and 3 provided the appeal with a clear
focus. If the brothers could prove that Articles 2 and 3 amounted to a de jure claim to
govern Northern Ireland, they only had to demonstrate that the Agreement conflicted
with that claim. Given the emphatic endorsement of the consent principle elucidated in
Article 1, the brothers had considerable grounds for buoyancy. By following O’Higgins’
rationale that the claim existed predominantly in the political order, Barrington had
provided a clear interpretation for the legal team to challenge. 159 If the McGimpseys
could confirm that Articles 2 and 3 represented a de jure claim to govern Northern
Ireland, their appeal stood a reasonable chance of success.160

There was every reason to think that the Supreme Court would agree with the plaintiffs’
assertion. Case law from Boland onwards had tended towards a legal and political
definition of the claim.161 O’Higgins had been a fairly solitary voice in his insistence that
the Articles should be characterised as purely political. By accepting the McGimpseys’
contention, therefore, the Court would be merely following the accepted legal wisdom.
The plaintiffs, therefore, had a sound legal case to bring before the Supreme Court. The
success of the appeal hinged on whether they could definitively assert the legal nature of
Articles 2 and 3. If so, then it was reasonable to expect that the Agreement could be
invalidated on that basis. The defence, on the other hand, appeared to rely solely on their
belief that Article 1 (of the Agreement) referred exclusively to the de facto position.162
Such a stance may have shielded Articles 2 and 3 from political challenge previously, but
the emphatic recognition of consent in the Agreement would prove much more difficult
to defend.163 If the McGimpseys could convince the Court of the merits of their
interpretation, there was every reason to believe the appeal could succeed. From a legal
perspective at least, the plaintiffs appeared to have grounds for optimism.
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It was not only legal considerations, however, that would sway the opinion of the
Supreme Court.164 The Court would have been acutely aware of the political fallout
accruing from an acceptance of the plaintiffs’ claims. In nationalist Ireland the AngloIrish Agreement was widely heralded as a permanent and balanced solution to the
Northern Ireland problem.165 In the context of escalating violence, the Agreement was
viewed as an essential step towards ending the conflict. The Agreement had been
achieved through painstaking negotiations, and had required a sustained involvement
from politicians on both sides of the Irish Sea. Many important constituencies of Irish
society had a vested interest in the success of the Agreement; from lawyers and
politicians to civil servants and administrators. The Agreement represented a significant
political investment from the political establishment in Britain and Ireland, with both
administrations wedded to its success. For Thatcher and Fitzgerald in particular, it was
inconceivable that Hillsborough would be permitted to fail.166 For the Irish negotiators
especially, it would have been particularly unpalatable for their pet project to fail because
it was deemed unconstitutional. The Agreement could unravel due to a number of factors,
but being discarded because it had been struck down by the Irish courts was not
something the Irish government was prepared to contemplate.167

Fitzgerald in particular had invested heavily in the Agreement from a personal
perspective. Hillsborough was the culmination of a concerted policy of engagement in
Northern Ireland.168 The engagement had been characterised by interaction with the
unionist community, and a determination to bring the conflict to a conclusion.169 The
Fitzgerald administration had staked their political credibility on the success of the
Agreement, and was resolved to follow though on its commitments. Much energy and
effort had been expended on the Agreement, underlining the importance of its
implementation. Obviously the Supreme Court had not been subject to overt political
pressure to reject the plaintiffs’ claims, but it is fair to say that the Court would have been
164
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aware of the consequences arising from condemning the Agreement as unconstitutional.
Conditions prevailing at the time favoured a realist interpretation of the evidence. Indeed
it would have been virtually impossible for the Court to have remained oblivious to the
political consequences of their decision. The political significance of the Agreement, and
the importance attached to its success, would certainly not have been lost on its Chief
Justice. By 1990 Thomas Finlay had enjoyed a long and distinguished career as a Senior
Counsel and later trial judge, maintaining an active history of involvement in Irish
politics.

170

Along with the other justices of the Court, Finlay would have been very

reluctant to confirm a breach of Articles 2 and 3. Some subtle but influential factors
would have affected the Supreme Court’s assessment of the case.

First there is the traditional reluctance of the courts to involve themselves in areas of
political sensitivity.171 As in previous cases of political relevance, the natural inclination
of the judiciary was to avoid controversy.172 It is not an accident that a breach of Articles
2 and 3 had never been successfully proven in the Irish courts. Finlay and his colleagues
would have been all too aware that the impetus was against a successful challenge.
Moreover the political background of the plaintiffs may have influenced the Court. By
this I don’t mean to accuse the Court of a sectarian bias, but the suspicion remained that
the McGimpseys faced a daunting task in attempting to persuade the Court to strike down
an area of the Irish Constitution. The Irish courts would have been reluctant to take action
that would jeopardise the Agreement in any event, but would perhaps have been wary of
doing so at the behest of two politicians from outside the State, regardless of their locus
standi. It is my thesis that the judgement of the Court was consistent with previous case
law, and was certainly the result of a detailed analysis of the evidence. It is equally
obvious, however, that in reaching its decision, the Court was subject to a whole host of
influences. Too much had been invested in Hillsborough for it to fall at the first major
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hurdle. Despite the validity of the plaintiffs’ case, the political conditions prevailing at
the time still favoured a rejection of their claim.

THE SUPREME COURT DECISION
The initial optimism garnered by the appeal soon gave way to a realisation of the massive
odds the McGimpseys and their supporters were confronting. A sound legal case in itself
was never going to be enough to convince a sceptical judiciary to deviate from its
established position in relation to Northern Ireland. The brothers needed to convince the
Court that the terms of the Anglo-Irish Agreement were so repugnant to the Constitution
it would have no option, but to declare the Agreement unconstitutional. The plaintiffs
were thus asking the court to do something completely unprecedented, and adopt a
position which would fly in the face of the established constitutional position in relation
to Northern Ireland.173 . In order to succeed, the plaintiffs had to demonstrate two factors:
1) that Articles 2 and 3 stated a full legal claim to govern Northern Ireland, and 2) that
Article 1 of the Anglo-Irish Agreement referred to more than the de facto position of
Northern Ireland. By proving these two factors the legal team could assert that they were
constitutionally incompatible with one another.174 In the final analysis, this was further
than the Court was prepared to go. Relying on the authority and precedent of previous
case law, the Supreme Court followed Barrington in rejecting the plaintiffs’ claim. The
judgement (delivered on 1 March 1990) was provided by “Finlay C.J., with Griffin,
Hederman and Walsh JJ. agreeing.” McCarthy J., in delivering his assessment, chose
only to concur with his Chief Justice.175 Disappointing as the judgement was for the
McGimpseys, the Supreme Court had remained consistent re: the constitutional position
that had been traditionally interpreted by the courts. The decision was reached according
to established legal rationale, and derived, in no small part, from the potential political
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implications that weighed heavily on the Court’s shoulders. In the end, the Court rejected
the plaintiffs’ central arguments. As Finlay C.J explains:
“With regard to these three main grounds of appeal I have come to the following conclusions.

1) Inconsistency of the Agreement with Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution.

The main source of this submission was Article 1 of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. In the course of his
judgement Barrington, after considering the details and other provisions of the Agreement concluded:“It appears to me that in Article 1 of the Agreement the two governments merely recognise the situation on
the ground in Northern Ireland”………I find myself in agreement with this economic but precise analysis
of the provisions of Article 1. The learned trial judge then concluded that on any interpretation of the
provisions of Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution, these provisions of the Agreement were not in any way
inconsistent with either of those two Articles. With that conclusion I am in complete agreement. There can
be no doubt that the only reasonable interpretation of Article 1, taken in conjunction with….Article 2 (b) of
the Agreement is that it constitutes a recognition of the de facto situation in Northern Ireland but does so
without abandoning the claim to the re-integration of the national territory……In so far as they accept the
concept of change in the de facto status of Northern Ireland as being something which would require the
consent of the majority of the people of Northern Ireland these Articles of the Agreement seem to me to be
compatible with the obligations undertaken by the State in Article 29.1 and 29.2 of the Constitution
whereby Ireland affirms its devotion to the ideal of peace and friendly cooperation and its adherence to the
pacific settlement of international disputes.”176

The judgement may be in line with the interpretation offered in previous cases, but
represented a real blow to the McGimpseys’ aspirations. The plaintiffs had hoped to
prove the true nature of Articles 2 and 3 and, in so doing, render the Anglo-Irish
Agreement invalid. The judgement delivered by Finlay C.J. should (in one sense) be
characterised not just as a rejection of their claim, but a systematic deconstruction of the
plaintiffs’ arguments. Finlay delivered a double rebuttal of the plaintiffs’ assertions.
Firstly the judge rejected the argument that Article 1 referred to acceptance of the consent
principle by the Irish government. In referencing Barrington, Finlay agreed that the
Agreement referred only to the de facto position of Northern Ireland.177
176
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The other central plank of the case was the inspiration drawn from the Crotty, i.e. that
international agreements can be subject to Judicial Review, and successfully challenged
on the basis of unconstitutionality.178 Finlay rejected the parallel with Crotty, stating that
the conditions which influenced the Supreme Court to accept Crotty’s objection to the
S.E.A., did not apply in this case.179 The Crotty decision had been interpreted as
confirming that international agreements (such as the S.E.A.) could restrict the
government in its ability to implement foreign policy.180 The Chief Justice disputed the
comparison.181 He stated:
“The basis of the decision of this Court in Crotty v. An Taoiseach was that the terms of the Single European
Act could oblige the Government in carrying out the foreign policy of the State to make the national
interests of the State…….subservient to the national interests of other member States. I have no doubt that
there is a vast and determining difference between the provisions of this Agreement and the provisions of
the Single European Act, as interpreted by this Court in Crotty v. An Taoiseach.”182

The logic of the Chief Justice is interesting. He is not saying that international
agreements cannot be subject to Judicial Review. The decision in Crotty clearly affirmed
that such treaties can be subject to judicial supervision.183 Nor is Finlay arguing that
aspects of the S.E.A. (as it was originally being implemented) were not incompatible with
the Constitution. Finlay is instead arguing that the terms of the Anglo-Irish Agreement
are sufficiently different as to “render any comparison invalid.”184 Just because the
plaintiffs’ claim had been rejected, therefore, it did not follow that it was impossible for
the Anglo-Irish Agreement to be found unconstitutional. The terms of the Anglo-Irish
Agreement are merely different. It did not diminish the precedents established by the
Supreme Court in Crotty.185 International agreements are subject to Judicial Review and,
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in the right circumstances, can be found to be unconstitutional.186 The State’s
participation in the Anglo-Irish Agreement, however, did not meet this legal threshold.187
The argument employed by the Court says something about its rationale in reaching the
decision. The Supreme Court did not believe that the McGimpseys had provided enough
evidence to prove that the Agreement was unconstitutional, so had no option but reject
their claim. The Court did want to ensure, however, that the decision was framed in such
a way as not to compromise the earlier decision reached in Crotty.188 The Court seemed
to have been determined to express the rejection of the McGimpseys’ claim in a way that
left the Crotty judgement intact.
Another pivotal element of the McGimpseys’ case was their objection to the inherently
undemocratic nature of the Hillsborough Agreement. The plaintiffs had reasoned that
such disregard of the democratic process served to discriminate against the majority
community in Northern Ireland. Ergo, as the people of Northern Ireland had no
opportunity to either approve or reject the Agreement, it is rendered undemocratic. The
unjust and undemocratic nature of the Agreement, the McGimpseys argued, served to
undermine and erode its political credibility. The Chief Justice rejected this proposition.
He argued:
Disregard of the “majority” community in Northern Ireland
“It does not seem to me that there are any grounds for suggesting that there has been an in invidious or any
discrimination between the two communities in Northern Ireland by virtue of the terms of the Anglo-Irish
Agreement. I am satisfied, therefore, that all the grounds of the appeal brought by the plaintiffs must fail. I
come to that conclusion from an analysis of each of the submissions that have been made….I would also
point out......looking at the Anglo-Irish Agreement in its totality and looking at the entire scheme and thrust
of the Constitution of Ireland a high improbability that a clear attempt to resolve the position of Northern
Ireland by a process of consultation, discussion and reasoned argument structured by constant
communication between servants of each of the two states concerned could ever be inconsistent with a
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Constitution devoted to the ideals of ordered , peaceful international relations. I would dismiss this
appeal.”189

The Court had delivered an emphatic response to the plaintiffs’ arguments, with the Chief
Justice refuting each of their legal team’s central arguments. As Casey explains:
“That instrument (the Agreement), they (the plaintiffs) contended, was invalid in that it flouted Articles 2
and 3 of Bunreacht na hÉireann, and that it unconstitutionally fettered the executive in its conduct of
international relations under Articles 28 and 29 of the Constitution. The Supreme Court unanimously
repelled these objections, holding that though Articles 2 and 3 made re-integration of the national territory a
constitutional imperative, the Anglo-Irish Agreement did not run afoul of this. Nor had the executive
unconstitutionally fettered its power to conduct the State’s international relations; the analogy sought to be
drawn between the Anglo-Irish Agreement and the Single European Act was misconceived.”190

Ostensibly the judgement seems to be an emphatic rejection of the plaintiffs’ claim. The
McGimpseys’ case had revolved around two central legal planks: the belief that the
Anglo-Irish Agreement represented an unconstitutional endorsement of consent, and the
provision that an international agreement could be successfully challenged on the basis
that it conflicted with the Constitution.191 In one fell swoop Finlay C.J. had definitively
rebutted those arguments, thus eliminating any prospect that the Agreement would be
dismissed as constitutionally invalid. Both central arguments of the McGimpseys’ legal
team had been rejected. Article 1 of the Anglo-Irish Agreement referred only to the de
facto existence of Northern Ireland, and the parallel with the Crotty decision was
unreliable, due to the intrinsic differences between the terms of the Agreement and the
S.E.A.192

Several aspects of the judgement are rather unconvincing. First, the assertion that Article
1 is not an endorsement of the consent principle is refuted by the evidence of the
Agreement. Even a cursory reading of the Agreement confirms that Article 1 refers
189
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unambiguously to the right of the people of Northern Ireland to determine their own
future.193 It is difficult to conceive of a more definitive confirmation of the consent
principle. Moreover, in its categorical reference to the “people of Northern Ireland” and
its statement that constitutional change could only be achieved through the consent of a
majority in both jurisdictions, it is clear that Article 1 refers to more than the de facto
reality on the ground.194 Although probably not the intention of the Irish negotiators,
Article 1 seems to incontrovertibly assert the right of the people of Northern Ireland to
remain in the U.K. as long as a majority there wishes that to be the case. The principle of
consent underpins the Agreement. It is the immutable principle at its heart. Constitutional
logic decrees that such endorsement is inevitably at odds with a document that claims to
govern Northern Ireland by legal right.

195

Finlay’s position is perfectly consistent,

however, with the constitutional position as interpreted by the Irish courts. Case law had
long since adjudged that the claim to govern Northern Ireland could co-exist with the
reality on the ground.196 So although the decision may appear inconsistent with the
Agreement, Finlay’s interpretation is simply an extension of the position established in
the earlier cases.197 On the face of it, the judgement appeared to be a clear rejection of the
McGimpseys’ claims, signalling an end to their ambition of destroying the Anglo-Irish
Agreement. Maginnis summarises unionist reaction to the decision thus:
“The immediate reaction to the harsh, uncompromising and strictly nationalistic terms in which the
McGimpsey judgement was given was predictable. Unionists found the whole thing highly offensive and
believed that any self-respecting British government should share that sense of grievance.”198

THE LEGAL STATUS OF ARTICLES 2 AND 3
To many observers it seemed that the case had been a failure, albeit one which had
elucidated the sense of injustice felt within the unionist community. The ultimate goal of
destroying the Agreement had not been achieved, while the claim over Northern Ireland
193

See O’Dowd (1994): pp.2-4.
See above.
195
See Clarke (2000): pp.110-119.
196
See above.
197
See below.
198
Maginnis (1990): p.13.
194

R.W. McGimpsey

McGimpsey v. Ireland

41

remained not only intact but strengthened. The McGimpseys felt that the judgement
secured an important victory in one sense, however. The brothers had stated at the outset
that they wished to prove the real nature of Articles 2 and 3, i.e. that they claimed an
authority to govern Northern Ireland by right.199 In terms of the nature of the claim, the
Court was certain over the legal status of the Articles. On the subject of whether the
claim existed in the political or legal order, Finlay is emphatic:
“With Articles 2 and 3 of the Constitution should be read the Preamble, and I am satisfied that the true
interpretation of these constitutional provisions is as follows:

1. The re-integration of the national territory is a constitutional imperative (cf. Hederman J. in Russell v.
Fanning [1988] I.R. 505).

2. Article 2 of the Constitution consists of a declaration of the extent of the national territory as a claim of
legal right.

3. Article 3 of the Constitution prohibits, pending the re-integration of the national territory, the enactment
of laws with any greater area or extent of application or extra-territorial effect than the laws of Saorstát
Éireann and this prohibits the enactment of laws applicable in the counties of Northern Ireland.

4. The restriction imposed by Article 3 pending the re-integration of the national territory in no way
derogates from the claim as a legal right to the entire national territory.” 200

By following Hederman’s interpretation of the claim, rather than the `political`
alternative offered by Barrington J., Finlay C.J. had provided the brothers with
confirmation that the

Constitution expressed a de jure right to govern Northern

Ireland.201 Their ancillary objective of proving the legal nature of the claim had been
achieved.

The importance of this development is manifold. The brothers had set the identification
of the legal claim as a central ambition of the case for good reason. The McGimpseys had
199

See Maginnis (2000): pp.2-7.
McGimpsey v. Ireland [1990] I.R. 110: pp.110-119. See also Clarke (2000): p.110.
201
See Clarke (2000): pp.110-112.
200

R.W. McGimpsey

McGimpsey v. Ireland

42

deduced that the confirmation of the nature of the claim by the Irish courts would
undermine the entire validity of Articles 2 and 3, making their retention unjustifiable. If
Articles 2 and 3 were exposed as being contrary to international law, they reasoned, the
Irish State would be placed under overwhelming pressure to amend the Articles. 202 The
fact that their legal status had been verified by the State’s own courts compounded the
pressure on the Irish government to consider constitutional change. The momentum to
update the Constitution, in respect of its outdated interpretation of the national territory,
was now being applied from within. As well as being exposed to external pressure to
amend the Articles, the State was now compelled to consider an internal assessment of its
own Constitution. The definitive interpretation of the legal claim by the Supreme Court
was not something the State could easily ignore. The need for (at the very least) a debate
on constitutional reform, in relation to this issue, had to be acknowledged by the
government. The wheels had been set in motion for the eventual amendment of Articles 2
and 3.

203

For the plaintiffs, this acknowledgment represents the ultimate legacy of the

case. As Chris McGimpsey has stated, the acknowledgement of the de jure nature of the
claim, highlighted its anomalous place in the Constitution. According to Dr. McGimpsey
the Court’s verdict, “made the retention of the claim insupportable.”
The rationale used by the Court is noteworthy. From a legal perspective, Finlay’s
decision underlines that the case, rather than offering a fresh slant on the constitutional
position, is merely a successor to the landmark cases that preceded it.204 Although the
accentuation of the de jure aspect of Articles 2 and 3 is significant, the Supreme Court
decision should be viewed as an extension of the existing constitutional position. In that
sense, the judgement is in line with the interpretation offered in the earlier cases. Instead
of rejecting the authority that had already been established, Finlay invoked existing
precedent to deliver what he considered the definitive interpretation of the constitutional
position. It is through a consistent application of legal logic that the courts have been able
to reconcile the existence of Northern Ireland with Articles 2 and 3. The Supreme Court,
in rejecting the plaintiffs’ claims, had relied on this authority. Invoking previous Supreme
202
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Court judgements, Finlay re-iterated that, in relation to Articles 2 and 3, the Constitution
needed to be interpreted harmoniously.205 Without acknowledging the other relevant
Articles of the Constitution, the Chief Justice argued, it was impossible to place Articles
2 and 3 in their proper constitutional context.206 It is a familiar argument, one that has
been at the epicentre of the constitutional position relating to Northern Ireland. 207 In
particular, Finlay stated that the Articles should be read with the Preamble and Article
29.208 Opponents of Articles 2 and 3 could easily attack the Constitution by reference to
international law. As a consequence, it became difficult for the Irish State to refute the
argument that the Articles were irredentist. After all, if they express a de jure right to
govern Northern Ireland, then surely that claim placed the Constitution at odds with the
claim of the U.K. government to exercise jurisdiction over the same territory? 209 It was a
difficult quandary for the Irish legal system, compelling the courts to defend a position
that was dubious in the eyes of international law. The only way the courts have been able
to square this circle is by placing Articles 2 and 3 in the context of the overall
Constitution. This interpretation has been followed consistently by the courts.210 Indeed
Finlay’s argument bears remarkable similarity to the position followed in earlier Supreme
Court decisions.211 Without a harmonious interpretation of the Constitution, a robust
defence of Articles 2 and 3 was difficult. By incorporating other Articles, particularly the
provisions on international relations enshrined in Article 29, the courts have been able to
protect Articles 2 and 3 from political challenge. By applying similar logic, Finlay C.J. is
following the established authority of earlier case law.
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SIGNIFICANCE OF THE CASE
What can be considered the ultimate legacy of the McGimpsey case? What did the
brothers achieve? In the final analysis, how did the decision help clarify the constitutional
position? The answer depends on the perspective from which we interpret the evidence.
In a legal sense, there is little doubt about the true significance of the decision. The
judgement offered in McGimpsey provided clear legal guidance on the scope and
relevance of Articles 2 and 3. Previous case law had been vague and ambiguous.212 Such
ambiguity, in turn, influenced how the Articles were defined in terms of international
opinion. Although the other cases can be considered fairly consistent in their
understanding of Articles 2 and 3, they failed to provide a definitive analysis of the claim.
Some cases had characterised the claim as primarily political in nature 213, whilst the other
cases had tended to favour the view that the claim should be considered as having
political and legal elements.214 However the summary of Finlay C.J. had provided a
definitive and authoritative interpretation of the legal nature of the old Articles 2 and 3.
The Articles formed a substantive, legal claim to govern the whole of the national
territory by right.215 In addition, the Articles were fully compatible with the recognition
of Northern Ireland, but this recognition referred solely to the de facto situation on the
ground, without diminishing the legal nature of the claim.216 The legal status of Articles 2
and 3 was re-iterated by McCarthy J. In his endorsement of the constitutional position
that had been defined by the Chief Justice, he argued:
“I have read the judgement delivered by the Chief Justice and I wholly agree with the conclusion that the
plaintiffs have failed in their challenge to the Anglo-Irish Agreement. I would wish to state my firm
opinion, that, whatever the political background to the wording of Article 2 of the Constitution, it is an
unequivocal claim as of legal right that the national territory consists of the whole island of Ireland, its
islands and territorial seas. (See O’Keefe P. in Boland v. An Taoiseach [1974] I.R. 338 at 363).”217
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The reaction of legal academics to the case seemed to confirm its fundamental
importance. David Gwynn Morgan, writing in The Irish Times, assessed the significance
of McGimpsey thus:
“….The McGimpsey case upheld the constitutionality of the Anglo-Irish Agreement. What is more
significant for the future of the island, however, was that a unanimous court held that Articles 2 and
3…enjoy legal and not merely political status. …..The question of whether these Articles are legally
binding arises because the Constitution is not only a legal instrument, it is also a political document; one of
the symbols, like the national flag or anthem, through which a polity proclaims itself to outsiders: “This is
who we are”. It is the focus of loyalty, a statement of national beliefs, ideals and aspirations…..The
McGimpsey decision may be regarded as similar to the Crotty case. There, too, the issue involved the
matter of international relations which it is plausibly thought had been left to the discretion of the elected
government. Crotty was an important case, but Northern Ireland is an issue rather closer to the Irish psyche
than the S.E.A. Accordingly, in the medium term, McGimpsey is likely to hold even more significance than
did Crotty.”218

From a legal perspective, the argument had been settled. Articles 2 and 3 constituted a
legal claim by the Irish Constitution to exercise jurisdiction over Northern Ireland. As
such, McGimpsey can be considered a natural successor to the earlier cases, where the
principle had already been established that the Articles reconciled the de jure claim with
the de facto reality.219

With the legal status of the Articles having been confirmed, the question remains as to
the wider significance of the decision. For unionists, the decision seemed to vindicate
their belief that the Constitution required amendment. Although they had failed to
achieve the dismantling of the Anglo-Irish Agreement, the McGimpsey team believed
that the identification of a legal claim had highlighted the unsustainable nature of the
Hillsborough Agreement.220
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As Maginnis has argued:
“The Anglo-Irish Agreement, Unionists were told in 1985, would bring peace, stability and reconciliation;
an end to megaphone diplomacy; a recognition of the status of Northern Ireland; better security and
extradition for terrorist offences. It has constructively and systematically (and I choose my words carefully)
failed to deliver on a single one of those promises…..The Agreement may still be in place but it means
nothing and can never be an instrument for progress.” 221

The belief persisted within the unionist community that although the Supreme Court had
rejected the McGimpseys’ claims, the decision was a validation of their objections to the
Agreement. The confirmation of the legal nature of the claim, therefore, had provided the
McGimpseys with a victory of sorts. The decision had highlighted the political
incongruity of Articles 2 and 3, paving the way for their eventual amendment. This
interpretation is endorsed in an Irish News editorial that followed the decision. The paper
argued:
“The confirmation of the legal status of Articles 2 and 3 could be highly significant in lending support to
Unionist claims on the essential duplicity of the overall Agreement, regardless of its precise legal
status…Similarly, future political events may yet show that, while the McGimpsey brothers have lost the
short term legal battle, they may have helped win the Unionist war.”222

The article reflected the gut feeling within the unionist community that although the
Supreme Court had effectively rejected their claims, the brothers had achieved a moral
victory by revealing the legal status of Articles 2 and 3. Certainly that was the reaction of
the plaintiffs. The revelation of the existence of a de jure claim to govern Northern
Ireland had made the amendment of Articles 2 and 3 inevitable, by exposing their
inherent weakness. In the opinion of Chris McGimpsey, the Supreme Court decision had
shattered the political foundation that had protected the Articles from challenge.
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He argues:
“Once the claim was exposed as being de jure, the continued existence of Articles 2 and 3 became
indefensible. By retaining the Articles, the Irish State was making a claim over not just a territory, but a
people. Such practice could no longer be justified. While it may have been possible to justify Articles 2 and
legally, from a political perspective, they were no longer sustainable. After the Supreme Court decision
Articles 2 and 3 were dead on their feet.”

For nationalists, the decision was no less significant. By confirming the de jure claim
over Northern Ireland, the Supreme Court had set in motion a chain of events which
would culminate in the amendment of Articles 2 and 3. Following the case, the pertinent
question became when, not if, the Articles would be amended. Although the prospect of
amending the Articles had sporadically arisen in Southern political discourse, this had
never let to a concerted debate.223 The chief importance of the McGimpsey case, from a
Southern perspective, was that it led to an acknowledgment that the Articles required
amendment, and that this would form an intrinsic part of any negotiated settlement. It is
my belief that the McGimpsey case precipitated this understanding within the Irish
political establishment. For ideological and symbolic reasons, the Irish State had retained
Articles 2 and 3 in the same format since 1937; as a political re-iteration of the State’s
determination to re-unify the national territory. The Supreme Court decision had exposed
that conceit as being no longer politically sustainable. The revelation of a fully legal
claim to exercise jurisdiction over Northern Ireland, contrary to established principles of
international law, exerted pressure on the State to consider constitutional change.224
Obviously the State wished to retain the status of Articles 2 and 3 as a bargaining chip in
future negotiations. The Irish government recognised the importance of the issue in the
unionist mindset, that the Articles conveyed a symbolic importance far beyond their legal
223
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status. Such symbolism meant that the existence of Articles 2 and 3 would have an
axiomatic part in any future settlement. The State certainly recognised the value of
Articles 2 and 3 at the negotiating table, explaining why the eventual amendment was not
agreed until eight years after the McGimpsey decision. Although the political
establishment had recognised that Articles 2 and 3 needed to be amended, they would
have realised that such constitutional change could only occur as the result of a political
settlement. Even the inevitable posturing over the timing of amendment was
disingenuous, however. Articles 2 and 3 had been validated as legally sound, but exposed
as politically insupportable. That is the ultimate legacy of the case. It made the removal
of the political claim inevitable.

There is a tendency among some commentators to think that the McGimpsey case reinvented the wheel in relation to the claim over Northern Ireland, that the case heralded a
sea change in our understanding of Articles 2 and 3. I make no such claims or assertions.
Of course the case provided a definitive definition of the Articles when other cases had
offered only vagueness and obfuscation.225 McGimpsey, at the very least, had provided a
definitive and authoritative answer. Articles 2 and 3 were intended to convey a de jure
claim to exercise jurisdiction over the whole of the national territory, whilst at the same
time acknowledging the de facto limitations applied to that right, and the restrictions
relating to extra-territoriality.226 There is no doubt that McGimpsey extended the
constitutional position beyond anything heretofore interpreted by the Irish courts. The
legal importance of the case should not be diminished. The Supreme Court decision
represents the only occasion where the existence of a fully legal claim was acknowledged
and confirmed. In that sense, the case did considerably more than any of its predecessors
to elucidate the nature of Articles 2 and 3.

The decision, however, should never be viewed in isolation. The McGimpsey case forms
part of a distinguished jurisprudential lineage, which provided the necessary
reconciliation between the 1937 Constitution and the existence of Northern Ireland.
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Without such reconciliation, the claim over Northern Ireland would not have endured
unfettered for over 60 years. The Irish State and courts have both applied the same
pragmatic interpretation of Articles 2 and 3. The old Articles were conceived primarily as
a political device, intended to accentuate the existence of a defined national territory;
reassuring Northern nationalists that the State remained wedded to the re-integration of
that territory. The insertion of this profoundly political device created a problem for the
judiciary, in reconciling the idealistic Republican vision with the political reality. In
reality, however, the State created in 1937 had negligible difficulty in so doing. A strain
of pragmatism had always characterised the institutions of the State in its interaction with
its nearest neighbour.227 An exclusively ideological interpretation of Articles 2 and 3
would never have endured, and the legal claim would have been consigned to history
long before the conception of the Good Friday Agreement. The imaginative construction
of Articles 2 and 3 made such pragmatism unnecessary, however. The old Articles were
fundamentally sound from a legal perspective, successfully accommodating the desire to
re-unify the national territory with the political reality pertaining on the ground. That is
the rarely acknowledged strength of the old Articles.

They enabled the political

determination to re-unify Ireland to co-exist with the legal frameworks that had been
necessitated by partition. By achieving these twin objectives, the old Articles allowed the
courts to consistently reconcile the existence of Articles 2 and 3 with the State’s
inevitable interaction with Northern Ireland.

Which brings us back to the argument (expressed by Clarke), that the legal significance
of the McGimpsey case has perhaps been overstated.228 I contend that the McGimpsey
case went substantially further than any of its predecessors. The identification of the de
jure claim remains the key legal ramification of the case. Such narrow legal
considerations, however, do not paint the full picture. Although the legal status of the
Articles was important, their political status bore greater significance. The Articles were
conceived as a political symbol which would advance the prospect of unity, but would
also serve a transient purpose, in their acknowledgement of the Treaty arrangements the
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Republican drafters sought to destroy. In that sense, the language of the Articles reflected
the pragmatic principles which complement Republican ideology at the heart of the
Constitution. On the question of pragmatism or principle, the State’s position definitely
erred towards pragmatism. Such a spirit of conciliation demonstrates the flexibility and
compromise which characterised the State post-1937. A pragmatism that is rarely
acknowledged, but is embedded in the history of the Republican tradition. This pragmatic
spirit is epitomised by the constitutional interpretation that has been consistently applied
to Articles 2 and 3, and was essential for maintaining a workable relationship with their
neighbouring jurisdiction.229

The identification of Articles 2 and 3 as a legal claim was momentous, but the Articles
epitomized so much more. They embodied a significance that extended far beyond mere
legal definition. The interpretation of the claim applied by the courts was part of a
deliberate process designed to maintain a vision of the Irish nation. Articles 2 and 3,
therefore, need to be understood in a holistic, rather than a narrow, legal sense. The claim
to exercise jurisdiction over the whole island was sagaciously political, and was
formulated to convey a message that unity remained a realistic objective. More than
anything, Articles 2 and 3 must be understood in the context of the political conditions
that had been created by partition. One of the Articles’ fundamental political functions
was to impart a message of solidarity to Northern nationalists, who had benefited least
from the political machinations of 1921.230 Articles 2 and 3 sent out a powerful message
that Northern nationalists had not been forgotten about, that their aspirations would still
be recognised within the new constitutional arrangements. Articles 2 and 3 asserted
categorically that unity remained a central objective of the State. In attempting to
communicate this message of national unanimity, however, the State managed to alienate
the unionist community whose complicity was crucial if political unity was ever to be
realised. The ultimate irony of the claim over Northern Ireland was that its very existence
became detrimental to the realisation of the ambition it was intended to achieve. In that
sense, the claim had become counter-productive, its removal necessary to achieve a
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political settlement. The precise legal status of the Articles was a moot point. Their
retention had become anathema to unionists, and their amendment was an essential
component of the Good Friday Agreement. That Agreement signalled that the Irish
government had conceded that unity would be achieved by conciliation, rather than
coercion.

One of the reasons Chris McGimpsey decided to pursue legal action, was his belief that
mass protests alone were never going to be sufficiently effective to encourage
constitutional change. Although he supported the protest marches as a valuable means for
expressing democratic dissatisfaction with the status quo, Dr. McGimpsey recognised
that street politics alone would not be enough to produce change. A coherent, organised
approach was needed. For the Irish government to even contemplate amending the
Constitution unionism needed to offer more than the usual philippic rhetoric. That is why
the constitutional challenge assumed such importance. The McGimpsey case provided a
focal point for unionists implacably opposed to the perceived injustice of the Anglo-Irish
Agreement. Without the case, it is unlikely that constitutional change would ever have
occurred as expediently or conclusively. The confirmation of the existence of a de jure
claim to govern Northern Ireland was an essential component in the campaign to
encourage constitutional amendment. For Chris McGimpsey, the case also involved the
realisation of a more personal ambition. He argues that McGimpsey v. Ireland
permanently altered the way unionists were perceived in the South:
“The result (the decision of the Supreme Court) was important, and was crucial in the achievement of a
settlement in Ireland. But just as important was the massive effect the case had on Southern public opinion.
Here was a unionist who identified himself as an Irishman, and was able to use the institutions of the State
to affect change like any other citizen. In terms of public opinion, the case altered the perception of
unionists permanently. Previously there had been a massive negative stereotype of Ulster Unionists
(particularly Presbyterians) in Dublin. The case shattered all those old assumptions.”

The McGimpsey case proved that unionists could express their grievances in a coherent
and intelligent manner, enabling them to be taken seriously by the Irish political
establishment. The reasoning employed in the case certainly assisted their cause. The
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advancement of a fundamentally nationalist argument was crucial in the Courts’ decision
to recognise their standing as fully fledged Irish citizens. The unprecedented involvement
of unionists in the centre of constitutional discourse proved to be of enduring importance.
The manner in which the courts recognised the sincerity of the McGimpseys’ protests
presaged the sustained interaction between the two traditions in Ireland, which
culminated in the Good Friday Agreement. A settlement would never have been achieved
by isolationism and exclusivity. It was only made possible by dialogue, and
accommodation between the traditions. The McGimpsey case had illustrated that Articles
2 and 3 needed to be amended in order for the founding fathers’ utopian vision of Irish
unity to become achievable. That is the supreme legacy of the case. By exposing the
redundant nature of Articles 2 and 3, it paved the way for more meaningful interaction
between the two main traditions which inhabit this island. Perhaps the Irish News
assessment of the McGimpseys’ legacy is correct. The brothers may have lost the battle,
but they ultimately won the war.
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PRAGMATISM OR PRINCIPLE?-THE MCGIMPSEY CASE

CONCLUSION:

“….Why should the people of a given geographical region re-think their national identity? Why should
they re-write their history-that is, the account of their past to which they have become accustomed-and
perhaps, in doing so, re-evaluate the honorific status of those who engaged in the “heroic and unremitting
struggle” for the international recognition of Ireland as a distinct nation? Is it not an extreme and
implausible form of revisionism not only to re-evaluate the past but also to attempt to change our identity
by modifying our current beliefs about who we are? The answer to the first question, in summary form, is
easy: because justice demands it. Justice demands, in a region that includes individuals with diverse
cultural identities, that their cultural diversity should be acknowledged and that no group should be allowed
to impose its culture, by exclusion or enforced inclusion, on others.” 1

So Clarke encapsulates the dilemma facing Irish nationalism as it headed into a new
millennium.2 How could the nationalist tradition extricate itself from the intractable
notions of exclusivity that characterised its philosophy during the 20th century?3 The need
to re-define Irish nationalism became more acute when considered in the light of the great
swathes of immigration that have descended upon this island in the last twenty years.
This immense influx, with all the consequent semantic, cultural and ethnic diversity that
it brought, posed a challenge to Irish nationalism and its perception of the nation.4 The
rapidly evolving social conditions of the last two decades provided just as compelling a
reason to re-define our conception of Irishness as the exigent need to make peace
between the two predominant traditions that inhabit this island. As important as it was to
create a workable political framework which both nationalism and unionism could
1
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subscribe to, the emergent multiculturalism that was beginning to characterise Irish
society at the turn of the millennium meant that the very notion of Irish nationality
needed to be re-defined in a fundamental way.5 That is why the Good Friday Agreement
assumed such critical importance for the Irish nation. Not only did the Agreement herald
a conciliatory structure of mutual cooperation which enabled both jurisdictions in Ireland
to co-exist with one another, it also opened up the possibility for a long overdue
modification of our collective idea of nationality.6 The decline of the vituperative
dialogue and antagonism that had characterised the relationship between the main
traditions since (at the very least) the 19th century, had engendered an environment where
a wholesale revision of Irish nationality and citizenship had become possible.7 By
updating and modernising our essential idea of the nation, the Agreement challenged the
orthodox principles of nationalism, precipitating the facilitation of a new dispensation,
where the nation could be defined in a more inclusive manner.8 The exclusively
nationalist ideology of De Valera and the other founding fathers had been replaced by a
new conception that was characterised by inclusiveness and commonality. 9

That is not to say that the revision of nationality that emanated from the Agreement
imposed a standardised version of Irishness upon everyone on the island. In fact the
negotiators had been keen to challenge the exclusive and constraining philosophies which
had only served to prolong the conflict.10 The updated concept of nationality sought to
respect individual traditions and affiliations, but within a common framework that would
apply to everyone who chose to embrace it. In particular, the Agreement aspired to
update the inter-related ideas of nationality and citizenship.11 The aspiration was that
citizenship (and the more abstract idea of the Irish nation) would be extended the

5
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unionists of Northern Ireland, and other groups entitled by statute.12 The re-integration of
unionism within the Irish nation was an essential component of conflict resolution;
relations between the two traditions being long overdue for revision. In addition, the
challenges posed by immigration demanded a wholesale clarification of citizenship.13
The amended Articles 2 and 3 have updated the meaning of Irishness by defining
nationality according to those who wish to belong to the nation.14 Hence the inhabitants
of Northern Ireland are free to delineate themselves as Irish, British or both.15
Nationalism had seemed to have moved beyond its previously restrictive and exclusive
parameters, giving rise instead to a more inclusive, broader definition. Nationalism (as
an idea) has always been quite elusive and adaptable, adjusting to the evolving needs and
trends of society. As such, the idea of nationality has always been open to interpretation.
Indeed the construction of nationality can be extremely multi-faceted and complex.16 The
Irish conflict should be viewed as a microcosm of the myriad of problems caused by
nationhood.17

The difficulties inherent in nationality are illustrated by the different understandings of
the concept which have been exhibited by the two main traditions in Ireland. Not only do
the traditions differ over whether or not to define themselves as “Irish”, they often apply
diametrically opposed interpretations about what the nation actually is. Irish nationalists
have tended to perceive the nation in absolutist terms; as an exclusive philosophy where
nationality is applied to the inhabitants of a defined geographical territory.18 According
to this definition nationality is interpreted restrictively, the nation being the preserve of an
exclusive number of people who subscribe to a homogenous culture and tradition.19 Thus,
as Clarke notes, Irish nationality was traditionally linked with related expressions of
culture and identity, notably language, “native” sports, music, and other cultural
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reference points.20 Although not exhaustive, these expressions of identity were viewed as
unlocking the barriers for admission to the nation.21 From a unionist perspective, the
unspoken implication derived from such a narrow application of Irishness was that those
living in Ireland who didn’t share the same cultural reference points were consequently
excluded from the nation.22 While unionists, by definition, tend to define themselves as
British, it is my observation that they have also rejected such a limited idea of Irishness.
By opposing their conscription into the Irish nation, unionists have hinted that a more
credible interpretation of the Irish nation can be effected from defining the nation in
broader terms.23 Here we can distil one of the main conundrums confronting Irish
nationalism at the beginning of the 21st century. In order to realise the vision of reunification nationalists needed to move away from the ideologically restrictive definitions
of nationality they had traditionally espoused.24

Nationalism is fundamentally a political idea, an idea which derives from a rather
idealistic and romantic understanding of human distinction and society.25 Perhaps this is
the reason for the ubiquitous distinction between nation and state which is described in
the Constitution.26 The distinction was perhaps borne of necessity, as a rhetorical means
of underlining the political relevance of the nation and the unique characteristics it
possessed.27 As such, the Constitution is keen to differentiate the nation from the
transient legal framework of the State. The consequence of the accentuation of the nation
and its cultural components has been a divergence between the idea of nationhood and
citizenship.28 The definition of citizenship offered in the Constitution (and by Irish
nationalism generally) is linked more closely to the idea of statehood. The consequence
of that distinction has been that Irish nationality has moved away from the idea of

20
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citizenship, with the latter concept being more closely connected to the State.29 One of
the consequences of the Good Friday Agreement is that there has been a re-convergence
of nationality and citizenship, with nationalism being defined in terms of people and
citizens.30 According to the revised definition of Irish nationality all citizens are deemed
to belong to the nation regardless of their ethnic or political background.31 The redefinition of nationality codified in the Agreement afforded individuals from a diversity
of ethnic backgrounds an opportunity to become part of the nation.32 The revision of
nationality, moreover, would necessarily find room to accommodate people from the
unionist tradition who also regarded themselves as Irishmen. Unionists, therefore, were
just as entitled to participate in the nation as their nationalist counterparts. Both traditions
were free to characterise themselves as Irish, with only subtle but significant differences
in interpretation. Herein lay one of the principal benefits of the Agreement from a
unionist perspective. All potential barriers for assimilation into the nation had been
removed, enabling all Irishmen to be included.33 Equally importantly, the Good Friday
Agreement provided for unionists to define themselves as British and opt out of the Irish
nation, thus counteracting the traditionally (Irish) nationalist idea that unionists could be
conscripted into the nation by virtue of their residence on the island. In describing the reevaluation of Irish nationality prescribed by the Agreement, and the importance of the
extension of the nation, Clarke writes:
“…The extension of membership of the Irish nation cannot deprive those who so choose of their British
nationality. By conceding the right of the people of Northern Ireland to hold both British and Irish
citizenship, and by recognising that the relevant people have a choice, the Agreement implies that
membership of one nation may overlap with that of another.” 34
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Humphreys agrees that the correlation between nationality and citizenship is important,
as is the stipulation that citizens of Northern Ireland are free to choose which nationality
to define themselves as. He writes:
“…The governments…..agreed that, whichever of them would exercise sovereignty over Northern
Ireland……the birthright of all the people of Northern Ireland to identify themselves and be accepted as,
British or Irish or both, and to hold British or Irish citizenship, was accepted and `would not be affected by
any future change in the status of Northern Ireland`. This provision might be regarded as envisaging that
the Good Friday Agreement was intended to continue, at least to some extent, following Irish unity.” 35

There was no need for unionists to be rapacious. In the final analysis, the Good Friday
Agreement enabled them to achieve most of their primary objectives. The consent
principle had been universally recognised, Articles 2 and 3 had been amended
satisfactorily, and the two governments had agreed a new framework of nationality and
citizenship that could be endorsed by both traditions. A template had been established for
a re-definition of Irishness that would permit a new sense of enfranchisement, whereby a
more diverse cross-section of people would be admitted into the Irish nation.36 The redefinition had been long overdue and represents the ultimate legacy of the Good Friday
Agreement: the nation had been extended beyond the traditionally exclusive parameters
which had been prescribed by the 1937 Constitution.37 Thus the 19th Amendment had a
profound effect on both jurisdictions. The concepts of nationality and citizenship had
converged and the nation had now been defined inclusively. The nation was now defined
in popular rather than geographical terms, while anyone born on the island was
considered to possess a birthright to be included in the Irish nation, including those
otherwise entitled to citizenship.38 The changes affected by the amendment promised a
new era of inclusiveness, an era which would be based on mutual tolerance and respect.39
Ideas of equality, diversity and multiculturalism underpinned the changes.40 The Good
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Friday Agreement (and consequent 19th Amendment) represented real innovation,
heralding a radical re-definition of the Irish nation.
That is not to say the revised definition didn’t foment a new set of problems. In
particular, the amended Article 2 engendered an unintended consequence. The provision
that every person born on the island had an entitlement to be part of the nation caused an
unforeseen dilemma for the Irish State. The Amendment had intended to secure a noble
objective, i.e. emphasising the inclusive nature of the nation, whereby everyone born on
the island would be entitled to membership.41 The nation, therefore, would be comprised
of everyone born on the island who desired inclusion, particularly nationalists and
unionists from Northern Ireland. This stipulation enabled the Irish State to accentuate
their new definition of nationality whilst retaining an aspiration for unity. Although the
claim over Northern Ireland had been discarded, the State was keen to emphasise that reunification remained one of its central objectives. The extension of nationality to
everyone born on the island was an important symbolic device to assure Northern
nationalists that they remained an integral part of the nation. What the lawyers and civil
servants who composed the Amendment failed to envisage was the effect the redefinition would have on immigration policy.42 During the Celtic Tiger years Ireland had
become an attractive destination, and a fear emerged within government that Article 2
could be abused as a basis for assuming citizenship, in circumvention of normal rules.43
Officials became anxious that a loophole had been created, whereby a foreign national
could become pregnant and the resultant offspring would have an automatic,
constitutionally protected right to citizenship.44 An apparent influx of foreign nationals
into the State seemed to substantiate officials’ concerns.

In reality, the political reaction owed more to the typical hysteria over immigration being
disseminated by sections of the media. Such anxiety did, however, lead to demands for
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government intervention to clarify the rules in relation to citizenship.45 In response the
government introduced proposals to amend Article 9 and its eligibility provisions. As
Doyle explains “In Lobe v. Minister for Justice [2003] I.R. 1, the Supreme Court
commented that the ius soli definition of citizenship had been given constitutional
protection by Article 2. The government’s response was to propose amendments to
Article 9 [2004] which were subsequently endorsed by referendum”.46 The amendment of
Article 9 sought to limit the scope of the revised Article 2 by placing restrictions on
membership of the nation.47 “The revised Article 9 (2) reads:”
“Notwithstanding any other provision of this Constitution, a person born in the island of Ireland….who
does not have at the time of the birth of that person at least one parent who is an Irish citizen or entitled to
be an Irish citizen is not entitled to Irish citizenship or nationality , unless provided for by law.” 48

The amendment superseded the revised Article 2 by asserting the primacy of the
Oireachtas in the determination of citizenship, returning precedence to statute law.49 In
effect the Amendment restricts citizenship to those who have a parent who is a citizen or
who is otherwise entitled by law.50 The Amendment provided much needed clarification
on the limitations of Irish citizenship and nationality in the post Good Friday Agreement
era. As Doyle has observed, however, these limitations are not necessarily permanent.51
By returning responsibility to the Oireachtas the Amendment provided for extension of
the definition.52 An extension is duly provided by the Irish Nationality and Citizenship
Act 200453 which provided further clarification. The restrictions and qualifications
imposed during the succeeding years need to be kept in mind in any authoritative
assessment of the re-definition of nationality provided by the Good Friday Agreement.
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Subsequent modification notwithstanding, the Agreement still constituted a radical reevaluation of the idea of Irish nationality.54 The accord heralded a new era of inclusive
politics and citizenship, predicated on notions of equality.55 The realisation of reunification had effectively been put on the back burner until such times as majorities in
both jurisdictions felt comfortable with the idea. The Agreement envisioned that unity
would evolve organically through reconciliation between the two main traditions, and
would consequently stand a much better chance of enduring than if pushed through by
coercive dogma. The new emphasis reflected a developing belief that unity should not be
impelled, that a sustained push for re-unification would be profoundly counterproductive. John Hume has frequently spoken of a “post-nationalist world”, where the old
ideologies of the past assume less importance.56 Real unity, therefore, is achieved not by
a forced congruence of unionists and nationalists, but by both communities working
together civically and politically. Through such cooperation, it is argued; the desirability
of permanent political unity will become evident and inspire a renewed debate on the
issue.57
The Agreement demonstrates a paradox inherent in 21st century Irish nationalism;
namely that an excessive and sustained focus on re-unification makes its prospect less
likely. Hence the success of the Good Friday Agreement: both unionists and nationalists
could be convinced that the institutions provide a mechanism for the constitutional issue
to be permanently resolved in the fullness of time. Neither community needed to seek
victory over the other, constitutional change would evolve incrementally. From a political
perspective, the Good Friday Agreement achieved the laudable objective of satisfying the
ambitions of both main traditions in the short to medium term. Unionists had safeguarded
the position of Northern Ireland within the United Kingdom through acceptance of the
consent principle. Nationalists, on the other hand, had secured an institutional framework
which they hoped would eventually lead to political re-unification. The Agreement had
achieved the apparently impossible objective of keeping both communities satisfied in
54
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the interim term. Two irreconcilable positions had been accommodated, creating
conditions where more meaningful dialogue between nationalists and unionists would
emerge.

So how has Ireland reached this critical interlude in its history? The political conditions
that spawned the Good Friday Agreement derive in no small part from the McGimpsey
case. By elucidating the political indefensibility of the old Articles 2 and 3, the
McGimpsey brothers precipitated their amendment. Without their intervention it is
difficult to conceive that amendment would have occurred as quickly or
comprehensively. By exposing that the 1937 Constitution contained a de jure claim to
govern Northern Ireland, the McGimpsey case paved the way for its amendment as part of
a political settlement. Would the Good Friday Agreement (with the emphasis on
amending Articles 2 and 3) have been delivered otherwise? In all probability it would
have been, the prevailing will of the Irish people at the end of the 20th century tended
towards reconciliation and ending the conflict.58 There is no doubt, however, that the
case played a small but significant part, helping to inspire the political conditions that
culminated in the Good Friday Agreement. Once the de jure nature of Articles 2 and 3
had been established their amendment became inevitable. By revealing the essence of the
claim the Articles (in their former guise) had been exposed as politically insupportable. In
the aftermath of the case the pertinent question became when, not if, the Irish government
would concede that the Articles were redundant? Surviving only as an iconic symbol of
outdated nationalist philosophy, their amendment had become certain.59 In that sense, the
McGimpsey decision had rendered subsequent political negotiations over Articles 2 and 3
meaningless. The invalidity of the Articles had been extrapolated by the case, and made
their retention anomalous. The enduring legacy of McGimpsey is the intrinsic part the
case played in the eventual revision and amendment of Articles 2 and 3.

In my view, a wider significance can also be attributed to the case. By elucidating
unionist unease at the constitutional interpretation of the national territory, the
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McGimpsey case enabled Irish nationalism to confront some home truths. By 1998 it was
evident that while the irredentist philosophy that underpinned the Constitution served an
important symbolic function, the claim had become detrimental to the realisation of the
aspiration that it espoused. Unionists could not be coerced or trampled into submission.
Nor could they be convinced of the perceived error of their convictions. Democracy and
equality decreed that the aspirations of all traditions be respected.60 The constitutional
protection and defence of one tradition at the expense of another was not a viable formula
for political stability and progress.61 Meaningful change could only be achieved through a
re-definition of the nationalist philosophy expressed in the 1937 Constitution.62 Only by
re-evaluating and modernising these values could Irish nationalism enter into dialogue
with their unionist counterparts, based on mutual tolerance and respect.63 The
negotiations that produced the Good Friday Agreement merely represent the end of a
torturous and prolonged journey.

That ultimate destination would never have been

possible had Irish nationalism not been inclined to reassess its image of itself, and its
relationship with unionism. In order to achieve reconciliation it became necessary for
nationalism to discard some of its central and sacred tenets.64 Amending Articles 2 and 3
were just a narrow but significant part of a compendious, radical re-assessment.

A more significant revelation had occurred. Nationalism had realised that strict
adherence to an outdated and redundant ideology was incapable of creating the political
conditions necessary to undertake a radical revision of our constitutional framework. The
Good Friday Agreement could only be facilitated by a sincere and thorough re-evaluation
of the nationalist position. The definition of the national territory needed to be updated
from the irredentist and territorial manifestation of 1937 to a more inclusive definition,
encompassing all the Irish people.65 Irish nationalism has traditionally been characterised
by a willingness to contemplate conciliation and ideological revision if it was deemed to
benefit society. From Parnell, to Collins, to Adams, the majority tradition on this island
60
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has historically been prepared to compromise on its convictions in order to improve
institutional arrangements. The accommodation at the heart of the Good Friday
Agreement is merely the descendant of that pragmatic disposition. While not quite a
rapprochement between the two main traditions, the principles of the Agreement
represent an attempt to understand each other. Although retaining their ideological
differences, unionists and nationalists realised that negotiations could only be conducted
through a willingness to listen to the perspective of the other side. Such profitable
interaction was derived from recognition that the political aspirations of both
communities could only be reconciled through engagement. An emerging unionist
moderation undoubtedly played its part, but the underlying success of the Agreement is
attributable to the preparedness of nationalism to challenge its fundamental ideals and
values. Nationalist Ireland had accepted that unity could only be achieved through
persuasion, by convincing unionists of its virtues. Accordingly the exclusivist
interpretation of the nation had to be revised and replaced with a more accommodating
vision.66 Without this nationalist revision, meaningful dialogue between the two
traditions would never have been possible.67 The accomplishment of the Good Friday
Agreement derives from a wide variety of sources and influences. The basic principles at
the heart of the Agreement, however, were facilitated by the re-assessment of nationalist
paragons and ideals.68 The starting point for the revision is the acknowledgement that
Articles 2 and 3 required amendment. The McGimpsey case provided an initial
inspiration, and underlined the need for constitutional change.

In erring towards the pragmatic interpretation, we must remember that nationalist Ireland
had a strict ideological foundation. An over-emphasis on the pragmatic qualities of
nationalism can never fully account for the traditional definition of the nation.
Nationalism tended to define itself according to what Garvin has called “romantic,
idealistic Republicanism.”69 The ability to make peace, however, owes much to
Republicanism’s ability to rein in and curb its more idealistic tendencies. A spirit of
66
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conciliation and compromise was endemic in Republicanism and co-existed seamlessly
with the purer quixotic ideology.

Without these pragmatic influences the Good Friday

Agreement would never have been achieved. The pragmatic qualities exhibited by
Republicanism are far from novel, and can be traced back to the very genesis of Irish
Republican thought. For evidence of the pragmatic disposition we need only refer to one
of the earliest republican icons, a man who flirted with ideas of commonwealth and dual
monarchy in tandem with republicanism.70 As a means of illustrating the pragmatic strain
inherent in Republicanism it seems fitting to conclude with a quote from the founder of
Sinn Féin. I started this thesis with a quote from Arthur Griffith and consider it
appropriate to end with a quote from this most cultured of Republican ideologues. As far
back as 1907 Griffith was extolling the virtues of a broad and conciliatory
Republicanism. Writing in the Sinn Féin newspaper, he argued:
“The Sinn Féin platform is and is intended to be broad enough to hold all Irishmen who believe in Irish
independence, whether they be republicans or whether they be not. Republicanism as republicanism has no
necessary connection with Irish nationalism; but numbers of Irishmen during the last 116 years have
regarded it as the best form for an independent Irish government. What the best form of an Irish national
government should be is an interesting but not a material question. It is the thing itself, regardless of its
form, Ireland wants.”71

Similarly, the pragmatic application of the Constitution by the Irish State demonstrates
that a fundamental strain of pragmatism has run concurrently alongside more inflexible
Republican ideology. Republicans maintained allegiance to their dogmatic influences,
but came to realise that re-unification would only evolve from a remote dream to a
practical reality through reconciliation and accommodation. It was through the mutable
juxtaposition of pragmatism and principle that the Irish State was able to engage, and
eventually make peace with, Ulster Unionism.
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